

# МАРК СОЛОНИН



**НЕТ  
БЛАГА  
НА  
ВОЙНЕ!**

**ЗАПРЕТНАЯ ПРАВДА  
О ВЕЛИКОЙ  
ОТЕЧЕСТВЕННОЙ**

## Abstract

"The darkness of low truths is dearer to me than the uplifting deception...". Many episodes of the Second World War were described (or, on the contrary, consigned to oblivion) precisely from these positions. The well-known historian Mark Solonin argues with such an attitude to the lessons of the tragic past. In his new book, it is precisely those events that we would most like to forget: the complicity of the USSR in unleashing a world war, the deaths of hundreds of thousands of residents of besieged Leningrad due to the criminally insufficient supply of food to the city, the "Baby rebellion" in Ivanovo in 1941, the atrocities of the Red Army on German soil, the crimes of the Ukrainian fascists... The author does not try to describe these horrors "listening to good and evil indifferently", but the journalistic passion in the presentation is combined with the invariable documentary accuracy of the facts. This book is for those who are not afraid to know and think, who are ready to share with their country not only the joy of victories.

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**Mark Solonin**

**Forbidden truth about the  
Great Patriotic War. There is no good in war**

## Three plans of Comrade Stalin

There is a fact. At dawn on June 22, 1941, Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union came as a terrible surprise to Comrade Stalin. Stalin did not believe in the possibility of such a development of events. Even on the evening of June 21, when ciphers flew from the command of the border districts to Moscow that the Germans were removing barbed wire on the border and the rumble of tank engines was hanging in the air, when at least three Wehrmacht soldiers crossed the border Bug in an attempt to warn the Motherland of the working people of the whole world, - even then, Comrade Stalin doubted the authenticity of these reports. And on the morning of June 22, it took Stalin several hours to finally take note of reality.

Soviet radio broadcast cheerful Sunday music and read reports from the fields at a time when radio stations around the world were broadcasting the statements of Hitler and Ribbentrop. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of fascist Italy until noon unsuccessfully tried to find the Soviet ambassador in order to hand him an official note declaring war - on Sunday, June 22, the Soviet diplomat deigned to relax on the beach. Chargé d'Affaires of the United Kingdom (British Ambassador S. Cripps had already been de facto escorted out of Moscow by that time) Bagdikian could not get a meeting with Molotov until 12 noon on June 22, and Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky arrogantly refused any discussion of issues of providing assistance to the Soviet Union from the UK, citing the lack of guidance.

The German attack amazed the inhabitants of the Kremlin offices, stunned them and plunged them into a state of shock. This is a fact.

There is one more fact, more precisely, a large group of facts. In May-June 1941, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union were in a state of covert strategic deployment. Moreover, all components of strategic deployment (mobilization of reservists, strategic regrouping and concentration of troops, operational deployment of groupings) were carried out in the mode

the strictest, unprecedented even by the super-tough Stalinist standards, secrecy.

The troops of the western districts advanced to the border by night crossings, and hid in the forests during the day; formations of the internal districts were transferred to the West in wagons boarded up with plywood shields, and even the commanders of the formations did not know the place of unloading (and even more so - the purpose of the regrouping and the combat mission). The call for reservists was made by personal agendas under the guise of "training camps." Until the very last hour, the government of the USSR did not present Germany with any claims related to the concentration of German troops near the border. Moreover, the official mouthpiece of the Soviet leadership, the TASS agency, on June 14 circulated a placating statement: "No war is foreseen between the USSR and Germany, the parties strictly observe the terms of the Non-Aggression Pact: rumors of an impending war "are clumsily concocted propaganda hostile to the USSR and Germany

strength."

In June 1941, the Soviet Union was preparing for large-scale military operations, but at the same time, in every possible way, it tried to hide the ongoing preparations. This is a fact. The task arose before historians: to combine these two facts

into one picture, to give them an internally consistent interpretation. Simply put, one single question had to be clarified: if Stalin did not expect a German invasion, then for what reason were thousands of military echelons marching to the border, and on the basis of the border districts were deployed front departments and already on June 19 - two days before the attack, which Stalin didn't wait, did the front-line departments, on orders from Moscow, begin advancing to field command posts? Twenty years ago Viktor Suvorov gave a detailed answer to this question. He suggested—and substantiated it with open Soviet publications at

his disposal—that Stalin was preparing for war. Always prepared, from the very first day of his power. Collectivization, industrialization, the Great Terror - all these are just different facets of the multifaceted work of Comrade Stalin to turn the Land of Soviets into a huge military camp and

the division of the builders of communism into two categories: "manpower" and "cannon fodder". In August 1939, Stalin made the final decision to support Hitler. Support him like a rope supports a hanged man. Stalin helped Hitler start a war against a coalition of Western powers (England, France and their allies) in order for the outbreak of a war of extermination to devastate Europe, through the ashes of which Stalin's armies had to march in triumph. In June 1941, preparations for this march were interrupted by an unexpected invasion by the Wehrmacht, blinded by Stalin's megalomania.

Subsequently, V. Suvorov's hypothesis demonstrated the main sign of a true scientific theory, namely: all new facts and documents fit into the framework of Suvorov's concept, like cartridges in a clip. Accurately and clearly, without destroying the structure, but only increasing its "lethal power". P. Bobylev, T. Bushueva, V. Danilov, V. Kiselev, M. Meltyukhov, V. Nevezhin, I. Pavlova, M. Solonin, Yu. Felyptinsky - this is not a complete list of Russian historians, whose works contain hundreds of documents and facts confirming the hypothesis of V. Suvorov and actually transferring it from the category of "hypothesis" to the rank of scientifically established truth (contrary to the now fashionable political correctness, I believe that the truth does exist and the task of historical science is precisely in the search for truth, and not just "writing texts"). On

the other hand, in the twenty years that have elapsed since the publication of the Icebreaker, no alternative concepts have been formulated. There is not a single book, there is not a single article. No one has ever tried to give another explanation, another interpretation of the two fundamental facts I mentioned above. But there is a huge stream of criticism of Suvorov, growing

every day. The information field is filled and overflowing with wild noise, uproar, screeching, mocking laughter. Huge areas of Karelian forests have been exhausted for the publication of libelous little books, in which, with ritual cries, the "presenting" that has already become a standard set is repeated. Suvorov's personality is dismantled bit by bit, and "as proven twice" that he is a very, very bad person. He is not our man. Radish. Claims are repeated ad infinitum about errors in the production indices of Kharkiv

locomotive building (that is, a tank) plant or incorrectly specified diameter of the left rear support roller.

According to D. Khmel'nitsky's profoundly correct remark, the producers of "anti-Suvorov" waste paper "it is even pointless to reproach them with dishonesty - the authors exclusively conscientiously perform a task that excludes a conscientious scientific approach. Neither in form nor in essence it can be classified as scientific historical literature. These are works that consolidate the ideological community." From complete hopelessness, other critics limit themselves to only the endless repetition of the mantra: "Suvorov is lying in every word." On the "initiates", that is, on the members of the sect of "militant anti-rezunists", these cries produce a magical effect, similar to the ritual of a shaman.

**"I don't need criticism, I need a**

**version."** This phrase, which was recorded on one of the countless Internet forums by an anonymous visitor, very clearly describes the historiographic situation that had developed by 2008. Version, alternative to the hypothesis / theory of V. Suvorov, as it was not, and is not. The deathly silence of the masters of Russian "historical science" is especially noteworthy. I hasten to clarify right away - by "silence" I mean the absence of a VERSION, the absence of a logical, coherent, fact-based interpretation of Stalin's actions in 1939-1941. There is a lot of noise, shouting and calls to "stop rewriting history". Other speeches by Russian academicians make the best domestic comedians burn with envy. For example, Comrade O. Rzheshevsky speaks on the pages of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper (and this, if anyone

has forgotten, is the official press organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), and says these words:

***"Rejected as untenable by the majority of Russian and Western historians, this version (V. Suvorov's version. - M.S.) nevertheless sprouted on domestic soil, primarily for the reason that the mass media actually do not give the opportunity to oppose it with the available reliable documents and facts.*** Here it is - they do not allow the Head of the

Department of the History of Wars and Geopolitics of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the President of the Association of Historians of the Second World War,



Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Rzheshhevsky to the editors and publishing houses. A venerable scientist cannot present to the public "the reliable documents and facts that he has." I, an "amateur historian from Samara", can show it, but the President and the professor are silenced. Terrible thing. Not otherwise than here "the Englishwoman is shitting" ...

And not only comrade Rzheshhevsky is bound hand and foot. In Moscow alone, there are 257 Doctors and 436 Candidates of Sciences in the capital branch of the Academy of Military Sciences. And this is only in Moscow. According to the statute, a doctoral dissertation must be "a fundamental research that forms a new direction in science." 257 scientific discoveries! Outstanding scientists are moving towards the knowledge of the truth in fat herds. And after all, in addition to doctors of military sciences, incomparably more numerous flocks of doctors of historical sciences graze on Russian fields abundantly irrigated with petrodollars. And now there are also sociological and political science doctors ...

The deafening silence of the official military-historical science is not just a "sign of agreement" with Suvorov's hypothesis. This is a white sheet of surrender hanging from the windowsill of the generals' dachas. Having at their disposal all the archives of Russia, having a crowd of full-time subordinates paid at the expense of the taxpayer, for 20 years they have not been able to present to the "city and the world" a single document confirming Stalin's peaceful aspirations.

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If the scientific discussion about the general direction of Stalin's military-political plans can be considered completed by now, then **the question of the planned dates for the start of the invasion of Europe still remains open.** And this is not surprising - the official Soviet / Russian "historical science" made every effort to conceal and distort information on this issue. Let's not forget that the identification of specific plans and deadlines is in principle impossible without access to that array of documents of the highest military-political

leadership of the USSR, which to this day are tightly closed to any independent researcher.

As will be shown below, these plans changed THREE TIMES, and the bizarre interweaving of fragments of information about Stalin's three very different plans poses an extremely difficult task for historians. The only thing that can be said today with all certainty is that within the framework of the existing source base, this problem will not be SOLVED. If anything is possible, it is only to formulate a series of HYPOTHESES that will be confirmed or refuted by the next generation of historians. For those who consider the discussion of unprovable hypotheses a waste of time, it makes no sense to continue reading this article. I ask everyone else to come to terms with the presence in this text of parasitic words that upset me and myself: "possibly", "most likely", "probably", "it is possible", "it can be assumed" ...

**Stalin's first, original plan was extremely simple and logical.** The texts now known, in particular, the so-called "Stalin's report of August 19, 1939" published by the French agency Havas on November 28, 1939; published by T. Bushuyeva a record of this "report", which she discovered in the Special Archive (repository of trophy documents);[1] a report published by M. Shauli of a group of Czechoslovak communists on the instructions they received in October 1939 in Moscow from the leadership of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR[2] , most likely quite adequately convey the intentions of Stalin in the autumn of 1939 - although the problem of the authenticity of the texts themselves still needs to be resolved. Plan No. 1 is an

attempt to realize an ancient Chinese parable about a wise monkey watching a fight between two tigers from a mountain. ***"As a result of his stupidity, Hitler gave us the opportunity to build bases against himself ... From the point of view of the economy, Hitler depends only on us, and we will direct his economy in such a way as to lead the warring countries to revolution. A long war will lead to revolution in Germany and France ... The war will weaken Europe, which will become our easy prey. The peoples will accept any regime that comes after the war..."***. If we replace the ritual word "revolution" in a conversation between "comrade communists" with the words "devastation,

chaos and anarchy”, then Stalin’s simple plan, like everything ingenious, will appear before us in all its glory. In the

autumn of 1939, there was no question of setting specific dates for the invasion of Europe: the war had just flared up, and the opposing sides were still very far from complete ruin and exhaustion. At this stage, it was Germany that seemed to Stalin to be the weak side of the conflict, to which he provided various political, psychological, and economic assistance so that the war would not stop at its very beginning due to the defeat of Germany. In this regard, one noteworthy point should be noted. In the above-mentioned report of the Czechoslovak communists, A.M. Alexandrov (Head of the Central European Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) that **"we cannot afford Germany to lose."** This phrase has a long and quite reliable history.

It was said by Stalin himself in the late evening of August 23, 1939, during a conversation with Ribbentrop. On October 18, 1939, Ribbentrop decided to use this phrase in his public speech and, as a loyal partner of Stalin, sent the text to Moscow in advance for approval. In Ribbentrop’s version, Stalin’s words sounded like this: **“The Soviet Union is interested in Germany, which is its neighbor, being strong, and in the event of a test of strength between Germany and Western democracies, the interests of the USSR and Germany will, of course, coincide. The Soviet Union will never want to see Germany caught in a difficult situation”** <sup>[3]</sup>.

Comrade Stalin with understanding reacted to Ribbentrop's desire to publicly intimidate the hated Anglo-French plutocrats and only asked for a slight softening of the wording. In the agreed version, Stalin's words sounded like this: **“The Soviet Union is interested in the existence of a strong Germany. The Soviet Union therefore cannot approve of the actions of the Western powers, which create conditions for the weakening of Germany and** <sup>[4]</sup>.

**her in a difficult position”** was published in correspondence was **putting** 60 years ago by the US State Department in the famous collection of captured documents of the German Foreign Ministry “Nazi-Soviet Relations”, and historians have no doubts about its

authenticity. The deed (i.e., the anti-Western orientation of Stalin's policy) was not limited to words alone. The Red Army invaded

Poland and occupied a little more than half of its territory - an action that formally put the USSR on the brink of war with Great Britain, which gave Poland the notorious "guarantees" of the inviolability of its territory. Then there was an attack on Finland, a traditional ally of the Western democracies, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations, and the not formally legal, but quite real prospect of the Soviet Union entering the European war as an opponent of the Anglo-French bloc. An amazing document (surprising not for its content, but for the fact that it was not destroyed in

time) was preserved in the bowels of the Russian State Military Archive. On March 5, 1940, Deputy Head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, Major of State Security Osetrov, wrote a memorandum to People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov: ***"On January 31, Commander of the Siberian Military District, Commander of the 2nd Rank***

***Kalinin made a report on the international situation in the District House of the Red Army ... Kalinin announced the inevitability of a big war in the spring of 1940, in which, on the one hand, the USSR would stand in a bloc with Germany, Japan and Italy against the Anglo-French bloc ... Military operations with England, France and their allies would be protracted***

[5] *character...*" – .

In the last lines of the memorandum, the deputy chief "special officer" of the NKVD of the USSR draws extremely strange conclusions: ***"Many commanders consider the speech of comrade. Kalinin is confused and the coverage of the international situation in this form is politically harmful.*** How would you like to understand such vagueness and caution in the assessment? Since when did the "specialists" hide behind the "opinion of many commanders"? And this after the NKVD successfully jailed and shot many thousands of Red Army commanders? It can be assumed

that on March 5, 1940 Comrade. Osetrov himself still didn't really know how it was now necessary to "cover the international situation", with whom and against whom the Soviet Union would fight, but just in case he decided to inform Voroshilov in order to relieve himself of any responsibility. Judging by the consequences - June 4

1940 S. A. Kalinin received the rank of lieutenant general and continued to safely command his district - a report with open statements about the "inevitability of war against the Anglo-French bloc", and even in alliance with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, was not at all regarded as a vicious slander of the invariably peaceful foreign policy of the USSR. The war against England and its allies was not just talked

about in the "district House of the Red Army". They were hard at work preparing for it. A number of aviation historians (V. Belokon, A. Stepanov) drew attention to the obvious "anti-English" direction of the development of the Soviet Air Force at the turn of the 30s and 40s. Already having a DB-Zf bomber in mass production and in service with combat units, capable of flying 3300 km with a bomb load of 1 ton (the most distant German Non-111 at that time had a combat range of no more than 2700 km), Stalin in January 1939 sets the designers the task of creating a bomber with a range of 5000 km. In accordance with these requirements, the twin-engine bomber DB-240 (Er-2) was developed and put into mass production at the largest Voronezh aircraft plant No. 18. Where, to what distance were the "Stalin's falcons" to fly on bombers with a huge range? From Minsk to Berlin - 1000 km, from Minsk to Hamburg - 1200 km, from Kyiv to Munich - 1400 km, from Vladivostok to Tokyo - 1200 km. The range of the serial DB-Zf was quite enough for the bombing of these targets. But to strike at the British Isles, a bomber with a much greater range was really required (from Minsk to London 1900 km, to Manchester - 2000 km). The most fantastic project was the "PB-4 product": a long-range, heavy, 4-engine and, for all that, dive (!!!) bomber. Such an incredible (never realized in metal) combination of parameters was determined

by the task: the aircraft was intended to fight large surface ships, which it had to hit with a super-heavy bomb, dispersed in a dive to a speed that allowed it to penetrate the battleship's armored deck. PB-4 was developed in the "sharashka" - the prison design bureau of the NKVD, in which Beria carefully collected the entire color of Soviet engineering thought: Bartini, Glushko, Yeger, Korolev,

Myasishchev, Petlyakov, Stechkin, Tupolev, Charomsky ... According to Yeger, when developing the PB-4, the English battleship Nelson and the Royal Navy base in Scapa Flow were considered as a typical object for bombing. And although the creation of an aircraft with such parameters exceeded the capabilities of aviation technology of that era, work on the PB-4 project continued until the end of 1939.

In a conversation about how "a powerful defense industry was created under the leadership of the Communist Party on the eve of the war," they will definitely remember and name the T-34 and KV tanks, rocket launchers ("Katyusha"), and the Il-2 attack aircraft. At the same time, it is customary to forget about the grandiose program for the construction of the navy. In the list of military equipment, equipment and weapons purchased in 1939-1940. in Germany (in exchange for fodder grain, cake and flax tow), almost half are numerous samples of naval (including special corrosion-resistant guns for submarines) and coastal artillery, mine and torpedo weapons, sonar instruments, carrier-based reconnaissance aircraft and catapults for launching them, propeller and turbine shafts, marine diesels, ship armor steel, and finally, the latest cruiser "Luttsov", then completed in Leningrad. Of the 25 billion rubles allocated in 1940 according to the plan for orders for weapons and military

equipment, almost a quarter (5.8 billion) was allocated to the People's Commissariat of the Navy 57, Italy - 68, Japan - 63. The huge continental country of the USSR was armed (though not by September 39, but by June 41) 267 submarines. Two hundred sixty seven. The question is - which country's naval blockade was supposed to be carried out by this huge submarine fleet?

In the "Note of the Commander of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet on the plan of operations of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet" (not earlier than March 27, 1940) we read:

***"Probable adversary: England, France, Romania, Türkiye.***

***The tasks of the Air Force are: to strike at ships in the waters of the Sea of Marmara, the Bosphorus, laying minefields in the Bosphorus ... " [7]***

Report of the Commander of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet to the Main Naval Staff on the plan for the development of aviation of the Black Sea Fleet for 1940-1941.

assumed the following development of events: "...

***The tasks of aviation in the theaters of military operations: the Black Sea. Delivering***

***powerful bombing attacks on***

***bases: Constanta, Izmail, Varna ... Aegean Sea: Thessaloniki, Smyrna ... Mediterranean Sea: Alexandria, Haifa, Suez Canal, about. Malta, Brindisi... Systematic strikes on the Suez Canal to deprive England and the Mediterranean states of the*** — .

***possibility [8] of the normal operation of this communication... " 1 (passes Barochil, Chitral) and No. 4 (passes Killio, Gilchit, Srinagor) " [9]*** On 34 pages, a "List of military-industrial facilities" of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and India was compiled[ 10] .

Almost all of these countries are colonies or allies of Great Britain. On May 11,

1940, Divisional Commissar Shabalin submits a memorandum to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Mekhlis, in which he writes with great concern about "the need to carefully ***review the organization of units and formations of the Red Army from the point of view of their readiness to wage war in the [11] Middle East theater***" All this "Manilovism"— .

sweet dreams about the "passes of Killio, Gilchit, Srinagor" on the way to the Indian Ocean and the liberation campaign against Jerusalem, crumbled to smithereens in May 1940. France and its allies were defeated within one month. The English Expeditionary Corps barely got away, leaving mountains of heavy weapons on the coastal sand of Dunkirk. The newborn Wehrmacht with dizzying speed turned into the most powerful army in the world. Much of continental Western Europe came under Hitler's control. This stunning reality forced Stalin to urgently change the strategic plan for the war. More recently (April 17, 1940), less than a month before the start of the

German offensive in the West, speaking at the Conference



the highest command of the Red Army, Stalin expressed his concern about the passivity of the sluggishly fighting imperialists: ***“They are fighting there, but the war is somehow weak, either they are fighting, or they are playing cards. Suddenly they will take and reconcile, which is not excluded.*** Two months later, German troops marched under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, and the very wise monkey faced the prospect of being alone with an angry tiger that had tasted blood. But it passed. In the summer of 1940, Hitler for the first (but not the last) time helped Stalin to get out of an extremely difficult situation. Instead of stopping in time and, in the cynical language of stock

speculators, "fixing profits", Hitler decided to finish off recalcitrant England. And then the scythe found a stone. On June 22 (yes, history sometimes makes strange jokes...) 1940, the Soviet ambassador I. Maisky reported from London to Moscow: ***“Now it can be said with complete certainty that the decision of the British government, despite the***

***surrender of France, to continue the war finds the universal support of the population ... Churchill's speeches played a big role in this. There is no panic. On the contrary, a wave of stubborn, cold British fury and determination to resist to the end is growing ... ”.***

In August 1940, a large-scale air attack on the British Isles began. However, despite the significant numerical superiority of the Luftwaffe, the blitzkrieg in the sky over London did not take place. It was not possible to strangle England with the noose of a naval blockade, although the German submariners achieved tremendous success, sending 300,000 tons of destroyed ships to the bottom of the sea every month. The war, which in June 1940 seemed already over, flared up with renewed vigor, spreading over a vast territory from the coast of Northern Norway to the deserts of North Africa. Comrade Stalin was able to breathe a sigh of relief and proceed to the development of "Plan No. 2". **Plan number 2 is a plan for war with Germany.** Not with

Germany, but against Germany.

Unlike "Plan No. 1", the content of which can only be guessed from individual bits of information, "Plan No. 2" is known



enough detail today. In the first half of the 90s, the following documents were declassified and published in a number of collections (in particular, in the well-known two-volume "Russia - XX century. Documents. 1941". M., International Fund "Democracy", 1998) the following documents: - Memorandum of the People's

Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov "On the fundamentals of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR [12] in the West and in the East", w / n, no later than August 16, 1940

- A document with a similar title, but with a number (No. 103 202) and the exact date of signing (September 18, 1940 ) [13] Stalin and V.M. Molotov

No. 103 313 (the document begins with the words: ***"I report for your approval the main conclusions from your instructions given on October 5, 1940 when considering plans for the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces for 1941", in connection with which it is usually*** called the "refined October plan strategic deployment") [14] - Memorandum of the Chief of Staff of the Kiev OVO by decision of the Military Council of the South-Western Front according to the plan [15] of deployment for 1940, w / n, no later than December 1940 - Memorandum of the People's Commissar—

of Defense of the USSR and the chief General Staff of the Red Army in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov "An updated plan for strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the West<sup>the</sup> .

and in the East", w / n, dated March 11, 1940 - Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the commander of the Western OVO to develop a plan for the operational deployment of the district troops, w / n , [17] April 1941 - [16].

Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and [18] its allies, w / n, not earlier than May 15, 1941 Documents describing the operational plans of the Soviet command — .

should include and materials of the January (1941) operational-strategic games held by the highest command staff of the Red Army[19]

— .

— . We are led to this conclusion not only by a simple

worldly logic, but also an article by Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky (as Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, he participated in the development of all the above operational plans), which directly indicates that ***“in January 1941, when the proximity of the war was already quite clearly felt, the main points of the operational plan were tested on the strategic military game with the participation of the highest command [20] of the armed forces”*** Strictly speaking, there is plenty of information for reflection. Historians have at their — .

disposal five variants of the general plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army and materials on the operational plans of the two most important fronts: the Southwestern and the Western. In this article, only a few

key points.

First, the operational plan of the Great War existed. It is strange that this should be emphasized, but some propagandists, in their "zeal beyond reason", even went so far as to assert that the "naive and gullible" Stalin replaced the development of military operational plans by lovingly looking at Ribbentrop's signature on the notorious "Non-Aggression Pact". Of course, there was a plan for a war with Germany, and many months of work on it went on without any regard to the Pact. In the plans for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR mentioned above (i.e., starting from August 1940), England is no longer mentioned as a possible adversary of the USSR (!); Germany is invariably considered the main adversary, which supposedly could be supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland. Secondly, all strategic deployment plans published so far are actually the same document, only slightly changing from one version to

another. There is not only a semantic, but also a clear textual similarity of all planes. Without exception, all documents are a description of the plan for the preparation and conduct **of a grandiose offensive operation carried out outside the state borders of the USSR**. A strategic defensive operation on one's own territory was not even considered as one of the possible scenarios for the development of events in a future war! All

The toponymy of the theater of alleged military operations is the names of Polish cities and rivers (***“to strike and decisively defeat Lublin - Radom - Sandomierz - the Krakow enemy grouping, force the Vistula River, capture Krakow and Warsaw and go to the front Warsaw, Lodz, Kreutzburg, Oppeln ... ”***). Thirdly, only the August (1940) document makes the choice of the direction of deployment of the main forces of the Red Army dependent on the probable plans of the enemy (***“assuming that the main attack of the Germans will be directed north of the mouth of the San River, it is necessary that the main forces of the Red Army deployed to the north of Polissya”***). With a big stretch, this logic can also be called "planning a counterstrike." Nevertheless, the subsequent options establish the geography of strategic deployment solely from considerations of military-operational and political "conveniences" for the advancing Red Army. The assessment of the probable plans of the German command (deployment by the Germans of the most powerful grouping to the north or south of the swamps of Polesye) changes several times, but this does not in any way affect the choice of the direction of the main attack of the Red Army.

More specifically: starting from October 1940, all variants of the operational plan provide for the deployment of the main forces of the Red Army south of the river. Pripyat, in the area of the so-called "Lviv ledge". The choice of just such a deployment scheme (and, accordingly, the rejection of the "northern option") is justified by the compilers of the documents with purely offensive considerations: ***“The deployment of the main forces of the Red Army in the West with the grouping of the main forces against East Prussia and in the Warsaw direction raises serious concerns that the struggle on this front can lead to protracted battles, tie up our main forces, will not give the desired and quick effect, will hasten the entry of the Balkan countries into the war against***

***us ... The most advantageous is the deployment of our main forces south of the river. Pripyat in order to defeat the main forces of the Germans with powerful blows to Lublin, Radom and in the Krakow direction and, in the very first stage of the war, cut off Germany from the Balkan countries, deprive her of important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of th***

The attack on Lublin - Radom - Krakow was invariably called only "the first strategic task." The March (1941) plan already explicitly sets out the directions of subsequent strikes: ***"Depending on the situation, the further strategic goal for the***

***main forces of the Red Army can be set: to develop an operation through Poznan to Berlin, or to act southwest on Prague and Vienna, or an attack in the north on Torun and Danzig in order to bypass East Prussia" [22]***

— .

If the very concept of the operation is clear and the discussion is possible only in terms of clarifying individual details, then even the approximate date for the start of the "liberation campaign" cannot be established on the basis of declassified documents. The Russian state continues to successfully play hide-and-seek with independent historians. I remember that in the years of my childhood there was such a radio program: "Guessing game, guessing game is an interesting game ...".

The hypothesis expressed by V. Suvorov and I. Bunich that Stalin intended to start the invasion of Europe at the moment when German troops landed on the British Isles does not find confirmation in known documents. There are no words, the hypothesis is beautiful and logical, but, alas, only the "beauty of the idea" for the historian few.

In the course of the January (1941) operational strategic games mentioned above, conducted by the highest command staff of the Red Army, an offensive was played from Lvov to Krakow and further through Slovakia to Budapest, which, according to the scenario of the game, takes place in August 1941. This - an indication of a specific year - looks like rather strange; the indication of the month (August) is necessary so that the commanders can correctly take into account the natural and climatic conditions, the length of daylight hours, etc., but why did it take a year? The biggest questions

are raised by the Memorandum dated March 11, 1941, where on the reverse side of the 27th page, in a thin pencil, neat "beaded" handwriting (presumably by the hand of the Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff Vatutin) the phrase is inscribed: "Offensive start 12.6" [ 23 ] . This phrase has nothing to do with the context (it appears after the description of the task set by

in front of the "left wing of the main grouping of the Southwestern Front") and generally seems out of place in the document, where all chronological marks are expressed in conventional values, "tied" to the first day of the operation ("on the 3rd day of the operation, seize Sedlec with moving parts and on **5 - day crossings on the Vistula River ... by the forces of mobile groups on the 8th day**

**of the operation to capture Krakow ... ").** A careful analysis of the document gives some reason to assume that the phrase "**offensive to begin on June 12**" could in no way be connected with June 12, 1941. Most likely, it was about the summer of 1942. The logic here is very simple - most of the mechanized (tank) formations mentioned in the March (1941) strategic deployment plan simply did not exist in reality. So, according to the plan, three mechanized corps were included in the 4th Army of the Western Front (it was she who was to "**on the 3rd day of the operation take possession of Sedlec with mobile units and on the 5th day of crossings on the Vistula River ...**"). Their numbers are also inscribed with the same thin pencil: 13th, 14th and 17th. At that time, a decisive offensive by the forces of these formations was out of the question. According to the plans approved in February 1941, the 14th mechanized corps completed its formation only at the beginning of 1942. As for the 13 MK and 17 MK, they were at the very early stage of formation, and even by the end of 1941 their planned staffing with tanks should

have been about 25-30%. In general, the program launched in February 1941 to form a gigantic armored force consisting of thirty mechanized corps of a thousand tanks each, rearmament of this monstrous armored horde with "new types of tanks", i.e. KV and T-34, could not be completed before the end 1942 (if not later). No reasonable person - and Stalin was no doubt a sober-minded and extremely cautious person - would have embarked on such a grandiose "major overhaul" in the months before the Great War. It may very well be that there is a fair amount of truth in the endless incantations of Soviet historical propaganda ("Stalin hoped to delay the German attack until the summer of 1942"). Truth, truth, bizarrely distorted. Stalin did not create the largest army in the world in order to guess with bated breath: "he will attack - he will not attack ..." Stalin led his own, active and

offensive policy; he did not wait for Hitler's attack at all, but chose the optimal moment for delivering a crushing first blow. In March 1941, this moment was most likely attributed by him to the beginning of the summer ("June 12") of 1942 or even 1943. **"There are**

**two wills in the field,"** says an old Russian proverb. The dramatic development of the events of the world war did not allow Stalin to prepare for the invasion of Europe thoroughly, "with feeling, with sense, with the arrangement." At some point in the spring of 1941, Stalin realized that it would not be possible to "put off" until the next summer and that it would be possible to strike first only if the Red Army launched an offensive **no later than September 1941**. Thus, "Plan No. 2" died before it could be realized, and the top military-political leadership of the Soviet Union had to hastily develop **"Plan No. 3"**. When did this sharp turn

in Stalin's plans take place? Oddly enough, but we can determine this point in time with an accuracy of one or two months (which, in the absence of direct documentary evidence, can be considered high accuracy). Not earlier than April 6 - and not later than May 24, 1941.

April 6, 1941 is one of the most mysterious days in the history of World War II. Recall the main outline of events. On the night of March 26-27, a military coup took place in Belgrade, inspired by either the British or Soviet intelligence services. The new government of General Simovich announced its intention to give a firm rebuff to German claims and turned to the Soviet Union for help.

On April 3 (i.e., only a week after the coup), the Yugoslav delegation was already negotiating in Moscow on the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Stalin himself. Despite the fact that Germany, through Ambassador Schulenburg, brought to the attention of Molotov its opinion that **"the moment for concluding an agreement with Yugoslavia was chosen unsuccessfully and causes an undesirable impression"**, at 2.30 am on April 6, 1941, the Soviet-Yugoslav agreement

was signed. A few hours after its signing, Luftwaffe aircraft subjected Belgrade to a fierce bombardment, and German troops invaded the territory of Yugoslavia. Soviet

The Union did nothing to help its new friend. On April 6, at about 4 pm Moscow time, Molotov received Schulenburg and, after listening to the official announcement of the Wehrmacht's invasion of Yugoslavia, limited himself to a melancholic remark: "It is extremely sad that, despite ***all efforts, the expansion of the war thus turned out to be inevitable ...***» [24]

What was it? Why was Stalin defiantly "teasing" Hitler, having no desire (and no practical possibility) to provide Yugoslavia with effective military assistance? It is known for certain that in Berlin this strange diplomatic demarche was received with extreme irritation. Later (June 22, 1941), it was the events of April 5–6 that were used in the German memorandum declaring war on the Soviet Union as the main evidence of the hostile policy that the Soviet Union pursued against Germany ("With the conclusion of the Soviet Yugoslav friendship treaty, which strengthened the rear of the ***Belgrade conspirators, the USSR joined the common Anglo-Yugoslav-Greek front directed against Germany***"). April 6 is the last day about which it can be said with certainty that on this day Soviet-German relations were

very tense and unfriendly. Further, the external (let us emphasize this word with three bold lines) outline of events changes dramatically. Moreover, it is changing in a purely unilateral manner - Moscow begins defiantly and obsessively ***"to be friends"*** with Berlin. On April 13, 1941, a major event of world significance took place: the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan was signed in Moscow, an agreement that freed Stalin's hands for action in the West. On the same day, there was a small episode at the Moscow railway station, which, however, attracted the close attention of politicians and diplomats from all over the world. In the report, which the German Ambassador on the same day marked "Urgent! Secret! sent to Berlin, this strange episode was described as follows:

***"... Obviously unexpectedly for both the Japanese and the Russians, Stalin and Molotov suddenly appeared and, in an emphatically friendly manner, greeted Matsuoka and the Japanese who were present there and wished them a pleasant journey. Then Stalin loudly asked about me and, finding me, came up, put his arm around my***



***must remain friends, and you must now do everything for this! Then Stalin turned to the acting German military attaché, Colonel Krebs, and, having previously made sure that he was a German, told him: "We will remain friends with you in any case." Stalin, no doubt, greeted Colonel Krebs and me in this way deliberately and thereby consciously attracted the general attention of the large public [25] present there.***

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Warm hugs at the door of the car were soon supplemented by other equally demonstrative actions. Embassies and diplomatic missions of countries defeated and occupied by the Wehrmacht were closed in Moscow. The embassy of the same Yugoslavia was no exception, on the friendship agreement with which, as they say, "the ink has not yet dried." On the other hand, relations with Great Britain reached such a freezing point that on June 6, 1941, British Ambassador S. Cripps was recalled from Moscow to London "for consultations." In May 1941, the Soviet Union with lightning speed recognized the pro-German government of Iraq, which came to power through a military coup. All issues of economic cooperation were resolved in the most benevolent spirit towards Germany. The memorandum of the German Foreign Ministry dated May 15, 1941 noted: ***"Negotiations with the First Deputy People's Commissar for***

***Foreign Trade of the USSR were held in a very constructive spirit ... I get the impression that we could present economic demands to Moscow, even going beyond the treaty of 10 January 1941 ... At this time, the volume of raw materials stipulated by the contract is delivered by the Russians punctually, despite the fact that it costs them great effort; contracts, [26] especially in relation to grain, are carried out remarkably ... "***

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The elderly Count Schulenburg was completely fascinated by the embraces of the hospitable Moscow hosts (by the way, in 1944 the former German ambassador to the USSR was executed for participating in a conspiracy against Hitler, so his "naive gullibility" might not be as naive as it seems) . On May 24, 1941, in another report to Berlin, he writes:



**"... The fact that this foreign policy is primarily aimed at preventing a clash with Germany is proved by the position taken by the Soviet government in recent weeks (emphasis mine. - M.S.), the tone of the Soviet press, which considers all events relating to Germany, in unobjectionable form, and compliance with economic agreements ..."** [27]

On May 5, 1941, Stalin appointed himself Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, i.e. head of the government of the USSR. This event then surprised everyone - except, of course, the citizens of the Land of Soviets, who warmly and unanimously approved another wise decision. Everyone else was lost in conjecture. Later, in the autumn of 1941, S. Cripps wrote in his report addressed to the Minister

of Foreign Affairs E. Eden: **"... things began to happen in the USSR that obviously had some special goals. Shortly after the May Day parade, a decree was published appointing Stalin to the post of prime minister, which was undoubtedly an act of enormous political significance. Everyone claimed that behind this step of his lies some important purpose, but no one knew for certain what that meant..."** [28].

This mystery is great. It is hardly necessary to explain that even before May 5, 1941, Comrade Stalin, being just one of the many deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, had absolute power. And until May 5, 1941, Comrade Molotov, being the nominal Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, coordinated any step, any decision of the government with the will of Stalin. For many years, Stalin ruled the country, not feeling the need to formalize his actual status as the sole dictator. What changed at the beginning of May 1941?

On May 10, 1941, the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved the "List of issues to be considered at the meeting" (whom with whom is not indicated). Item 14 of the agenda reads as follows: **"On additional cost estimates for the period of mobilization and the first month of the war"** [29] On May 12, 1941, a "List of questions in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)" was prepared. Item 7: **"On the work of the Civil Air Fleet (Civil [30] Air Fleet)-in-wartime"**

The following document deserves special attention. On June 4, 1941, the People's Commissar of the Navy N. Kuznetsov sends a memorandum No. 1146 to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (i.e., Stalin's deputy) N. Voznesensky. Classification of the document:

"Top secret, very important." And this is indeed a document of particular importance for the historian - for the first time, absolutely specific dates appear next to the phrase "wartime" in it: ***"At the same time, I present a statement of the needs of the People's Commissariat of the Navy for mine and torpedo weapons for wartime from 1.07.41 to 01.01.43. I ask for your instructions on increasing the allocated quantities of mine and torpedo weapons, given that the need for them in the 2nd half of 1941 is 50% of the total requirement for the period up to 1.01.43.*** As you can see, the People's [\[31\]](#).

Commissar of the Navy plans to fight as early as next month. The operational plan for this great naval war has already been drawn up - otherwise N.G. Kuznetsov could not predict the specific distribution of the consumption of mine and torpedo weapons for each half of the year.

In May (not earlier than May 15, the exact date is unknown) another version of the "Considerations on the Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union" was drawn up. The May "Considerations" - completely repeating all the previous versions in terms of goals, tasks, directions of the main attacks, terms and boundaries - also contain some new moment. Namely: ***"Germany has the ability to warn us in the deployment and deliver a surprise strike."*** In all other known variants of the strategic deployment plan, there is no such phrase in meaning. Further, the developers of the plan insistently suggest ***"in no case give the initiative to act to the German Command, preempt the enemy and attack the German army at a time when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the military branches."***

It is extremely important to emphasize that this is not

at all about the "greater aggressiveness" of the May "Considerations" - all previous options also did not offer anything other than a large-scale offensive operation outside the state borders of the USSR. As for the intention to get ahead of the enemy and "under no circumstances give him the initiative of action", it is just an elementary requirement of common sense. First strike advantage is too serious a thing to bestow on an opponent. The essential novelty is

in the fact that in May of the 41st the Soviet command was no longer so sure that he would be able to do this, and therefore asked Stalin to immediately take all the necessary measures, "without which it is impossible to deliver a surprise attack on the enemy both from the air and **on earth.**"

On May 24, 1941, many hours of meeting, the participants of which, in addition to Stalin himself, were:

- Deputy Prime Minister and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov, - People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko, - Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, - Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff Vatutin, - Chief of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force Zhigarev, - commanders of the troops of the five western border districts, members of the Military Councils and commanders of the Air Forces of these districts.

There were no other equally representative meetings of the top military-political leadership of the USSR either a few months before May 24, or after this date until the start of the war. No less remarkable is the list of those who

was not at the Meeting on May 24, 1941. Not invited:

- Chairman of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Marshal Voroshilov, - Deputy People's Commissars of Defense: Marshals Budyonny, Kulik, Shaposhnikov, General of the Army Meretskov, - Head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army Zaporozhets, - People's Commissar of the Navy N. Kuznetsov, - People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beria, - **Secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov and Malenkov, who**

**oversaw military issues along the party line and were members of the Main Military Council.** Here, in fact, is the whole "array of information". Nothing more is known to this day. Neither Soviet nor Russian official historiography uttered a word about the subject of discussion and the decisions taken on May 24. Nothing was reported in their memoirs by the few participants in the Conference who survived to see Stalin's death. Declassified already at the beginning of the 21st

meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for May 1941 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 34–35) also do not contain even the slightest mention of this Meeting. And only Marshal Vasilevsky, in his article, which has lain in archival silence for almost 27 years, recalls: “ ***A few weeks before the attack on us by fascist Germany, unfortunately I can't name the exact date, all the documentation on the district operational plans was transferred by the General Staff to the command and the headquarters of the respective military districts***”

What conclusions can we draw from the scraps of information we have? On May 24, 1941, a meeting of the top military-political leadership of the country was held. The composition of the participants in the Meeting is rather strange: there are no marshals who occupy high and loud positions by name, but there are lieutenant generals from the districts. If the usual “duty event” took place in Stalin’s office, something like a discussion of the results of combat training of troops and plans for exercises for the summer period, then the composition of the participants would most likely be different. It remains to be assumed that Vasilevsky's memory did not fail him, and it was during the Meeting on May 24, 1941 that the contents of the top-secret operational plans were brought to the attention of the executors, i.e., the command of the border military districts (future fronts).

If this is so, then the selection of participants in the Meeting (only those who developed the latest version of the operational plan of the war and who were to carry out this plan) and the strictest, impenetrable veil of secrecy that surrounded (and still surrounds) everything becomes completely understandable. which is connected with the secrecy of the May 24 Conference. If our

assumption is correct and at the Meeting on May 24, 1941, the war plan against Germany approved by Stalin was brought to the attention of future front commanders, then the “range of possible dates” for the start of the operation narrows to almost two months: from mid-July to the end of August 1941. Briefly Let us explain this

rather obvious conclusion. If in May of the 41st the invasion of Europe was planned to begin in 1942 (and even more so in 1943), then on May 24, 1941, top-secret operational plans would not have been transferred to the command of the military districts. Too early. Dangerous - the possibility of leakage increases dramatically

information. Yes, and it makes no sense - until the summer of 1942, the military-political situation could change many times over. Both the very fact of holding the Conference on May 24, and the policy of ostentatious "peacefulness" in relations with Germany that has clearly emerged since mid-April, and Stalin's official acceptance of the post of head of the USSR government, and, most importantly, the covert mobilization and large-scale redeployment of troops that began in late May, suggest that **Stalin's plan No. 3 was supposed to start an invasion of Europe in the summer of**

**1941.** It is not possible to indicate the exact specific date for the start of the strategic concentration of the Red Army troops. A beautiful metaphor proposed by V. Suvorov ("a lion in the savanna at first creeps up to its victim for a long time and silently and only at the last moment, with a deafening growl, rushes at it in an open jump") describes the situation in May-June 1941 in the best possible way. The strategic deployment of the Red Army took place in an atmosphere of unprecedented secrecy, in violation of many "generally accepted" rules. ***"The total volume of transportation of military formations was 939 railway echelons. The protracted advance of troops and the late periods of concentration were determined by camouflage measures and the preservation of the peacetime railway operation regime,"*** write the authors of the collective work "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" (compiled by a large group of military historians of the USSR in 1992).

The phrase about the "protracted advance of troops", and even with the "preservation of the mode of operation of the railways in peacetime", deserves special attention. For the multi-million armies of the first half of the 20th century, railways, trains and steam locomotives became the most important "arms of the army", largely predetermining the outcome of the main battles of the two world wars. Accordingly, all countries had plans developed back in peacetime for the transfer of railway traffic to the "maximum military traffic" regime. Thus, at the stage of the strategic deployment of the Wehrmacht for the invasion of the USSR, the railways switched to the schedule of maximum military transportation from May 23. The regime of military transportation in the European part of the USSR was introduced (September 12, 1939) even at the stage of the strategic deployment of the Red Army before the war with

half-ruined by the invasion of the Wehrmacht Poland[32] . However, in June 1941, nothing of the kind was

done! According to the calculations contained in the pre-war plans of the Soviet command, it took from 8 days (for the Northern Front, i.e. Leningrad Military District) to 30 days (for the South-Western Front, i.e. Kiev OVO). In fact, in the conditions of maintaining the mode of operation of the railways in peacetime, the regrouping of troops was not forced, but delayed. It was dragged on for a completely understandable goal, frankly named in 1992 by a group of Soviet historians - to ensure the maximum possible "camouflage measures." To put it even more simply - do not scare the "game" ahead of time. The formations of the 16th Army and the 5th

Mechanized Corps located in Transbaikalia and Mongolia were the first to begin advancing. On May 22, 1941, the loading of the first units into echelons began, which, taking into account the vast distance and the continuing schedule of the peacetime railways, were supposed to arrive in Ukraine, in the Berdichev - Proskurov - Shepetovka region, from June 17 to July 10. From May 13 to May 22, orders were received from the General Staff to begin advancing two more armies of the High Command reserve to the western border. The 22nd Army was advancing to the Velikiye Luki-Vitebsk region with a concentration deadline of July 1–3, the 21st Army was concentrating in the Chernigov-Gomel-Konotop region by July 2. On May 29, a decision was made to form the 19th Army and deploy it in the Cherkasy-Bila Tserkva region by July 7. Not earlier than June 13, a decision was made to form, on the basis of the formations of the Orlovsky and Moscow Military Districts, another, the 20th Army, which was supposed to

concentrate at Smolensk by July 3–5. ***"The transfer of troops was planned with the expectation of completing the concentration in the areas outlined by the operational plans from June 1 to July 10, 1941."*** For this phrase alone, the authors

of the collective monograph "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" should have been awarded the medal "For Courage". In fact, this

phrase means that when developing "operational plans", in particular when dra

The logic and chronology here is very simple. Troops that have completed their concentration by July 10 will complete operational deployment and prepare for battle no earlier than July 15-20. In order to conduct a strategic DEFENSIVE operation, this will be hopelessly late (which was mercilessly confirmed on the battlefields of the summer of 1941). It would be naive to expect that Hitler - if he decides to attack the USSR in 1941 - will delay the beginning of the invasion until the second half of July. As is known today, according to the original plan of the German command, the invasion was to begin on May 15, after the final drying of the dirt roads of the European part of the USSR from the spring thaw. The Balkan campaign "mixed the cards" of Hitler and led to a delay in the attack on the USSR for as much as five weeks (it is no secret that, according to many military experts - and not only from among the "beaten Hitler generals" - this delay had a fatal effect on the results of the campaign). To start an offensive in the second half of July would be complete madness - even in the absence of any resistance from the Red Army, the German infantry (and this is four-fifths of the invasion army) had to trudge to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line established in the "Barbarossa plan".

"Completion of concentration in the areas outlined by operational plans" in the first ten days of July means readiness for the start of a strategic OFFENSIVE operation starting from **July 15-20. This is the "lower limit" of the start date for the invasion** of Europe according to Stalin's "Plan No. 3". The upper border is also not difficult to determine, based on an assessment of the natural and climatic

conditions of the Eastern European Theater. The main blow, as noted above, was to be delivered in the direction of Lvov - Krakow, with the further development of the offensive on Poznan - Berlin or Prague - Vienna. The planned duration of the solution of the "first strategic task" was 25-30 days. But not everything in the war goes according to plan, and besides, the successful solution of the "first task" was to be followed by the next, even deeper blow. But even in southern Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, autumn comes in October-November, and then winter - damp, slushy, with rain, fog and sleet. For the actions of aviation and motorized troops, this is mu

of a "normal" Russian winter with severe frosts that turn all road directions into a "paved road" and fetter lakes and rivers with an ice "bridge". Thus, **the end of August - the beginning of September can be considered the deadline** after which it would be too risky to launch a large-scale offensive in southern Poland and the Balkans. It is worth comparing the chronology of the strategic deployment of the Red Army with how the preparations for the invasion

went on the other side of the future front. In December 1940, Hitler informed his generals: ***"I will give the order for the strategic deployment of armed forces against the Soviet Union, if necessary, eight weeks before the scheduled date for the start of the operation."*** Hitler fulfilled this promise ("eight weeks") - the day the operation began (June 22, 1941) was finally set and brought to the attention of the Wehrmacht High Command on April 30, that is, 52 days before the start of the operation. Counting the same eight weeks from the date of the Conference on May 24th, we find ourselves on July 19th - a quite realistic date for the completion of all measures for the strategic deployment of the Red Army.

It is worth noting that in TsAMO, in the archival fund of captured documents of the enemy, there is a certain analytical note (probably intended for the propaganda services of the Wehrmacht), which describes the reasons that prompted the Fuhrer to start a war against the Soviet Union. There, in particular, some ***"secret material found in the office of the Red Army in Lutsk" (Western Ukraine)*** is mentioned, according to which the start of hostilities was allegedly provided for on July 25, 1941 [33] .

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July-August 1941 and many of the captured commanders of the Red Army were named as the expected date for the start of the war. Of course, the circle of people admitted to a military secret of such importance as the exact date of a surprise attack was extremely limited, so the testimony below can only serve as a reflection of the general mood, the "common spirit" that soared in the Red Army in the summer of 1941 [ 34 ] .

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Thus, the military doctor Kotlyarevsky, who was called up on May 30, 1941 for a 45-day "training camp" in the medical battalion of the 147th Infantry Division, reported that "on ***June 7, the medical personnel are confidentially***



**reported that after 45 days there would be no dismissal, since there would be a war with Germany in the near future.**

Captain Krasko, adjutant commander of the 661st regiment of the 200th rifle division, testified: **"Back in May 1941, the opinion was expressed among the officers that the war would begin after July 1."**

According to Major Koskov, commander of the 25th regiment of the 44th rifle division, **"judging by the scale and intensity of the preparations for the war, the Russians would have attacked Germany in a maximum of 2-3 weeks" (after June 22. - M.S.).**

Colonel Gaevsky, commander of a regiment of the 29th Panzer Division (in the documents of the 29th Panzer Division there is no mention of a colonel with such a surname. - M.S.) testified: **"Among the commanders, they talked a lot about the war between Germany and Russia. There was an opinion that the war would**

**begin around July 15th.** Major Solovyov, chief of staff of the 445th regiment of the 140th rifle division: **"In principle, a conflict with Germany was expected after the harvest, around the end of August - the beginning of September. The hasty redeployment of troops to the western border can be explained by the fact that the time of the attack was moved back.**

Lieutenant Colonel Lyapin, head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 1st motorized rifle division, testified that **"a Soviet attack was expected in the autumn of 1941. "**

Major General Malyshkin (before the war - senior lecturer, then head of the course at the Academy of the General Staff; chief of staff of the 19th Army of the Western Front, captured on October 11 in the Vyazemsky "boiler"; one of Vlasov's main associates, hanged on August 1, 1946) stated that **"Russia would have attacked in mid-August using about 350–360 divisions".** The testimonies given in enemy captivity, and even

by persons who actively collaborated with the invaders, raise understandable doubts. However, the ill-fated month of August, as the probable date for the start of the war, emerges in the most unexpected documents.

In early June 1941, the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General M.M. Popov. June 15 M.M. Popov signed a report sent to the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, in which he expressed concern

insufficient, in his opinion, the defense capability of the base in Hanko and made a number of specific proposals for its strengthening. The report ended with the following phrase: ***“All these measures must be carried out no later than August 1, 1941 (emphasis mine. - M.S.)”*** [35] On June 17, 1941, the Politburo — .

of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decided to “conscript 3,700 reserve political workers to complete the middle political staff. Call to produce from July 1 to! August 1941 ”[36] . On June 18, 1941, the Politburo of the Central —

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks makes the following decision: ***“to issue to the People's Commissariat of Defense in June from the state reserves 750 thousand pieces of car tires with a return to the UGMR [37] in September. Permit the People's Commissariat for Rubber Industry to stop shipping car tires to all consumers from June 18, with the exception of people's commissariats and departments specified in A [38] — .***

**Quarter”** There is no word “August” in this document, but there is a clear understanding that in June-July the People’s Commissariat of Defense will have an emergency, “peak” need for tires. It was decided to cover this need using emergency measures, and the “gap” formed in the reserves and supplies of civilian departments should be gradually filled, starting from September-October. It can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that the urgent need for tires was associated with the open mobilization planned for July-August, under which about 240 thousand cars were to be transferred from the national economy to the Red Army. The archives of the Comintern contain a most interesting collection of documents -

reports on the work done (in most cases - subversive) of the Finnish communists who crossed the front line in September 1941. Among others is the report by Comrade Reino V. Kosunen "On the Work of the Party Organizations in Helsinki and Kuopio." The report ends with the following self-critical remark:

***“We, the members of the party, were not at the level of international events at the time when the new war began. Two weeks before the start of the war between Germany - the Soviet Union and Finland (as in the text. - M.S.) I received a report from the party leadership on the assessment***

***position, because I had to go on a party business trip to Korkila. The report***

***contained the following: 1.***

***The war continues and spreads. This is not a lightning war. 2. Finland's situation***

***is not expected to change until autumn***

***(highlighted by me. - M.S.), so the war is not yet expected. [39] It***

***means that we did not prepare for war earlier than in the — .***

***fall.***” The ability for self-criticism adorns a person – but in this case, Comrade Kosulei is unfair to himself and unnamed “members of the party”. This party was controlled not from Helsinki, but from Moscow. The Finnish comrades could not work out any other “assessments of the situation”, except for those that came from the Moscow leadership (and they did not have the right to). And if the Finnish communists were preparing for a war that would begin “not earlier than autumn”, then this idea was not suggested to them by chance. It is no coincidence that the date of the alleged start of the war was named with some delay - the deliberate misinformation of ordinary performers is an important and generally accepted method of hiding true information ...

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Strictly speaking, on this brief review of Stalin's three plans can be considered complete. Detailed detailing and clarification of important subtleties will become possible only with the expansion of the source base. On the other hand, the most important thing is already known for certain - none of these plans was ever implemented.

In June 1941, in fact, the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces, which was just beginning, was an invasion. The troops that did not Hitler, scattered over vast complete the mobilization interrupted by areas, did not have time to build either the planned offensive or improvised defensive groups, were subjected to a crushing blow from the Wehrmacht and were actually defeated in parts. And only the huge size of these “units”, colossal human resources (in the second half of 1941, the Red Army had

11,790 thousand people were called up), the cyclopean mountains of weapons accumulated in the pre-war years, the powerful defense industry, geographically inaccessible to German aviation, made it possible to avoid complete defeat. There

is, however, one more question, one more historical problem, which, without any exaggeration, deserves the name "mystery of June 1941." The problem is that in the last peaceful days (approximately from June 13 to June 22, 1941), the top military-political leadership of the USSR committed actions (or no less surprising inaction) that were absolutely inadequate to the current situation. Either we are dealing with a manifestation of insanity, an attack of temporary insanity of Comrade Stalin (which, by the way, is quite acceptable - history is full of examples of insane acts of the powerful of this world), or in those days a certain one, which has not yet been plainly deciphered by anyone, has come into action, "Stalin's Plan No. 4.

What exactly were these "inadequate actions and inactions"? For Hitler, the

moment of transition from the stage of covert "sneaking up" to the last decisive breakthrough came on June 6-10, 1941 ... These days, the loading of tank and motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht into the railway echelons going to the East began (until that moment, infantry accumulated near the western borders of the USSR, gradually the growing concentration of which did not yet give grounds for unambiguous conclusions about the goals of the German command). On June 14-20, mechanized formations arrived at unloading stations 100-150 km from the border and moved in marching columns to the initial areas for the offensive.

A Wehrmacht tank division is an average of 200 tanks and more than 2,500 wheeled and tracked vehicles, transporters, tractors and armored cars. The marching column of a tank division is a rumbling "steel band" raising dust to the sky, several tens of kilometers long. And not one division went to the Soviet borders. So, on a narrow (approximately 35x35 km) strip of the "Suwalki ledge" (at the junction of the borders of East Prussia, Lithuania and Belarus) in the second decade of June, four tank tanks (20th, 7th, 12th, 19th) and three motorized (14th, 20th, 18th) divisions of the Wehrmacht. And this is in addition to nine infantry (26, 6, 35, 5, 161, 28, 8, 256, 162).

On the same days, a large-scale relocation of Luftwaffe air groups to border airfields took place. Thus, the two largest fighter squadrons (air divisions) of the 2nd Air Fleet (JG 53 and JG 51) flew to the airfields of occupied Poland on June 12–14 and 13–15, respectively, 1941. four groups (regiments) of diving Junkers, five fighter air groups and two assault (ZG) groups equipped with twin-engine Me-110s. Soviet intelligence could not fail to notice such a concentration of enemy forces in a strip of 30-50 km from the border. It was even more difficult to make a mistake in assessing the task that the German command set for the troops, concentrating on narrow patches protruding into Soviet territory at the junction of military districts / fronts.

According to sound logic, according to the fundamental basics of military science and in accordance with many years of practical experience in such a situation, the military-political leadership of the USSR had to immediately take two interrelated decisions:

start a full-scale mobilization (i.e., call up the planned number of reservists, withdraw hundreds of thousands of vehicles and tens of thousands of tractors from the national economy and transfer them to the army, unload mobilization stocks of military equipment) and begin an operation to cover the mobilization of concentration and deployment.

It is these two decisions that constitute the concrete practical content of what in everyday language is called "bring the troops to a state of full combat readiness." However, neither was

done. The Soviet Union, this extremely militarized totalitarian empire, which for many years was preparing for the Great War on a scale unthinkable for its neighbors, turned out to be the only one among the participants in the Second World War (meaning the large European states, and not the Latin American banana republics) that did not conducted a full-scale mobilization of the Armed Forces before the start of hostilities. Moreover, open mobilization in the USSR was not even started on the day the war began, but on the second day - June 23, 1941. This is absolutely

impossible, incredible situation. This was not the case anywhere: Germany and Poland, France and Finland, Romania, Italy and Belgium - all these countries began mobilizing a few days, or even a few weeks before the start of the war. The only exception to the rule was the Soviet Union.

The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR read: **"June 23, 1941 shall be considered the first day of mobilization."** The announcement of mobilization from June 23 is an action so incredible that the authors of many historical books, without much discussion, call the start date of mobilization "natural and understandable to everyone" on June 22 ... A noteworthy detail is Marshal Zhukov, who clearly understands the absurdity of the situation of NOT declaring mobilization on the day of the start war, begins to invent the following story in his memoirs:

**"...WITH. K. Timoshenko called I. V. Stalin and asked permission to come to the Kremlin to report on the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the mobilization and formation of the Headquarters of the High Command, as well as a number of other issues. I. V. Stalin replied that he was busy at a meeting of the Politburo and could only receive it at 9 o'clock (it is strange that in the early morning of June 22 it could be more important for the notorious "Politburo" than the report of the leadership of the Armed Forces? - M. S. )... A short way from the people's commissariat to**

**the Kremlin was covered by the people's commissar's car and mine at extremely**

**high speed. A. N. Poskrebyshchev met us and immediately took us to I. V. Stalin's office..." [40]**

How long could this trip "at extremely high speed" take from one building in the center of Moscow to another? If Zhukov's testimony were true, then Poskrebyshchev would have opened the door to the Boss's office for Timoshenko and Zhukov at about 9:20.

It doesn't take more than 20 minutes to drive from house to house, present documents to the guards and run up the stairs. Alas, the "Journal of Visits" silently but firmly convicts Zhukov of a lie: both he and Marshal Timoshenko entered Stalin's office at 14.00. At two o'clock in the afternoon. The cars

In fact, the meeting of the military in Stalin's office began at 2 pm, and at 4 pm Timoshenko, Zhukov, Kulik, Vatutin and Shaposhnikov left Stalin's office. And only after that the telegram about

The announcement of mobilization was signed by the People's Commissar of Defense and handed over to the Central Telegraph Office of the

Ministry of Communications at 4:40 pm on June 22, 1941.

"Mobilization is war." The complex of mobilization measures is so large that it will not be possible to hide the mobilization that has begun from the enemy (in the case of a public announcement of the Decree of the Presidium of the Armed Forces, there is no need to talk about the "secret" mobilization). The announcement (or actual start) of mobilization can push the enemy to start hostilities. Such a threat is very real. It is for this reason that all plans for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR, without exception, as well as the plans for the operational deployment of troops of military districts, provided for an operation to cover mobilization and concentration at the initial stage.

In the period from May 5 to May 14, 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent to the districts to develop full-fledged cover plans, and this work was completed in late May - early June 1941. Cover plans existed, they were detailed to the level of armies, corps and divisions and were kept at the headquarters in the famous "red bags". The matter remained small - the cover plans had to be taken out of the safe and put into action.

And this is where the big problem arises. Unlike the sentry at the post (who not only has the right, but is also obliged to decide on the use of weapons on his own, without waiting for any guidance from above), not a single commander had the right to start a cover operation without a direct order from a superior commander. At the "top of the pyramid", at the command level of the military districts / fronts, the cover plans ended with the following phrase: ***"The cover plan is put into effect upon receipt of an encrypted telegram signed by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, a member of the Main Military Council and the Chief of the General Staff with the following content: "Proceed to implement cover plan of 1941."*** These four words were never

spoken. Instead of a short, prearranged phrase ("to put into action a cover plan"), in the late evening of June 21, 1941, Timoshenko and Zhukov (and, in fact, Stalin) sent a whole essay to the districts,

entered into history under the name "Directive No. 1". Here is her full text:

***"1. During June 22-23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the air defense, PriBOVO, ZapOVO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. The attack may start with provocative actions.***

***2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications. At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kyiv and Odessa military districts should be in full combat readiness, to meet a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies.***

***I ORDER: a)***

***during the night of June 22, 1941, covertly occupy fire points of fortified areas on the state border;***

***b) before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse all aviation, including military aviation, over field airfields, carefully disguise it; c) put all units on combat***

***readiness. Troops to keep dispersed and disguised; d) put the***

***air defense on alert without additional lifting of the assigned staff. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects; e) no other activities are to be carried out without special instructions.***

The discussion and analysis of the meaning of this text has been going on for more

than half a century. Some argue that the main thing in the Directive is the requirement "not to succumb to provocations". Others reasonably object, pointing to the phrase "to meet a possible German strike." Still others rightly point to the apparent ambiguity of the Directive: how can one "meet the Germans' blow" without carrying out "any other measures" than dispersal and camouflage? How can the unmobilized, understaffed wartime troops be placed on "full combat readiness"? How, in the conditions of the most severe shortage of time, should the commanders of the districts distinguish between "provocative actions" and "a sudden blow by the Germans"?



Until the very last minutes of peacetime, Moscow did not give a direct and clear order to put the cover plan into action. In the testimony of the commander of the Western Front D.G. Pavlova (minutes of the first interrogation dated July 7, 1941), the events of the night of June 22 are described as follows:

***"... 5 o'clock in the morning on June 22 with. On the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, I was summoned to the headquarters of the front. A member of the Military Council, Corps Commissar Fominykh, and Chief of Staff of the Front, Major General Klimovskikh, came with me. The people's commissar asked the first question on the phone: "Well, how are you, calmly?" I replied that a very large movement of German troops was observed on the right flank: according to the report of the commander of the 3rd Army, Kuznetsov, for a day and a half, German motorized mechanized columns were continuously moving into the Suwalki***

***salient. According to his own report, in the Augustow-Sapotskin section, the Germans removed the barbed wire in many places. The people's commissar replied to my report: "Be calm and don't panic, gather the headquarters just in case this morning, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but look, don't go for any provocation. If there are separate provocations, call." This conversation ended ... "*** So, in addition to hundreds of other reports that came to the General Staff of the Red Army, the commander of the troops of the border district reports that the enemy has removed the wire barriers and columns of tanks and motorized infantry are continuously moving towards the border. There is a connection between Minsk and Moscow, and it works steadily. Commissar's order - do not panic. At the same time, Tymoshenko suggests that on the morning of June 22 "something unpleasant may happen." Did the marshal and people's commissar

of defense really use these words to describe a possible attack by a 3 million enemy army? ***"... At 3 hours 30 minutes. People's Commissar of Defense called me on the phone again and asked - what's new? I answered him that now there is nothing new, I have established contact with the armies and the corresponding instructions have been given to the commanders ... "*** Once again, we note that

more than 12 hours ago, the order to attack was brought to the attention of three million soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht (which should have been recorded by Soviet military intelligence). But the People's Commissar of Defense stubbornly refuses to utter the four cherished words: "Introduce the cover plan." There is a

description of Stalin's reaction to the news of the German invasion. It belongs to the witness and the main participant in the events - Marshal Zhukov. Many years before writing his infamous memoirs, May 19, 1956, G.K. Zhukov compiled and submitted for approval to N.S. Khrushchev a draft report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The plenum, which was supposed to give a harsh assessment of the "cult of personality", never took place, but the text of Zhukov's unspoken speech has been preserved in archival silence to this day:

***"... We are with comrade. S. K. Timoshenko asked permission to give the troops an order for appropriate response actions. Stalin, breathing heavily into the telephone receiver, could not say anything for several minutes, and answered repeated questions: "This is a provocation by the German military. Do not open fire, so as not to unleash wider actions. Tell Poskrebyshev to call Beria, Molotov, Malenkov to the meeting by 5 o'clock, to come to you and Timoshenko.***

***Stalin reaffirmed his idea of a provocation by the Germans when he arrived at the Central Committee. The report that German troops had already broken into our territory in a number of sectors did not convince him that the enemy had begun a real and pre-prepared war. Up to 6 hours 30 min. he did not give permission for retaliatory actions and for — .***

**[41] opening fire ...** " This description of events is quite accurate - both in chronology and in terms of the named participants in the meeting (although G. Malenkov, a member of the Main Military Council, appeared in Stalin's office only at 7.30). It should also be noted the important circumstance that Comrade Zhukov had to deliver his report at the Plenum in the presence of a living participant in the events - in the spring of 1956 Molotov was still a member of the Central Committee. There are serious reasons to believe in the plausibility of this version, according to which Stalin not only regarded what happened as a "provocation of the German military", but also directly prohibited retaliatory actions!

The strange and mysterious events of the last pre-war days could not but attract the attention of historians and journalists. Hundreds of articles and books have already been written on this topic. The first in chronological order was put forward, stunning in its absurdity, the version that Comrade Stalin was not gullible, but super-trustful. Naive and stupid. A pupil of the Institute of Noble Maidens, blushing at the sight of naked horses in the street, could be considered a "genius of villainy" in comparison with this simple-minded fool. It turns out that Stalin lovingly looked at Ribbentrop's signature on the Non-Aggression Pact instead of bringing the troops to a "state of full readiness" ... Then

this version some modified And  
one has been "improved". No, our tyrant did not believe Ribbentrop, he was simply confused and fell into prostration. For greater importance, an Israeli professor G. Gorodetsky was called (he, by the way, is not a repatriate from the former USSR, but a born Israeli), who, in a book with a delightful title: "Fatal self-deception. Stalin and the German attack" wrote without a shadow of irony: **"...Stalin simply refused to accept intelligence reports... Stalin was clearly at a loss, he desperately did not want to part with his delusion... Stalin, apparently, drove away any thought of war, he lost initiative and was practically paralyzed..."**. Not much yielded to the "foreign consultant" and local personnel. One comrade wrote the following verbatim: **"Expecting an imminent defeat in the event of a war, and for himself personally, death, Stalin probably considered resistance useless, which is why he did not try to either threaten Hitler or prepare for battle in time ..."**. This version, which is amazing in its power of "fatal self-deception" (although in this case, most likely, we should not talk about the self-deception of the authors, but about the purposeful deception of others) could not survive the first meeting with the array of documents and facts that was discovered in the first half of the 1990s. -s. Today, there is no longer the slightest doubt about the fact that in the spring of 1941, Stalin was not at all paralyzed, confused and frightened to the point of insanity. Not only did he not "drive away any thought of war," but he prepared for the approaching day of the outbreak of war with the utmost exertion of all the forces of a huge

countries. Beginning in the second decade of June, measures began to be carried out in the deepest secrecy that cannot be interpreted otherwise than as preparations for war. To a war that should begin not in some "foreseeable future", but in the very next few days and hours. The most significant fact is the

creation of front-line departments and their withdrawal to field command posts. In peacetime, fronts were never created as part of the Red Army (the Far Eastern Front, deployed since the late 1930s, can serve as just an example of an "exception that confirms the rule" - the border with Japan-occupied China continuously flared up either large or small armed conflicts). And, on the contrary, front departments were created before each "liberation campaign" (September 11, 1939 - six days before the invasion of Poland, January 7, 1940 - after the "triumphant march on Helsinki" turned into a real war, June 9 1940 - nineteen days before the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina). The formation of active fronts on the basis of district troops, the withdrawal of front headquarters from district centers (Riga, Minsk, Kiev, Odessa) to field command posts, which began on June 19, 1941, is direct preparation for an imminent and inevitable war. No less indicative are other decisions and actions of the Soviet command, unequivocally testifying to intense preparations for hostilities, which should begin in the very next

days. For example, here are the orders and orders issued by the command of the Baltic Special Military District:

Order No. 0052 dated June 15,

1941 ***"... Prepare the installation of anti-tank mines and wire obstacles in front of the front edge of the fortified zone in such a way that a minefield is established within three hours ... Begin to install wire obstacles immediately ... From the first hour of hostilities (here and further emphasized by me. - M.S.) organize the protection of their rear, and immediately detain all persons who inspire suspicion and quickly establish their identity ... Disperse and disguise aircraft at airfields in forests, bushes, preventing***

**formation in a line, but while maintaining full readiness for departure. Parks of tank units and artillery should be dispersed, placed in forests, carefully disguised, while maintaining the ability to assemble on alarm in a timely manner ... The army commander, corps and division commanders should draw up a calendar plan for the execution of the order, which should be fully [42] executed June 25 this year . G." by .**

Order No. 00 229 dated June 18,

1941 **"... To the head of the air defense zone by the end of June 19, 1941, bring the entire air defense of the district to full combat readiness ... By July 1, 1941, complete the construction of command posts, starting from the battery commander to the commander brigade district (air defense) ... Not later than the morning of 6/20/41, allocate teams with the necessary equipment to the front and army command posts to organize communication centers on them ... Outline and prepare teams of signalmen who should be ready by the morning of 6/20/41 by the order of the commanders of the formations to take control of the communication centers approved by me ... The plan for the destruction of bridges is approved by the military councils of the armies. Completion date 21.6.41... Select all gas tanks from the parts of the district (except mechanized and aviation) and transfer them 50% each to the 3rd and 12th — .**

**mechanized corps. Deadline [43] 21.6.41"** On the same day, June 18, the commander of the 12th mechanized corps mentioned above, Major General Shestopalov, issued order No. 0033. The order was topped with the highest secrecy stamp ("of special importance, top secret"), which is very rare for corps-level documents. Order No. 0033 begins with the following words: "With the receipt of this order, put all units on alert. Put the units on alert in accordance with the plans for raising the alert, but do not announce the alarm itself ... Take with you only what is necessary for life and battle. Next comes the instruction to begin at 23.00 on June 18 the

advance to the areas of concentration, and all the final points of the routes are in dense forests! Strictly speaking, there

is nothing surprising in these and other similar documents. Incredible and almost inexplicable is

another: literally 1-2 days before the actual start of the war, events began to occur in the troops of the western border districts that can hardly be described otherwise than as a deliberate reduction in combat readiness! Facts of this kind are scattered mainly in memoirs and

therefore can cause a certain distrust. Nevertheless, one can no longer ignore the numerous testimonies of participants in the events. There are numerous reports of cases of cancellation of previously issued orders to increase combat readiness, an unexpected announcement of days off, the recall of anti-aircraft artillery of border units to rear ranges, and the withdrawal of personnel of fortified areas from pillboxes to rear barracks.

Noteworthy is the "big theatrical evening", which took place on June 21, 1941. It is known that the command of the Western OVO spent the evening of June 21 in the Minsk House of Officers, on the stage of which the comedy "Wedding in Malinovka" was staged. Everyone who wrote about this loudly resented the "short-sighted carelessness" of the district commander. However, even the most cursory review of memoirs allows you to make sure that on the evening of June 21, not only General of the Army Pavlov went on a "cult trip". **"... On Saturday, June 21, 1941, a team of artists headed by the famous Belarusian composer**

***Lyuban arrived at our air garrison from Minsk. Not so often we were indulged in the attention of theatrical artists, so the House of the Red Army was overcrowded ... "***

***"... On Saturday, June 21, the forty-first year, an evening took place in the garrison House of the Red Army, as usual. The Red Army Song and Dance Ensemble arrived from the district. After the concert, according to the hospitable army tradition, the corps commander, Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev, and I invited the members of the ensemble to dinner. I returned home only at three o'clock***

*nights....*

***"...21 June deputy commander of the 98th long-range bomber regiment for political affairs, battalion commissar Vasily Yegorovich Molodtsov invited me to the Shatalovo airfield, where an evening of amateur performances was to be held at the local House of the Red Army ... "***

***"... On the evening of June 21, the whole family was at the theater. Together with us in the box was the head of the political department of the army,***

***also with his family ... "*** Army General S.P. Ivanov (in the first days of the war - the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the 13th Army of the Western Front) in his memoirs gives a very interesting explanation for such actions of the Soviet command:

***"...Stalin sought by the very state and behavior of the troops of the border districts to make it clear to Hitler that calm reigns in our country, if not carelessness (a strange, however, desire for someone who is preparing for defense. - M.S.). Moreover, this was done, as they say, in the most natural form. For example, anti-aircraft units were at the training camp ... As a result, instead of using skillful disinformation actions to mislead the aggressor about the combat readiness of our troops, we actually reduced it to an extremely low level ... "*** The mysterious events of the last pre-war days can, in my opinion,

be explained, linked into a certain logical chain within the next version. I'll make a reservation right away - I don't have direct documentary evidence of this version (and it's hard to believe that they will ever be found). Nevertheless, this hypothesis deserves discussion, if only because it makes it possible to rationally explain many of the outwardly contradictory and improbable facts listed above. So, suppose that the word "provocation", which is repeated in every way both in Zhukov's memoirs and in Stalin's orders, did not appear at all by

chance. And it was not by chance that People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko warned the commander of the Western Front, D. Pavlov, that ***"something unpleasant may happen this morning, but look, don't go for any provocation."*** Stalin, Timoshenko, Zhukov absolutely knew that on Sunday, June 22, 1941, ***"the attack could begin with provocative actions."*** They knew because they themselves prepared this attack and this provocation.

Hitler's secret plans were never on Stalin's desk, but the actual redeployment of German troops was tracked by Soviet intelligence, aviation and radio intelligence in sufficient detail. On the basis of this information, completely

realistic assessments of the enemy's likely plans. In June 1941, Soviet intelligence recorded the beginning of the operational deployment of Wehrmacht strike groups near the borders of the USSR. The correct conclusions were drawn from this fact - Hitler is preparing an invasion that will take place in the summer of 1941. A truly "fatal" mistake was made only in determining the time it would take the German command to complete the concentration of troops and, accordingly, in setting the date for the possible start of the invasion. Stalin's fatal mistake is quite

understandable. On May 31, 1941, in the next "Special Communication", military intelligence reported to Stalin that the Germans had concentrated 94 infantry, 14 tank and 13 motorized divisions near the borders of the Soviet Union. Intelligence reported not quite accurately - in fact, even by June 22, the Germans had only 84 infantry divisions in the three Army Groups ("North", "Center" and "South"). But it's not about these minor inaccuracies. The main thing is that Stalin and the high command of the Red Army expected to see an incomparably larger number of troops in the enemy grouping. So, according to the Memorandum of March 11, 1941, already mentioned many times above, for the war against the USSR, the enemy (Germany alone, not counting its possible allies) had to put up 165 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions. Moreover, these tank divisions were supposed to have 10,000 tanks in service (in fact, all 17 German divisions by the morning of June 22 were armed with no more than 3.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns - and this is if we consider light machine-gun tankettes Pz-I and self-propelled guns created on their basis). From intelligence reports (which not only did not

underestimate, but even overestimated the number of enemy troops near the western border!) The top military-political leadership of the USSR, i.e. "collective Stalin", made an absolutely logical conclusion - the concentration of the Wehrmacht strike group has not yet been completed; Stalin could not believe that with such SMALL FORCES Hitler would risk attacking the mighty Soviet Union. Stalin could not believe that Hitler estimated the "invincible and legendary" Red Army lower than the army of 40 million France (for the invasion of which the German command allocated 136 divisions). Stalin was proud



his logic and reasoned in this case quite sensibly - the Germans would need a few more weeks to complete the concentration of troops. And this meant that the Red Army still had a chance to start a war with a devastating surprise blow against the enemy.

Stalin really "driven away every thought" - but not the thought of war (he didn't think about anything else), but that Hitler at the very last moment would be able to get ahead of him. Therefore, after long and, one might assume, painful reflections, after repeated meetings with the military leadership (in June 41st, Zhukov and Timoshenko were in Stalin's office seven times: 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 18, 21 - moreover, on other days the military came to Stalin twice, and the discussion dragged on for four hours), it was decided once again to change the start date of the operation in the direction of approach. It was probably supposed to start hostilities in the last days of June 1941. Within the framework of this plan (we will conditionally call it "plan No. 4"), Monday, June 23, 1941, was set as the day for the start of open mobilization.

The decision to start an open general mobilization on Monday was quite logical. In the Soviet Union, the workplace was the center of life. Factory.

It was there that the "draft contingent" was concentrated, it was there on the morning of June 23, 1941 that "spontaneous rallies" of workers were to take place, at which a pre-prepared Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces on the announcement of mobilization would be announced. Precisely because the text of the Decree was prepared in advance, it did not contain the slightest mention of the Nazi invasion and the war that had actually begun.

But Comrade Stalin was wise, and he understood that the Decree of the Presidium alone would not be enough. Especially since for two years Stalinist propaganda had been explaining to the working people **that** only enemies of the people, vile hirelings of the Anglo-American warmongers. Of course, Stalin did not doubt for a second the humility of the people he had brought up, but humility alone was not enough for such a thing that he planned. Needed "fury

noble, burning hearts. Simply put, it was necessary to organize and carry out a large-scale bloody provocation.

The staging of a German air strike on a Soviet city (cities) was chosen as the specific content of such a provocation. Sunday, June 22, 1941, preceding the day the mobilization began, was the best suited for the implementation of the plan. To obtain the maximum possible number of victims among the civilian population, the bombing on Sunday afternoon was the best option: a warm sunny day off, people slept off after a hard week of work and took to the streets, gardens and squares, take a walk with children ... The technical possibilities for staging were: back in In the 40th year, two Dornier-215 bombers, two Junkers-88 and five multi-purpose Me-110 bombers were purchased in Germany, not to mention the fact that at an altitude of 5–6 km no one, except for highly qualified specialists, and would not recognize the silhouettes of aircraft.

Comrade Stalin had firm ideas about the exact forms in which the "invariably peaceful foreign policy" of the Soviet Union should manifest itself. With the inexorable persistence of the "terminator" he put these ideas into practice. Everything had to be "correct". The Soviet Union could not attack Finland. The Red Army was supposed to stop the provocations of the White Finnish military, which treacherously fired on Soviet territory in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Mainila. In June 1941, a war of an immeasurably larger scale was to begin, respectively, and the next "pre-war provocation" should have been much more noticeable and bloody. It is extremely important to note that the event, which could be the first

component of the Great Provocation, **took place in reality. This is not a hypothesis. It is a fact.** On June 13, 1941, the famous TASS Report was compiled and published on June 14. Yes, yes, the same thing: ***"... TASS declares that, according to the USSR, Germany is as steadily***

***complying with the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as the Soviet Union, which is why, according to Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are deprived of any ground ... the USSR, as it follows***

***from his peaceful policy, has complied and intends to comply with the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, which is why the rumors that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are false and***

***provocative ...*** ". For decades, historians all over the world have been surprised, lamented, indignant at the "fatal self-deception" of Comrade Stalin. How could he believe that the insidious enemy ***"steadily complies with the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact,"*** thousands of journalists and publicists asked with ritual hand-wringing. Probably, this is how a savage from the Mumbu-Yumbu tribe examines a half of scissors that accidentally fell into his hands. "What is this? Awl? Some kind of uncomfortable, wide ... Knife? Why then the ring on the handle, and this "knife" is sharpened in a strange way ... ". And only by attaching the other half and screwing the necessary screw in the middle, we will get scissors - one of the outstanding inventions of

mankind. The soothing TASS Statement ceases to seem complete nonsense, as soon as we think that it could be the first act of a bloody "spectacle." This first stage was inevitably followed by a second stage: the mock bombing of Soviet cities by German aircraft. In response to the most peaceful statement of TASS - bombs on a sunny Sunday. Treacherous and vile murder of peaceful Soviet citizens. The corpses of murdered women and children on the blood-drenched greenery of parks and squares. A snow-white dove of peace on one side, black crows on the other. And only after all this - general mobilization. "Get up, huge country, get up for a mortal battle!"

Rough? Too deliberate? Yes, but it was precisely this "style and cut" that Comrade Stalin loved. Rough, absurd, slovenly "stitched" provocations. In the course of the open "Moscow trials" of 1936, the accused confessed to secret meetings with long-dead people, which "meetings" supposedly took place in long-demolished hotels. The Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, "Mr. Kuusinen", who has been living in Moscow since 1918, was declared the head of the "people's government of democratic Finland " .

And nothing. During the spontaneous rallies, the workers warmly approved and fully supported ... The

hypothesis of a provocative staging scheduled for June 22 not only corresponds to the general style of Stalin's "liberations", but also allows you to immediately explain several of the most "inexplicable" facts on the eve of the war. First of all, those

actions to demonstrate complacency and carelessness that took place on June 20-21 become understandable. For a greater propaganda effect, the provocations of the bombs were to fall on the Soviet city in a peaceful, outwardly completely calm environment. In combat units - a day off. The command enjoys high theatrical art, the rank and file run Komsomol crosses and compete in volleyball skills. We are peaceful people, and our armored train is rusting on the siding ... In addition to the propaganda effect, the lowering of combat readiness and the endless spells "do not succumb to provocations" also had a very practical meaning: the provocative bombardment had to take place successfully, and not a single retaliatory shot on the adjacent territory should be heard. In this context, the completely "inexplicable" fact of the dismantling of weapons from the aircraft of the 122nd Fighter Aviation Regiment (the regiment was located at the Novy Dvor airfield, 17 km from the border in the area of the "Suwalk ledge"), carried out by order of the high command of the Western Military District in the evening of June 21st of June!

The unexpected appearance of Mekhlis in Stalin's office on the evening of June 21 and early morning of June 22 becomes understandable - starting from 1924, this man was next to Stalin, acting as a particularly trusted guarantor for secret and dirty

affairs. Finally, Stalin's reaction to the announcement of the beginning of the war becomes psychologically understandable (or, to be quite precise, to the announcement of the German bombing strikes that began at dawn on June 22). Stalin was shocked, stunned and almost speechless - how could it be otherwise? He ordered a provocation, but received a real blow **on the same day!** It was impossible to believe in such an incredible coincidence. This could not be, because it could never be ...

Stalin reasoned absolutely logically - and was mistaken in everything. But, as Lenin himself said on another occasion and about another person (Leo Trotsky), "this can hardly be blamed on him personally." It was hard not to make a mistake. Stalin could not foresee, foresee, believe that his huge army, equipped with the best weapons in the world, was just an armed crowd of future deserters and prisoners of war. Even in a nightmare he could not imagine the picture of how thousands of tanks and planes, tens of thousands of guns, millions of rifles would be abandoned on the roadsides by panicked crowds of former Red Army soldiers ... But let's not judge Comrade Stalin too harshly for this

mistake. After all, you, dear reader, even today, even "hindsight", even after everything that has been declassified and published in recent years, which was told by a few eyewitnesses of events who survived to the era of freedom of speech and press, do not want to believe and recognize this real fact. Is it any wonder that Stalin could not make such a stunning prediction?

Mark Twain once said, "Truth is stranger than fiction, because fiction has to stay within the bounds of the probable, but truth doesn't." The above version of the events of June

The 41st is unbelievable enough to eventually turn out to be true.

# Babi riot in Ivanovo

This happened at the end of October 1941 in Ivanovo - the famous "city of brides" and a major center of the USSR textile industry. Of course, this event was not reported in the newspapers. Extremely stingy in those terrible days of October 1941, the reports of the Sovinformburo monotonously and muffledly reported on "tense battles in the Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Kalinin directions." Nothing was written about the "Ivanovo revolt" in the next six decades. And even today, after the former archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU (now RGASPI, fund 17, inventory 88, file 45) revealed one of its secrets, we cannot reliably say how unique (or, on the contrary, typical) these events were. In the autumn of 1941, after the evacuation of the department of the People's

Commissariat of the textile industry from Moscow to Ivanovo, this city finally turned into the "textile capital of the country." But it got really bad with the suitors: the men in the city remained (as it becomes obvious from those documents that will be given below) only among the authorities, ordinary men were almost without exception taken into the army. In early September (the document does not allow us to establish the

exact date), instructor Kozlov and the responsible organizer of the organizational department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Sidorov sent a memorandum "On the situation at the textile enterprises of the Ivanovo region" to Moscow. The situation was very alarming, in other words, pre-strike: "... **Recently, there have been**

***bagpipes of individual groups of workers who arbitrarily quit work before the end of the working day. Such facts took place at three factories in the Vichugsky district ... at two factories in the Furmanovsky district ... and at some other enterprises in the Ivanovo region (dots are replaced by a long list of large factories with a number of employees from 7 to 12 thousand people. - MS.). The workers express strong discontent and sometimes even anti-Soviet sentiments. Ordinary conversations in factories***

***passed on to each other, that a factory went on strike and their bread ration was increased to a kilogram.***

***At a meeting of factory workers Nogina's worker Kulakova declared: "Hitler didn't take bread by force, we gave it to him ourselves, but now they don't give it to us, are they protecting him?" Worker Lobova expressed the following: "We go hungry, there is no urine to work. The authorities receive in a closed store, they can live. Pom. masters Sobolev and master Kiselev (these are the only two male surnames, all the other "pipers" are women) declared: "If we will be taken into the army, we will show the communists how to starve us hunger." A worker at the spinning factory of the Bolshevik plant said to the communist Agapova: "God save the victory of the Soviet power, and you, the Communists, will be hanged all over."***

Stating the facts of such "unhealthy moods", as well as some of the reasons that give rise to such moods ("there is ***impassable dirt in the canteens, in most canteens there are no cisterns and mugs ... the quality of meals is extremely low, the menu mostly consists of empty cabbage soup (water with cabbage without onions , without any seasoning) and barley porridge boiled in water without any fat***"), Kozlov and Sidorov limited themselves to

***the following proposals: "Introduce supply secretaries in the regional committee and city committee ... replace the weak secretaries of party organizations ... entrust the leadership of propaganda teams to senior officials of the regional committee and city committee ... send a group of qualified lecturers and speakers to help the regional party comm***

Whether the "group of qualified lecturers" had time to arrive in Ivanovo, whether they managed to explain to the hungry weavers why there is "impassable dirt in the working canteen, and the bosses get it in a closed store" is unknown. But something else is known for certain: on October 2, German troops launched a large-scale offensive, and a week later, more than 60 Soviet divisions were surrounded in two giant boilers - at Vyazma and Bryansk; a week later, the last centers of organized resistance of the encircled were suppressed, on October 16 mass panic began in Moscow, robberies of shops and a disorderly flight of the population to the east along all available roads. In a word, exactly what preceded the fall of Minsk, Smolensk, Pskov, Orel began,

Kharkov... It seemed that a little more - the city of Moscow will appear in this tragic list.

In a situation where the breakthrough of the Germans to the Volga, Yaroslavl and Nizhny Novgorod seemed quite real, it was decided to evacuate Ivanovo enterprises. And this is where the rebellion began.

***“The Ivanovo Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in addition to telephone messages, considers it necessary to inform the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in more detail about the facts of anti-Soviet speeches. The riots took place in the city of Ivanovo at the Melange Plant, at the factories named after Dzerzhinsky, im. Balashov and, to a certain extent,***

***at the Krasnaya Zvezda factory, as well as in the city of Privolzhsk at the Yakovlevsky flax mill. The most characteristic are the events at the Melange plant. No explanatory work was carried out among the workers on evacuation issues. As a result, on October 18, the workers, having come to work at 6 o'clock in the morning, saw some of the dismantled equipment in the shops ... There was noise and shouting:***

***“The equipment will be taken away, and we will be left without work. We will not let them dismantle and take away the equipment”... To avoid further disorganization and disorder, it was announced that a meeting of workers was to be convened. The meeting began at 2 pm.***

***It was attended by the secretary of the city committee comrade Taratynov, the secretary of the regional committee comrade Lukoyanov, the secretary of the Kirov district committee comrade Veselov, the director of the plant comrade Chastukhin (it is worth paying attention to the fact that hereinafter all the bosses are men). The machine walker, a member of Butenev's party, took the floor and said in her speech: “If you feel sorry for the machines, you must first take out the families. We***

***On the morning of October 19, events at the plant began to take on a more acute character. Around 9:00 a.m., the same group of weavers began smashing boxes of equipment again. Attempts to resist, undertaken by the leaders of the plant, did not lead to anything. Many workers began to quit their jobs. Approximately 150 people broke into the office of the head of the spinning factory, Rastrigin, who ran away from them and hid in the sorting room under***



***tarpaulin. The head of the weaving factory, Nikolaev, fled home, frightened by threats to kill him for being rude to the***

***workers. The secretaries of the regional committee, t.t., arrived at the plant. Fingers, Kapranov, Enodin, Lukoyanov, head of the regional department of the NKVD comrade Blinov. More than 1,000 workers, mostly women, gathered in the yard of the plant. The secretary of the regional committee, comrade Paltsev, who spoke here, announced that the dismantling of the equipment had been stopped (emphasis mine. - M.S.) and gave the order to start assembling the already dismantled machines. Many of those present greeted this statement with approval...***

***Part of the workers started working on the night shift, and on October 20 the whole p***

***The beginning of the dismantling of equipment was used to provoke unrest at the factory. Dzerzhinsky and at the Dmitrievskaya manufactory. Balashov ... On October 19, the secretary of the party bureau of the factory. Dzerzhinsky Filippov began to explain to the workers why the equipment was being evacuated, but one of the workers shouted: "Let the equipment remain in place, and if Hitler comes, we will work for him." Then Filippov declared: "We will not leave anything to Hitler, we will destroy it with our own hands, we will blow up the factory." This statement was immediately picked up by provocateurs. There were screams and commotion. A group of unidentified persons began to arm themselves with reels and parts from cars and rushed to beat Filippov and the secretary of the party bureau, Grabochkina ...***

***Incited by provocateurs, the weavers put forward the following demands: "We will not go to the labor front! Add 100 grams of bread to dinner! Give free manufactory!" Party activists, workers of the district committee and the city committee of the CPSU (b) explained to the workers the incorrectness of the rumors spread by provocateurs. In response to this, shouts were heard from the crowd: "Do not listen to them, they themselves do not know anything, they have been deceiving us for 23 years. They themselves evacuated***

***their families, and we are sent to the labor front." The unrest in the city of Privolzhsk was caused by the decision to mobilize 4,000 people for the construction of a defensive belt in the region of the city of Ivanovo. At the factories of the flax mill, without any explanatory work, they began to compile lists of those mobilized, including teenagers of 16 years old, old people and mothers of large families, which caused dissatisfaction***

**workers of the Rogachev factory quit their job and went out to the factory yard. The leaders of the factory were confused, the secretary of the party bureau Vasiliev ran away from the workers from the yard to the spinning department ... A group of 200-300 people went through the streets of the city to the Yakovlevkaya and Vasilyevskaya factories to take the workers of these enterprises out into the street. Cries were heard in the crowd: "Let's not go to the labor front!", And a group of provocateurs and hostile personalities even threw out the slogan: "Down with the Soviet government, long live father Hitler!"**

What's next? But nothing. Further - silence, as the Danish prince Hamlet used to say. Having made a noise and shouted, the crowds of exhausted, hungry women went home. Somewhere on the same day, somewhere on the second or third. And they did not expect any "father Hitler", but simply burst at some point even their endless, world-famous, patience of a Russian woman. They are tired of a 10-hour working day, of the constant lies of well-fed male bosses, of the exhausting, inescapable fear for their husbands who have gone to the front, of the crying of hungry and undressed children. But even in their "fury of despair", the Ivanovo weavers did not go further than the demand "100 grams of bread for dinner" and the guaranteed right every day at 6 o'clock in the morning (if you're lucky, and they won't put you on the night shift) to come to the rattling, dusty weaving shop factories. The women made some noise, took out their anger on Comrade Filippov, the Secretary of the Party Bureau, who fell under the

hot hand, and dispersed. But not everyone was allowed to go home so easily. The authorities got out from under the "tarpaulin in sorting", recovered from the first fright and took up

their usual business, to punish. **"Regional Administration is taking appropriate measures to isolate anti-Soviet elements ... The military tribunal has already considered the cases of a group of active participants in the riots at the Melange plant and sentenced S., E., S., G., Ya. To 10 years in prison each with a loss of rights for 5 years, and D. sentenced to capital punishment - execution. The authorities of the court and the prosecutor's office also intensified the prosecution for the dissemination of provocative rumors..."**

Well, the last. Of course, you will ask - what did they do with the secretary of the regional committee, comrade Paltsev, who plucked

implementation of the GKO resolution on the evacuation of the factory? Nothing was done to him; moreover, it was he, Comrade Paltsev, who wrote the entire report cited above to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. And this is understandable and somewhere even correct. After all, responsible comrades did not need machines, but the humility of the workers who were attached to these machines. What humility comrade. Fingers and provided, deftly knocking down a wave of rebellion with a promise to stop the dismantling of equipment ...

## Two blockades

The most productive and cheapest mode of transport is water (sea, river). So it was and so it will always be. Since ancient times, "the seas connected the countries separated by them", and large cities grew up at the mouths of the rivers. Ground transport (rail and road) is much worse and more expensive. Aviation is also called a "mode of transport" - the hand does not rise. Compared with the performance characteristics of a wretched wooden longboat, the best transport aircraft looks like a flying joke. In a longboat, the weight of the transported cargo is 5-10 times the weight of the longboat itself, and a very good aircraft (together with the fuel required for its flight) weighs three times more than the transported cargo. It's scary to talk about energy costs (and, consequently, the cost of transportation). The most famous transport aircraft of the era of piston aviation (Douglas DC-3, aka C-47, aka, in the Soviet licensed version, Li-2) with the help of two voracious aircraft engines of 1000 l / s each lifted 2 tons of cargo into the air. With two economical low-speed diesel engines of the same power, the Volgoneft tanker carries 4,620 tons. And not so slow luck - 20 km / h with a load. Every hour, day and night, in rain and fog, without a lunch break and a 12-hour rest for the crew. Even taking into account the 15-fold difference in speed, the tanker is 150 times better than the Douglas in terms of "tonne kilometers per hour", and therefore more (due to diesel efficiency) than 150 times more profitable in terms of fuel efficiency, and even with taking into account the difference in the cost of diesel fuel and high-octane aviation gasoline ...

Moreover, all this is not accidental, but is connected with some fundamental physical laws, which will never be canceled. Worse than air transport is only rocket and space transport, where the payload weight of 1% of the total launch weight can be considered an excellent result. This is where the necessary technical educational program ends, and we

let's move on to history.

## 1. Blockade of Berlin

Modern (born in 1999) and recommended for secondary schools "Dictionary of Contemporary History", ed. A. A. Kreder gives the following description of this event:

***“(1948–1949), the blockade of West Berlin (the American, British and French sectors of the city), undertaken by the authorities of the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany in response to the start of a separate monetary reform in the western part of Germany. This decision was made by the Western countries despite the resistance of the USSR and formally violated the principle of joint control of Germany, approved at the Potsdam Conference. The blockade was reduced to the termination of land communications between West Berlin and the Allied occupation zones. However, Western countries did not abandon the monetary reform and did not leave the city. They created an air bridge to supply West Berlin; Soviet troops did not interfere with the overflight of aircraft over East Germany. When the daily deliveries of goods via the air bridge reached 13,000 tons, the blockade became useless. Stalin did not go into further confrontation with the allies. The blockade lasted almost 11 months. This was the first manifestation of an open confrontation between the USSR and Western countries.”***

What is the most important thing in this text? Although he is magnificent from the first to the last word, I still draw your special attention to this pearl: ***"The blockade was reduced to the termination of land communications."*** In Russian, the word “reduced” is used to denote something unexpectedly small, weak and unworthy (“the discussion was reduced to an empty squabble,” “perestroika was reduced to cosmetic repairs at the price of a major one,” etc.). Apparently, Mr. Kreder and those who recommended his "Dictionary" to schoolchildren are unanimous in their opinion that the "termination of terrestrial communication" is just a minor nuisance. Now, if Stalin covered Berlin with a bulletproof cap - then oh ... The Second World War ended

with the complete surrender of Germany. The armies of the victors met on the Elbe, but Comrade Stalin "pressed", and the allies retreated 50-200 km west of the Elbe. The territory of the former Germany was divided into four zones

occupation, but since the imperialists of the USA, Britain and France acted in concert, it is customary to speak of two zones - "eastern" and "western". On the territory of the "eastern zone" - and at a distance of 250 km from the nearest point of the "western" zone - was the city of Berlin. Berlin was stormed by the Red Army, but in 1945 Stalin agreed with the division of the city into four (actually two) zones. In parentheses, we note that the three "western" zones of Berlin were approximately equal in area to one Soviet one. In February

1948, the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia, in the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany, "profound socio-political transformations" were in full swing, and Stalin decided that he did not need a "bourgeois abscess" on the body of the future socialist Germany.

On June 12, 1948, "due to repair work," automobile communication with West Berlin was stopped, on June 21, river transport was stopped, and, finally, on June 24, a complete transport blockade was introduced. To complete the effect, the Soviet occupation authorities cut off all power cables leading to West Berlin. As a pretext to justify such actions, the monetary reform carried out by the Allies in the "western zone" of the occupation of Germany was named. Hitler, frankly, did not reach such impudence. He did not try to explain his invasion of the USSR by the fact that Ulyanov-Lenin was depicted on Soviet banknotes instead of Horst Wessel ... Thus began the blockade, which lasted 11 months. No city can survive 11 months without supplies from

outside, but Berlin in 1948 was a special city. This city was bombed for several years, and very heavily (for example, on February 3, 1945, Allied aircraft dropped 2.25 kilotons of bombs on Berlin), and then it was finally destroyed during fierce street fighting. Residents were supplied with food "on cards", the population did not have stocks, everything that burns burned down (and in this Berlin was very different from Leningrad, whose residents could at least drown "bourgeois stoves" with their own furniture and books). The city was doomed by Stalin to starvation - or to another capitulation. Germany, as a state, did not exist at that time, but it was precisely for this reason that the allied occupation administration carried

legal responsibility for ensuring minimum living conditions for the German population. In addition, there were about 6.5 thousand Anglo-American military in West Berlin (not counting civilian services). President Truman was faced with a decision to make. And quickly. As every educated Russian knows, hated America hatched hellish plans for a

nuclear attack on the USSR. If this is true, then in June 1948 it was possible to start. All the necessary conditions were available: an absolute monopoly on nuclear weapons, several dozen ready-made atomic bombs, a long-range high-altitude B-29 bomber capable of flying from air bases in West Germany to Moscow and Leningrad, and a reason. The obvious, indisputable causes belli - the blockade of an unarmed city was an undoubted act of war, and the fact that Stalin did not declare this war only aggravated the situation. However, Truman rejected the insistent proposals of his military advisers and did not authorize either a nuclear strike on the USSR or a ground operation by ground forces to unblock Berlin.

As every educated Russian knows, if the hated "Pindos" did something good (or didn't do something bad), then, of course, not from humanistic motives. In this particular case, that is exactly what happened. The point is not at all that Truman felt sorry for the civilians of Moscow and Leningrad, not at all - he refused the nuclear bombing because of his enchanting ... Stop. I don't know if it's possible to say this about presidents (even those of a foreign country and long dead), so I'll limit myself to a quote. Speaking in June 1948 in Oregon, President Truman said:

***"I got very close to Joe Stalin, and I like old Joe! He is an honest guy. But Joe is a prisoner of the Politburo. He cannot do what he wants. He makes contracts, and if he could, he would certainly keep them; but the people in charge of the government tell him very clearly that he cannot fulfill".***

Based on such a deep analysis of the Soviet political system, Truman decided not to upset "old Joe" tormented by Narzan and ordered the organization of an "air bridge" with Berlin.

Nobody has ever done anything like this. Moreover, no one even discussed the possibility of supplying by air a city with a population of 2 million people. During the war years, there were precedents for supplying encircled groupings with an "air bridge": in the case of the "Demyansky cauldron", the Germans succeeded, in Stalingrad they did not succeed. But to supply the whole city with food and fuel by air? There will be more numbers to come. I ask you to pay close attention to them. The Americans started with **1,000 tons** of cargo a day. By the end of June, the cargo flow was

brought up to **4400 tons per day**. On an emergency basis, with the involvement of all available resources, two more airfields (!) were built in West Berlin in addition to the two available. By autumn, the cargo traffic amounted to **5620 tons per day**. Every 2-3 minutes, a huge 4-engine transport aircraft flew to one of the airfields in West Berlin. "Old Joe" watched this airshow in amazement and waited for winter - Berlin was supposed to freeze without fuel and electricity from outside. Then the Americans began to carry by planes ... coal! 1,421,119 tons (nearly one and a half million tons of coal) were delivered to the besieged city. They even transported a thermal power plant disassembled into the smallest units. The absolute record was set on April 16, 1949: 1400 sorties, **13 thousand tons of cargo**. plane per minute.

On May 12, 1949, Comrade Stalin once again confirmed the invariably peaceful course of Soviet foreign policy. The blockade was lifted, but the Americans decided to play it safe, and the "air bridge" worked even before September - thus accumulating food supplies for the next winter. In total, 278,228 sorties were performed, 2.32 million tons of cargo were delivered (8.3 tons on average per flight). On average, about **2,700 tons of food** was delivered to Berlin daily (not counting coal and everything else). During the operation, 31 American and 41 British pilots died - a monstrous overvoltage affected both people and

technique.

"Old Joe" didn't spend a dime on this whole story. The Americans "air bridge" cost 2 billion dollars (in modern prices). Yes, the reputation of the Soviet Union is a bit



got wet, but Stalin was hardly interested in this - he had long ceased to indulge himself with illusions ...

## ***2. Siege of Leningrad***

Leningrad is not on an island. And not even on a peninsula connected to the mainland by a tiny bridge (like Sevastopol in the Crimea). From the west of Leningrad - water, the Gulf of Finland. 40 km east of Palace Square - water, Lake Ladoga. Two huge reservoirs are connected by a thin "thread" of the Neva River. At the confluence of the Neva into the Gulf of Finland, Peter built the capital of his empire, and in the place where the Neva emerges from Lake Ladoga, the Shlisselburg fortress (now Petrokrepost). But from the south and north of Leningrad - the vast expanses of land. Having finished with this

simplest (but for some reason forgotten by everyone) geography, we turn to the tragic history of the 41st year. About politics (that is, about the reasons that prompted peaceful Social Democratic Finland to enter the war "on the same side of the barricades" with fascist Germany) - not a word, only the course of hostilities.

In the last days of August, on the Karelian Isthmus, Finnish troops reached a line roughly coinciding with the Soviet-Finnish border of 1939. The front stabilized, and this "front" was quiet until June 9, 1944; the Finns did not make any attempts to move further towards Leningrad. Even in the closest (western) part of the isthmus, the line of contact between Soviet and Finnish troops was at a distance of 30 km north of Leningrad; on the eastern flank, in the hands of the Red Army, there remained a section of the coast of Lake Ladoga 60 km in a straight line (not counting the natural windings of the coastline).

The Germans advanced from the southwest and cut one after another the railways leading to Leningrad. On August 29, the Mga station was occupied, the last one on the enemy's path to Lake Ladoga. On September 8, the Germans occupied Shlisselburg; thus, Leningrad was cut off from the "mainland" from the south. Until January 1943, the front stabilized along the line of the Neva River; however, it's hard to talk about stability - on the damned "Neva patch" there were

fierce battles, in which, according to modern data, 50 thousand soldiers of the Red Army and 10 thousand Germans died. From

the south - the Germans, 30-60 km north of the city - the Finns, in the west - the Gulf of Finland, which the Red Banner Baltic Fleet gave to the enemy without a fight. But there is another, fourth, side of the world - the east. In the east, there were more than 60 km of the shore of Lake Ladoga free from the enemy. If we lay the route of transport caravans along the shortest distance (through the so-called "Shlisselburg Bay"), then there was no more than 30 km of water space to the "Great Land" (the port village of Kobona). If you go to Novaya Ladoga (a city and port at the confluence of the Volkhov River into Lake Ladoga), then all 100 km will be typed. In any case, even the slowest "vessel", crawling at a snail's speed of 5 knots, could reach from the western, "Leningrad", shore of Lake Ladoga to Novaya Ladoga in 11-12 hours (i.e., during one autumn night, darkness which better than any air defense protected a moving ship from enemy aircraft). If this is called a "blockade", then it must be admitted that England and Japan fought through the entire war under conditions of a much worse "blockade". And to this day they live, and happily ever after.

Further discussion of the events and the issues raised by this discussion make sense only within the framework of the idea that the Soviet leadership and personally the "effective manager" sought to ensure the survival of the inhabitants of Leningrad. They tried at least with the same perseverance with which the Americans and the British saved from starvation the inhabitants of a foreign (and more recently, an enemy) city for them. Outside of this assumption, there is nothing to argue about ...

Is such an assumption appropriate? Does it correspond to historical truth? God knows. Academician Likhachev, a well-deserved and respected by all, and besides, he survived the blockade personally, in his memoirs writes:

***"Meanwhile, food was rapidly exported from Leningrad and no attempts were made to disperse it, as the British did in London. The Germans were preparing to blockade the city, and we were preparing to surrender it to the Germans. The evacuation of food from Leningrad stopped only when the Germans cut off all the railways.***

There is no documentary evidence that food from the doomed city was exported (and not imported), Likhachev does not cite, however, memoirs and do not pretend to be a scientific study. In a scientific study (D.V.

What

Pavlov. "Leningrad in the blockade." - M.: Voenizdat, 1958), and even published in the most Soviet times, we read: "The main department of the sugar industry, **located in**

***Moscow, sent a telegram to the Leningrad office of Sakharosby in mid-September 1941 demanding that several wagons of sugar be shipped from Leningrad to Vologda, although Leningrad had already been blocked since September 8.***

The author cites this fact as a curious example of ***"untimely awareness of people."*** I propose to pay attention to the direction of the prescribed movement of a high-calorie product. And if the Germans had not cut the roads, would they have taken the sugar to Vologda? And is it just sugar?

The assumption that foodstuffs were exported from pre-blockade Leningrad seems absurd and blasphemous - but only at first glance, and, moreover, pretty clouded by obligatory pathos. According to common sense, we are talking only about a particular case of fulfilling the general instructions of Comrade Stalin:

***"Do not leave the enemy a kilogram of bread or a liter of fuel. The collective farmers must steal all the livestock, hand over the grain for safekeeping to state bodies for its removal to the rear areas. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel, which cannot be exported, must be unconditionally destroyed."*** Note that nothing is said

about the evacuation of the population from territories where ***"not a kilogram of bread"*** should be left. Now, if Hitler and the Wehrmacht soldiers were cannibals in the truest sense of the word, then old Joe would probably have ordered "to drive all the inhabitants to the rear." And so - only cattle. Nevertheless, guided by the unshakable principle

of the presumption of innocence (in Russian it sounds "not caught - not a thief"), we will further proceed from the fact that "the party and the government, the Headquarters, the GKO and personally comrade. Stalin did everything

possible to save Leningrad. And since, as you know, it was not possible to save everyone, the question will be quite justified: why?

A lot has been written about the blockade of Leningrad in general, about the problems of transport and supply in particular. There are entire monographs devoted to the "transport component" of the Leningrad Figures and facts - the sea. And the more you get to know them, the less clear the situation becomes. The numbers contradict each other even in small things (however, for the inhabitants of the besieged city, these were not "little things" at all). For example, in one

paragraph we read the following: **"From**

**November 20, 1941, Leningraders began to receive the lowest ration of bread for the entire time of the blockade - 250 g for a work card and 125 g for an employee, child**

**and dependent. Considering that work cards in November-December 1941 received only a third of the population, then the meagreness of these norms will become even more obvious. Now only 510 tons of flour were consumed daily to supply 2.5 million inhabitants of Leningrad.**

A few lines above, the recipe for preparing this terrible blockade bread is also indicated: **"The bread was**

**baked from a mixture of: food cellulose - 10%, cotton cake - 10%, wallpaper dust - 2%, flour sweeping and shaking out of bags - 2%, corn flour - 3%, rye flour - 73%. Bakeries switched to tin baking of bread, baking was brought up to 68 %.** If I were a teacher, I would make

an assignment for a school textbook on arithmetic from this - here are percentages, and proportions, and reciprocal fractions, and an occasion to think about my well-fed life for the first time ... But my readers are adults, therefore, without bothering them with work with a calculator, I will give you a ready-made answer right away. It takes only 430 grams of flour to make one kilogram of such "bread". Accordingly, **"to supply 2.5 million residents of Leningrad"** according to the above standards, only 179 tons of flour were required. And it was consumed daily - 510 tons. This is arithmetic. This is not

philosophy, not political science, not a discussion "about a complex and in many ways ambiguous period of our history ...". This is simple arithmetic. With a consumption of 510 tons of flour, rations could be almost tripled. So what were these made of?

"one hundred and twenty-five blockade grams with fire and blood in half?" And where, excuse me, hundreds of tons of flour?

We will not, however, find fault with particulars - much more strange facts lie ahead of us. But before moving on to completely official statistics, let's do one more "amateurish" calculation. Let's calculate how much flour is needed in order to give each of the 2.5 million inhabitants (in September 1941, 2544 thousand bread cards were issued in Leningrad) 800 grams of excellent (not at all like that terrible mass of cake with sawdust, which in December 1941, Leningraders received bread. 800 grams of bread a day is the largest, working ration on the "Great Land". There is no need to talk about hunger, even more so about starvation, with such rations. Assuming a typical "pripek" for baking rye bread, equal to 33%, we get a very "round" and easily remembered figure of **1500 tons**.

If there are errors in this calculation, then they are not too large. So, during the operation of the ice "road of life" Leningrad received an average of 1920 tons of food per day. At the same time, from February 11, 1942, it was possible to increase the supply rates to the level of: 800 grams for soldiers at the front, 600 for rear units, 500 for workers, 400 for employees, 300 for children and the unemployed; bread began to be baked from flour with almost no impurities of "conditionally edible" components; since mid-February, real meat, natural fats, and dried fruits have been distributed to the population. Moreover, with such a cargo flow, it was even possible to accumulate serious food supplies (according to various authors, for a period of 18 to 60 days). In Berlin, as noted above, an average of 2,700 tons of food per day was delivered, with such a cargo flow, there was no question of hunger. Delivering 1,500 tons by air is a task of enormous complexity. But water transport has completely different dimensions. A very small (less than I could not find in a modern

reference book) river barge ("Project R-137") has a carrying capacity of 1500 tons (total displacement - 1953 tons). The river barge "project R-165" with a length of 91.6 m and a width of 15.7 m has a carrying capacity of 2670 tons. One such barge can provide the daily food needs of a million city. Yes, in the early 40s, the river (lake) fleet of the USSR did not have such ships, but the existing ones were not

too small. Thus, in accordance with the GKO decree of August 30, 1941, the people's commissariats of the navy and river fleets were asked to allocate 25 tugboats and 75 lake barges with a carrying capacity of 1 thousand tons each to supply Leningrad. The barges actually used in navigation in 1941 had an average carrying capacity (not displacement, but carrying capacity) of the order of 400–700 tons. Worse, due to problems with berths, loading and towing on the stormy Ladoga, their real load was reduced to 300-500 tons. All this abundance of figures boils down to a simple conclusion:

5-6 of the most modest barges a day removed all the problems with providing Leningrad with food according to the usual (i.e., very modest) wartime norms. Another 3-4 barges could provide the delivery of the required amount of fuel and ammunition for the front (it is in this proportion - 785 thousand tons of food and 495 thousand tons of fuel, ammunition and weapons - that the total cargo flow to Leningrad has developed over the entire period of the blockade, since September 1941 to March 1943). That's all that was required for the "transport breakthrough" of the blockade. And now we turn from calculations to facts. Water

transportation in the basin of the Neva, Svir

and Lake Ladoga was in charge of an organization called the North-Western River Shipping Company (NWRP). In 1940, NWRP transported 3.4 million tons of cargo through the Leningrad river port alone. Even if we forget that there is winter, this gives 9300 tons per day! In fact, taking into account the actual duration of navigation on the Neva, this figure can be safely increased one and a half times. By the beginning of 1941, the SZRP included 323 tugs and 960 non-self-propelled vessels with a total carrying capacity of 420 thousand tons. Even one percent (!) Of such a carrying capacity is 4200 tons. Don't you think, gentlemen, that after such figures the word "blockade" next to the word "Leningrad" should be written in quotation marks?

The war began - and with barges, on the Neva, exactly the same thing began to happen as with tanks, planes, cannons, cyclopean stocks of ammunition ... They began to melt, disappear in the fog ...

***“A large number of ships were transferred to the jurisdiction of military authorities and left Leningrad for the east (?) with the population (?) and evacuation cargo. Retrieve these last ships and replenish floa***

***SZRP by transferring ships from other water basins was impossible ... As a result, by the beginning of the blockade of Leningrad, SZRP had only 5 lake and 72 river tugboats, 29 lake and about 100 river barges on Lake Ladoga and Volkhov.***

It is impossible to understand with what kind of "population" the ships went east; unfortunately, there was no mass evacuation of the population from Leningrad; and what is already completely incomprehensible - where was this distant "east" if it was "impossible to return" the departed ships from it? However, even taking into account all these oddities, 129 barges and 77 tugs remained in the NWRP. It would seem, what are the

problems? The problems are known, more precisely, there is only one problem surprise. It suddenly became clear that:

***"In their condition, ships, especially non-self-propelled ones, were of little use for sailing along Ladoga. Therefore, only 43 wooden dry-cargo, 4 metal and 2 wooden oil barges were allocated for transportation. At the same time, of the allocated courts, more than***

***20 dry-cargo barges, due to their dilapidation, could not sail on the lake in the autumn***

***period ... "*** So, the huge river (lake) fleet has shrunk to 29 barges suitable for navigation on Ladoga. This is very little - in comparison with the potential capabilities of the SZRP, but in comparison with the required amount of "tonnage" needed to supply Leningrad - more than enough. Such a number of boats theoretically made it possible not only to meet the current needs of the city, but also to create many months of food supplies. Why did a terrible, mortal famine arise in the city? ***"The military prosecutor's office of the Ladoga***

***military flotilla (yes, in addition to the civilian SZRP there was also a military flotilla - M.S.) and the commissar of the Front Logistics Directorate N.N. Zhmakin, who checked the work of the Osinovets port on October 22 (the main port on the western, "Leningrad" shore of Lake Ladoga. - M.S.), stated that a limited number of barges run between Osinovets and Novaya Ladoga and that they unload for a very long time. So, barges No. 512 and No. 768 with ammunition arrived in Osinovets on October 13, and were unloaded only on October 17; barge No. 367 with gasoline***

***arrived on October 17, and unloaded on October 21 ... All these difficulties and shortcomings led to the fact that the turnover of barges instead of 4 days was 6-12 days ... "***

You can be sure that the enumeration of objective difficulties, due to which the transition to 100 km and back took 12 days, and ***"two weeks after the start of transportation, only 9 lake and 13 river barges remained in operation,"*** takes more than a dozen pages. And the berths were not equipped, and there were not enough lighthouses on the route, and coal was not delivered for tugboats, and the enemy counteracted in every possible way ... So after all, that's what the war is with the enemy. During the first six days of the Allied landings in Normandy (June 1944), 104 thousand tons of equipment were unloaded on the French coast. **17,300 tons per day.** These tons were unloaded not in the port and not on an empty unequipped beach, but on a very equipped shore. For several years, the Germans equipped this coast with all conceivable types of barriers so that even a light flat-bottomed landing boat, not to mention a heavy sea vessel, could not approach it ... In

just 58 days of navigation (from September 10 to November 7, 1941) in the blockade Leningrad, 58,873 tons of various cargoes were delivered, including 45 thousand tons of food, mainly grain and flour. On ships sunk for various reasons, including enemy air strikes, 2.8 thousand tons of cargo were lost (4.8% of the total cargo flow). The losses are quite moderate, but this should not surprise us, taking into account both the scantiness of the German aviation forces left near Leningrad after the transfer of the main forces of the Luftwaffe to the Moscow direction, and the composition of the Osinovetsky and Svirsky air defense brigade areas (in terms of the number of anti-aircraft guns and searchlights, they surpassed air defense of the oil fields of Ploiesti or the largest port of Constanta in Romania). As for food, a little less than 800

tons were delivered to the city along Ladoga, that is, in fact, two or three underloaded barges per day. It is clear that the potential of the huge river fleet was used extremely poorly. Another thing is not clear - from the point of view of irrefutable arithmetic, even 800 tons



food per day made it possible to give the population much more than 125 grams of surrogate bread ... Be that as it

may, it was the situation of the first months of the "blockade" that predetermined the death of hundreds of thousands of Leningraders. It was then that the bulk of the people died, and the health of many survivors was irreversibly undermined - that's why the "chronology of death" is shifted relative to the cargo flow statistics. In December 1941, when bread distribution rates dropped to a minimum, 53,000 people died; in January, 120,000 people died; such is the documentary statistics, as you know, in newspaper publications "for the anniversary", the figures are much larger - after all, we "consider fatigue as a measure of work", and "contribution to victory" we measure by the number of our own losses). During the "second navigation" (1942), the average freight traffic increased to

3,732 tons per day, including 1,863 tons of food (not including livestock). At the same time, it was possible not only to bring food rations up to the national level, but also to deliver 290,000 military reinforcements to the city - 20 full divisions in the pre-war state! In total, over a year and a half of the "blockade", all types of transport delivered 1.3 million tons of various cargoes to Leningrad (as well as 28 thousand heads of live cattle). Is it a lot? Everything is relative. This is only 8% of the total volume of transportation by river transport of the USSR during the war years. This is almost two times less than what the Americans delivered by plane (!!!) to West Berlin in a much shorter time.

## "Our power will be terrible ..."

### *Version one. Soviet-traditional*

Vile traitors, mercenaries of German fascism, long before the start of Hitler's aggression against the USSR, they sold themselves with all their giblets to the German special services. In German uniforms, with German weapons in their hands, OUN militants came to Ukraine. Fires and blood, brutal reprisals against Soviet and party activists, families of Red Army commanders - these are the milestones that mark the path of crimes of Ukrainian nationalists. At the same time, trying to mislead the broad masses of the people, the OUN played a "spectacle" with the proclamation on June 30, 1941 in the occupied Lvov of the so-called "government of sovereign Ukraine" - with such an awkward trick, the servants of fascism wanted to portray themselves as equal "allies" Germany. For greater credibility, the organizers of the "performance" even staged the arrest of Bandera, Stetsko, and a number of other figures of the Lvov "government", as allegedly violating the will of their German masters. In fact, all this was just cheap clownery - Bandera, allegedly "gone underground", did not undertake active military operations against the German occupiers and did not even plan. The struggle against the invaders was raised by the

Ukrainian people themselves, led by underground party organizations; every day the partisan movement grew and expanded, German echelons flew into the air, entire "partisan regions" arose in the forests of Volhynia and Zhitomir region. In this situation, following the next order of their German masters, the Ukrainian nationalists played a new vile trick - they announced the creation of the so-called "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA), which supposedly would fight against the Nazi invaders. In this way, the leaders of the OUN hoped to divert the working people of Ukraine from real resistance to the invaders, and even more than that, to send UPA armed detachments against the Soviet partisans. From the spring of 1944, after

the victorious Red Army began the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine, the last masks were thrown off, and the OUN leaders openly turned their weapons against the Soviet soldiers-liberators.

The UPA gangs fired at the columns of the Red Army, mined bridges and roads, tried to attack individual units of the Soviet troops. And even after the end of the war, gangs of nationalists who had taken refuge in the forests and mountains tried to prevent the restoration of peaceful life, terrorized the population, killed doctors and teachers, and prevented the unification of peasants into collective farms. However, the Soviet government, having shown unparalleled humanity, announced an amnesty five times, offering those who were driven into Bandera detachments by deceit or threats to leave the forest, lay down their arms and begin creative work. Most of the UPA militants (about 80 thousand people) took the opportunity to stop the senseless resistance; only those who were guilty of the gravest crimes and could not count on indulgence remained in the gangs. Law enforcement agencies, with the support of "destruction squads" from among the local population, successfully destroyed the bandits.

### ***Version two, perestroika-democratic***

The brightest page in the history of the resistance of the peoples of the USSR to the Stalinist dictatorship was the struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. In August 1943, on the territory of Western Ukraine liberated by UPA fighters, the 3rd Extraordinary Congress of the OUN was held, at which a movement program was adopted under the slogan: "Will to the peoples! The will of the people!" ("Freedom to the nations! Freedom to man!"). In July 1944, the Ukrainian Main Liberation Council (UGVR - according to the first letters of the corresponding words of the Ukrainian language) was formed. The UGVR, acting as the "underground government" of Ukraine, proclaimed the following goals and principles: equality of all peoples inhabiting Ukraine; building in the independent Ukrainian state a society free from the exploitation of man by man, based on public ownership of the main means of production; freedom of conscience, speech, press and assembly;

revolutionary reorganization of the USSR in line with the creation of independent states for all peoples enslaved by Stalin's tyranny.

Under the leadership of the UGVR, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army waged a selfless struggle against the punitive troops of the NKVD. To prevent the Stalinist dictatorship from gaining a foothold in Western Ukrainian lands, to prevent the enslavement of peasants in collective farm slavery, to prevent the creation of youth and cultural organizations hostile to the Ukrainian people, to destroy the agents of the occupiers - these were the goals of this struggle, during which the UPA fighters and the underground in the cities showed an unprecedented courage and heroism. Neither the constant threat of death, nor the hardships of many years of life in the forests and "cache", nor the torture in the cellars of the NKVD could break the will of the heroes. Nowhere and never did the Stalinist regime encounter such stubborn armed resistance, and he responded to it with the most brutal mass terror. Villages were burning, tens of thousands of civilians were killed and tortured, hundreds of thousands were deported to Siberia. Wanting to compromise the UPA fighters in the eyes of the population, the Chekists created special detachments of thugs - the so-called "special fighters of the NKVD." Equipped with the latest rabble, these gangs of pathological sadists and rapists, acting under the guise and on behalf of the structures of the armed underground, brutally cracked down on peaceful peasants. In the end, the huge military machine of the Stalinist empire crushed a handful of daredevils, but the "madness of the brave" shown by the fighters and commanders of the UPA has found its highest justification today in the creation of an independent, democratic Ukraine.

### ***Version three. The latest sovereign***

For centuries, successive hordes of invaders divided the land of Ukraine among themselves, plundered its riches, tormented and corrupted the soul of the Ukrainian people. By violence and deceit, foreigners tried to force crests to forget their native language, to deprive them of faith in their own strength, to accustom them to look at themselves as second-rate "Khokhlov", "Little Russians". In the hardest hour for the fate of Ukraine, after the tragic death of the UNR and the occupation of Ukrainian lands by Poland and

Soviet Russia, the best representatives of the Ukrainian people created the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The nation, its interests, its future - this is the only guiding star that led them on the thorny path of struggle and self-sacrifice. Ukrainian nationalism created a new type of man with an iron, inflexible character, ready at any moment to sacrifice himself and others for the sake of a great goal - the Ukrainian Cathedral Independent State. With the firmness and foresight of the true leaders of the people, the leaders of the OUN cast aside the brilliant tinsel of corrupting liberal chatter about "human rights" and "democratic freedoms." States are built and destroyed only by force, only by fire and sword, and it is not the fault of the Ukrainian people that it fell to their lot to create their state in the 20th century, the century of petty-bourgeois hypocrisy and the dominance of sanctimonious morality.

Torn apart by numerous opponents, Ukraine needed a strong ally, and the leaders of the OUN firmly and consistently set a course for cooperation with the new, dynamic European power - Nazi Germany. The allies had a common goal - to recreate their (German and Ukrainian) state within its fair ethnic boundaries, and a common enemy - decaying Poland and the aggressive Soviet Union aimed at non-stop expansion. With great political skill, the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists used the situation of a fierce clash of world powers to achieve their invariable goal - the liberation of Ukraine from the centuries-old yoke of Moscow. Tactically supporting Germany, they tried to shift the burden of the struggle against the Stalinist empire onto the German army to the maximum extent possible, thus saving the vitality of the Ukrainian people for the last decisive battle. A tragic set of circumstances made it impossible to realize this plan, but even in the face of inevitable defeat, the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists showed unbending firmness of spirit. They fought on their own, not foreign land; they led thousands of their comrades-in-arms to death, they demanded complete dedication from the cowardly inhabitants, but they themselves, without a moment's hesitation, gave their blood and life for their homeland. Glory to Ukraine! Glory to heroes!

The most incredible thing is that, to a certain extent, all of the above (with the exception of the rally rhetoric) is not far from

truth (and the text itself is made up of quite authentic quotes). Is there another, equally diverse, phenomenon in the history of the 20th century? Is there another political organization that would make such an incredible "drift" from totalitarianism to declared democracy and back? Where should a brief review of the history of the Bandera movement begin?

From geography. ***"Far from the Ukrainian region, having passed through Poland,***

***bypassing the populous Lemberg (Lvov. - M.S.), high mountains go in rows ... There, the faith is not the same, and the speech is not the same.***" So wrote a well-known Putin

propagandist, a doctor of communist sciences, a great-power chauvinist and a Ukrainophobe (did I miss anything from the standard list of labels?) N.V. Gogol. It was this ("both the faith is not the same, and the speech is not the same"), far from the Ukrainian region, Galicia seemed in the 19th century.

Eastern (Ukrainian) Galicia, that is, the territory of the eastern foothills of the Carpathians with the cities of Lviv, Sambir, Stryi, Galich, Stanislav (now Ivano-Frankivsk), Kolomyia, Ternopil, Zbarazh, Brody, has never, not a single day, been part of the Russian empire. The heyday of the Galicia-Volyn principality in the middle of the 13th century was undermined by the invasion of Batu; after this blow, the principality existed for another century (becoming for a short time the first and only East Slavic kingdom), but by the end of the 14th century, its lands were finally divided between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Volyn went to it) and Poland, which included Galicia. The capital of the region - the city of Lviv - over time turned into one of the most important economic and cultural centers of Poland, in 1661 Lviv University was established. After the first partition of the Commonwealth (1772) and until the First World War, Galicia was an integral part of the huge multinational empire of the Habsburgs (the so-called "Austria-Hungary"). The geographical, administrative and state remoteness of Galicia from the "central", Dnieper, Ukraine was aggravated by the difference in religion. The centuries-old bloody

struggle of Orthodoxy and Catholicism led to the emergence and consolidation of the "Greek Catholic" (Uniate) Church in Galicia. The problem, of course, is not

THAT GALICIAN and, for example, VOLYNSKY or the Zhytomyr peasant was divided by contradictions in the dogma of the two confessions (hardly illiterate peasants could understand this intricacies). Everything was much simpler - and tougher. An Orthodox Ukrainian maiden and a Galician lad from a Uniate family could not get married in the same church, they could not jointly baptize children born in marriage. Moreover, over time, a very unusual (if not unique) tradition of determining nationality in the family has developed in Galicia. Here is how the Ukrainian historian Viktor Polishchuk writes about it: ***"In Galicia, because of the panoychogo***

***(dominant) there among the Ukrainians of the Greek-Catholic (Uniate) religion, the dogmatic organization of the orderly (subordinate) Roman Catholic Church, the members of the o) Poles and Galician Ukrainians, dŷysnŷ slubi (wedding, marriage) could go either in one or another church, either (i.e.) in the church of the Roman-Latin, or the same (eastern, i.e., Uniate) rite ... In such a blue family (boys, sons), if there is (if we are talking about) about religion, and to bring (and even) nationality, they went after their fathers, and daughters after their mothers. At first glance, marvelous families were formed, in some of them children were Roman Catholics and Poles, and others were Greek Catholics and Ukrainians ... "*** It is clear that such a

tradition, on the one hand, led to the mutual assimilation of Poles and Ukrainians, on the other hand, exacerbated the gap between the Uniate Galicia and the Orthodox center and east of Ukraine. A long succession of generations born and grown old in the Commonwealth inevitably led to the saturation of the language of Galician Ukrainians with Polonisms and Germanisms to such an extent that a resident of Eastern Ukraine could not always understand a Galician. In any case, Taras Bulba hardly recognized "his own" in the Galician Uniates - rather, on the contrary, he would say something like: ***"They adopt the devil knows what Busurman customs, they abhor their own language; does not want to talk to his own ... "*** Yes, and it's scary to think how the meeting of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks with the family of Stepan Bandera, whose father was a Uniate priest, and whose mother was the daughter of a priest, could have ended in reality ("The hair would now stand on end ***from those terrible signs of the ferocity of the half-wild century,***

***which the Cossacks carried everywhere. Beaten babies, circumcised breasts of women, torn skin from the knees of those released to freedom - in a word , the Cossacks repaid their former debts in large***

***coins ... ").*** The entry of Galicia into the Habsburg Empire led to significant changes in the social status of the Galician Ukrainians. The empire, within the framework of the traditional "divide and conquer" policy, led a skillful line of supporting the weak in their confrontation with the strong. The lands inherited by Austria-Hungary were Polish-Jewish cities surrounded by Ukrainian-Polish villages. It's in that proportion. Thus, according to the encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron, at the end of the 19th century the population of Lvov consisted of 67,000 Poles, 36,000 Jews, and 21,000 Ukrainians. And since in any era power, money and knowledge were in the city, and the city was Polish, and then Jewish and already quite a bit Ukrainian, the Austrian authorities considered it expedient to support the Ukrainians, using them as a counterweight to the Poles.

Ukrainian newspapers were published in Lvov and Vienna, books in Ukrainian were printed, Ukrainian national schools were opened (and in the 20th century, Ukrainian universities). In the last quarter of the 19th century, there were many Ukrainian national-cultural, youth, educational organizations in Lviv; the Ukrainian People's Rada acted (albeit on a "voluntary basis", without power). In the atmosphere of national revival, in the "Carpathian Piedmont", as Lviv was then called, the Galicians formed a very peculiar attitude towards eastern Ukrainians - as to "poor (in every sense of the word) relatives", oppressed and not even understanding the full measure of their oppression. With the outbreak of World War II, the Lviv People's Rada called on the Ukrainians of Austria-

Hungary to stand in the front ranks of the fighters against the Russian Empire, "oppressing the half-brothers of Ukrainians." On the basis of youth military sports societies, the so-called "Legion of Sich Riflemen" was created, which became one of the most combat-ready units of the Austrian army. The Russian imperial army in the Carpathians was by no means greeted with flowers. The Russian authorities did not remain in debt, and from Galicia there were



tens of thousands of Ukrainian activists, representatives of the intelligentsia and the Uniate clergy were deported (although these echelons never reached Siberia - a revolution began in Russia ...).

It is hardly a mere coincidence that D. Dontsov's book "Nationalism" was first published in Galicia (in the city of Zhovkva) in the printing house of the Greek Catholic monastic brotherhood, that the founding congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was held in Vienna, and the first Colonel of the Sich Riflemen Evgen Konovalets became the leader of the organization, and most of the leaders of the movement (S. Bandera, A. Melnik, J. Stetsko, R. Shukhevych, D. Klyachivsky, V. Cook, I. Grinyokh, M. Matviyiko) were born in Galicia , and the so-called "Act of the Restoration of the Independence of Ukraine" of June 30, 1941 was proclaimed in Lviv, and the first (it is the only) Ukrainian division of the Waffen SS was formed in Lviv and received the name "Galicia" ...

Parenthetically, we note that any discussion of the thesis that OUN nationalism was more of a Galician than an all-Ukrainian phenomenon leads the current apologists of Banderaism into indescribable fury. No wonder, because all their "argumentation" is based on the fact that "Bandera's people are the Ukrainian people", and "the people are always right, because they have the right", and "the attitude towards Bandera and the OUN is a litmus test that reveals Ukrainianophobes and imperial chauvinists. In line with such ideas, in the last 10–15 years, the most thorough "excavations" have been carried out, which should reveal at least the slightest traces of the Bandera movement in eastern Ukraine (it came to such shameless nonsense as the **statement** about the OUN origin of the Krasnodon "Young Guard").

As a result, the nationalists whipped themselves more painfully than Gogol's non-commissioned officer's widow: nothing resembling the existence of any active Bandera underground east of the Dnieper was ever found; among the established 254 names of the leaders of the OUN, UPA, UGVR, only 63 people were not natives of Galicia (and even those occupied third-rank positions). However, the results of the first round of the presidential elections in Ukraine in 2010 became the most objective and revealing "research".

praising Bandera, voted as much as ... 1.4% of voters. Even in Lviv (!!!) Tyahnybok won only 5.35% of the vote, losing to the "pro-Russian" Yanukovych (5.67%). The maximum level of support was noted in the Brody district of the Lviv region - 9.8%. In the central and eastern regions of Ukraine, a vanishingly small number of voters voted for Tyagnibok, which formed the final, very deplorable result for the nationalists. And this, we note, in a situation of a protracted political and economic crisis, with factories stopped, the hryvnia falling, mass unemployment, paralysis of power - that is, in an ideal "nutrient environment" for the development of extremist movements ...

Let us return, however, to history. Two empires (Russian and Austro-Hungarian) could not withstand the stress of many years of world war and collapsed; on their wreckage, a fierce bloody struggle "of all against all" immediately began. For the Ukrainian people, the results of this war were, without exaggeration, tragic. Created in Galicia, the ZUNR (Western Ukrainian People's Republic) was defeated by the army of the revived Poland; in central Ukraine, left-wing nationalists (the so-called "Petliurites") proclaimed the UNR (Ukrainian People's Republic), whose army suffered one defeat after another from the Red Army of Soviet Russia. In this situation, in April 1920, Petliura and Pilsudski concluded an agreement on the creation of a "Polish-Ukrainian confederation", while the border between Poland and Ukraine was drawn along the Zbruch River (i.e., Galicia and Volyn became part of Poland). As you know, Moscow did not approve the plan to create a Polish-Ukrainian confederation. In May 1920, the Soviet-Polish war began, during which the Red Army first drove the Poles from Kyiv to Warsaw, then itself fled in disarray from Warsaw to Minsk. In the end, on March 18, 1921, a peace treaty was signed in Riga between Poland and ... by no means the Soviet Union (which at that time did not exist at all), but two formal opponents of Poland - Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine. Under the terms of the Treaty of Riga, the border between Poland and Ukraine was also drawn along the Zbruch River; thus, the inclusion of Volhynia and Galicia (what was later called "Western Ukraine") in

the composition of the recreated Poland was confirmed by the signatures of two (Petliura and Soviet) Ukrainian governments. To

the east of Zbruch appeared "sovereign" Soviet Ukraine, soon included in the USSR. The political games with the party-communist "Ukrainization" of the 1920s quickly ended ("the players", as well as their political opponents and allies, were almost completely shot during the Great Terror), and all the disasters, all the "Egyptian executions" fell upon Soviet Ukraine Stalinist tyranny, including the man-made famine of 32-33, which killed millions of Ukrainians. In Volhynia and Galicia, that is, in "Polish Ukraine", a much more complex and ambiguous situation developed.

The authorities of the 2nd Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth quickly forgot about the obligation to grant Ukrainians the rights of broad autonomy; on the other hand, formally and legally, all national minorities in Poland (i.e., primarily Ukrainians and Jews) had equal rights with the Poles, Ukrainians were both members of the Seimas (parliament), and local authorities, and officers Polish army. At the same time, a completely conscious policy of "Polonization" was carried out - the number of Ukrainian schools was reduced, Ukrainian newspapers and publishing houses were closed. T. and. were resettled to Volhynia from central Poland. "siegemien", who were given the best lands (according to modern Ukrainian historians - in order to change the national composition of the population in favor of the Poles; according to Polish authors, there was only a return of the Poles to the lands of their fathers and grandfathers, confiscated by the tsarist government after the defeat of the Polish uprising 1863). Finally, the biggest tension was created by Polish arrogance and Polish arrogance, which were not recorded in any code of laws, but, alas, became a "common noun". It is not difficult to guess how these unworthy feelings flared up in the newly acquired Polish state, which was in a hurry to "take revenge" after two centuries of defeats and national humiliation. In general, we have to state that the leadership of the 2nd Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth (which led the country straight to the catastrophe of September 1939) conducted national policy in the most stupid way you can think of: Polish national oppression was

strong enough to make it impossible not to notice, but completely insufficient to (following the example of Comrade Stalin) crush any possibility of resistance. Which had its own, quite predictable, consequences.

The bitterness of defeat was especially keenly experienced by the Ukrainians of Galicia, who, from a privileged (in the conditions of the former Austria-Hungary) minority, had to turn into an object of open pressure from the Polish authorities. The leaders and activists of the defeated ZUNR moved to a very close (to Vienna and Prague) emigration, and already in September 1920, the "Ukrainian Military Organization" (UVO) appeared, headed by the colonel of the legion of the Sich Riflemen Yevgen Konovalts (grandson of the Uniate priest). The name of the organization quite frankly spoke about the alleged methods of struggle for the restoration of Ukrainian statehood. However, in the early 1920s, a sharply negative attitude towards liberal-democratic ideas became a pan-European (and not just Western Ukrainian) trend. Under the influence of "news from the East" (i.e., from the Stalinist USSR), the former prestige and the previously so widespread left socialist views quickly lost their former authority. The resulting vacuum needed to be filled. For Galician extremists, Dmitry Dontsov's "integral nationalism" became the core of ideological consolidation.

This man was born in Melitopol, into a Russian family, orphaned early, lived and studied in Petrograd, Vienna, Lvov, Berlin, was personally acquainted with Petliura, worked in the pro-German government of Hetman Skoropadsky in Kiev. He came into the world as Mitka Shelkoper, but since it is absolutely impossible to engage in journalism with such a surname, the future idol of Ukrainian nationalists took the pseudonym "Dontsov" for himself. The first "anti-Moskal" articles were published by him as early as 1913, and in 1926 D. Dontsov's fundamental work "Nationalism" was published. Two generations of Ukrainian nationalists were brought up on this book (and at the end of Yushchenko's presidency, the study of Dontsov's "Nationalism" was even included in university programs). An integral is a union,

connection, summation. In this case, this word was, in fact, "tracing paper", a synonym for that

the same concept ("bundle", "bundle"), which in Italian formed the basis of the term "fascism" (D. Dontsov was not only familiar with the works of Mussolini, but also translated "Dottrina del Fascismo" into Ukrainian). Dontsov linked together two, at first glance, not obviously related things. Firstly, the Nietzschean ideas coming from the 19th century, the cult of the "strong personality", for which there is neither law nor morality. This message could also be interpreted as a justification for extreme egoism and hedonism, but Dontsov connects it with the idea of the Nation, which is turned into an absolute value. The nation is higher than a person, higher than parties, higher than classes, while the will of the nation is realized through the active actions of a minority seized by a fanatical impulse, freed from the "petty-bourgeois restrictions" of morality and law. Dontsov declared these provisions extremely harshly and with surprising

frankness: ***"National fanaticism, ca zbraya (weapon) of strong peoples, which dig (perform) great vchinki (acts) ... A fanatic recognizes (recognizes) his truth for announcing (the only (universal), as may buti (should be) accepted by others. Zvydsi (from here) yoga aggressiveness and intolerance to other glances (views) ... Be saviors and well-being (aggressors and invaders) until you can be volodars and lords (rulers and owners). The will of life is unequivocal with panuvannya's thirst ... The essence of life is tse sit and panuvati (own and dominate); the essence is the struggle for superiority (superiority), for growth (growth) and breadth, for power, for the power of power, for the power of life (for the thirst for power is, in fact, the thirst for life) ... Human race, hot and cold (gregarious) breed, all the same, zavzhd buv and now lose (always was and now remains) still a hizhatsky (predatory) breed ... The law of nature is the right of strength, expansion - not only self-affirmation of the vlasnoy (one's) will until life, but th transcendence yy (denial, rejection of it) in others... The will of life and the will of power (striving for power) change into the will of war... The will of war between nations is eternal. Eternal and war... Nature that history does not know aggressive and non-aggressive races, only (only) strong and weak races. Rasi strong - vyzvolyayutsya, if the stench is beaten (weakened), and expands with the cost (at the expense) of the weak, if they are free ... "***

And so on. On hundreds of pages there is an endless variation on the theme: "Man is a wolf to man", and this thesis is transferred to the level of interstate and interethnic relations and elevated to the rank of Absolute Truth. Without a shadow of embarrassment, Dontsov names as the main **"great and dignified nationalism" (demands of active, effective nationalism) "romanticism, dogmatism, illusionism, fanaticism and "immorality"**. Yes, he put the word "immorality" in quotation marks, but, as can be seen from at least the above statements, Dontsov only wanted to use quotation marks to strengthen the expression of his contempt for the "weaklings" who seek miserable solace in the norms of generally accepted morality.

Dontsov's ideas fell into the inflamed consciousness of the Galician nationalists, like cartridges in a clip. Yes, by the way, when joining the OUN, a new convert took an oath of allegiance, placing his hand not on the Gospel, not on the crucifix, not on the Charter of the organization, not on the Constitution of the future sovereign Ukraine, not on a handful of his native land, but on ... a revolver! In January-February 1929, the founding Congress (1st Great Gathering, a number of authors use the term "1st Congress") was held in Vienna, at which the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was created. The same Yevgen Konovalets became the head of the OUN (UVO existed for some time in the unofficial status of the "armed wing" of the movement). In the address of the Congress to the Ukrainian people, in particular, it was said:

**"... The complete elimination (complete elimination, expulsion) of all borrowers (invaders) from Ukrainian lands, to advance in the biga of the national revolution, in order to open up the possibility for a wide development of the Ukrainian Nation within the boundaries of the sovereign state (within the borders of one's own state) ... ishno-political chivalry ( foreign policy activity) The Ukrainian State is striving to touch the boundaries (establishing borders) that slander (which cover) all Ukrainian ethnographic difficulties ... Only a national dictatorship, established in the course of the national revolution, can ensure the internal strength of the Ukrai**

In order to appreciate what exactly the future creators of the "national dictatorship" promised, what kind of **"borrowers"** they intended to "completely eliminate from the Ukrainian land", it should be taken into account that under the "Ukrainian

ethnographic lands," the leaders of the OUN understood not only the entire territory of today's Ukraine without exception (with Crimea, Odessa and Donbass), but also Przemyśl, Kholm, part of the Lublin Voivodeship in Poland, Brest and Pinsk in Belarus, Kursk, Voronezh, Taganrog, Stavropol, Krasnodar in Russia. In some official statements, the borders were described quite simply: "from the Danube and the Carpathians

to the Caspian." The word "dictatorship" was also used not for beauty of speech. In paragraph 16 of the Decree of the Great Assembly we read: **"The organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was inspired by ambushes (built on the principles) of all-Ukraine, non-party and monocratism."** All three come down to one thing, and in modern

political parlance it's called "totalitarianism." One of the main ideologists of the OUN at that time (by the way, the son of a Uniate priest) S.

Lenkavsky compiled the text of the "Decalogue", in which, in the form of "ten commandments" addressed to a member of the movement, the main principles and tasks. First of all, it was proclaimed: **"You will win the Ukrainian State, otherwise you will perish in the struggle for it."** Paragraph (it's a sin to call such a "commandment") the seventh

was: **"You don't care about the vikonati the greatest mischief, so that you vimagatime do good (you won't stop before committing the gravest crime if the interests of the Cause so require).** Point

eighth: **"I will take the enemies of Your Nation with hatred and**

**treachery (with hatred and treachery you will overcome the enemies of your na**

The form of the "big nationalist greeting" was also established - the right hand with an open palm raised up. Appeal: "Glory to Ukraine!",

Answer: "Glory to the leader!" (much later, after the death of Konovalets and the split of the organization into Melnikovites and Banderaites, the Banderaites, who did not recognize Melnik as a "leader", introduced

"Glory to the Heroes" as a response). In August 1939, when the question arose that the Germans, having defeated Poland, might perhaps allow the OUN to create some kind of "mini Ukraine" on its ruins, Melnik and Stsyborsky urgently drew up the text of the Constitution of the future power. It began like this: "Ukraine is a sovereign, authoritarian, totalitarian, professional class power." At the head of the "sovereign totalitarian" Ukraine was to be the Leader of the Nation appointed for life, having

the right to convene and dissolve the government and parliament, and in his actions the Leader is responsible only "before God, history and his own conscience."

There is such a good saying: "If a bird walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck." What should be the name of an organization that promotes the cult of power, openly sings of aggression, expansion, interethnic enmity and war? Without even the slightest authority, he starts broadcasting on behalf of the "whole nation"? Preparing for a violent takeover? Promises to establish a dictatorship of an irremovable "leader" and carry out total ethnic cleansing? Is there some well-known term that is used to designate such organizations and movements?

The current Bandera apologists are silent, they are silent and do not give an answer. Or, on the contrary, they scream heart-rendingly, demonstrating the indignation of offended innocence - just like the pupils of the boarding house of noble maidens, who were shown a naked horse. And others go even further, indulge in "breaking bad", begin to falsify documents - as a result, at the end of the 60s, among the Canadian Ukrainian emigration, they compose a "new decalogue", in which instead of the **frankly** the gravest crime"), a completely vegetarian "you will complete the most dangerous task" appears ... Let's pay tribute to the Galician fascists -

they were not shy about their ideological "kinship", they did not disdain comrades-in-arms and like-minded people. Back in 1923, in the journal Literaturno-Scientific Bulletin, published by the UVO, D. Dontsov published an article entitled "What are we fascists?" In which he fully approves of the "political and moral and psychological spirit" of this new (at that time) pan-European infection. In the format of a literary supplement to the "Bulletin" ("Book of the Visnik"), a series of brochures was published telling about the military path of the leaders of European fascism. Here are some names: "Mussolin - people and rank", "A. Hitler", "Vognisty Cross - Colonel La Rocque" (this is about the failed French "Fuhrer"), "Franco is the leader of the Espensians". In the preface to the pamphlet about Mussolini, Dontsov writes :



***(decomposing) forces of internationality and native coltunery, and Italy from the countryside-provinces, having killed the nation, without which nothing important can be done on our continent, but for a second, the posture of ours ... "***

The aforementioned Mykola Stsyborsky in 1935 wrote a large book "Nazocracy", where there was a 4th section called "Fascism". On these pages, a solemn hymn to fascism simply thunders: ***"Fascism and other nationalist movements***

***(movements) have unleashed a flood of great ideas; the basis of their decency (activity) stench put healthy principles of authoritarianism to the wire (leadership) of the nation, gierirkyh, obov'yazku (duty) and discipline. Based on these ideas and principles, there is a great mission for the doctors of an ailing era ... Dictatorship is a creative, mobilizing and uplifting (educating) factor that wins the majority (draws the majority) and with a firm hand skerov y y (leads him) to rozbudovi (building) wind and real values. Not to recognize this one can be less than blind people, but the adherents (followers) of the old, bankrupt Talmuds are embittered ... "***

For the sake of truth, it should be noted that at some point Stsyborsky recalls his beloved "independence" and clarifies : ***completely original (it is at the same time a movement through and through original) and in no way independent. Vyn yntuysya yn yntuysya vlasnoi vlasnoy (tasks vosnoi) natsyy...»***. It only remains to add to the above that in April 1941, at the 2nd Great Gathering (Congress) of the Bandera OUN, a black and red flag was adopted as a symbol of the movement (the German Nazis had a black swastika in a white circle against the background of a red banner), and after the

so-called. "Restoration of Independence" (June 30, 1941), the self-proclaimed "government" of J. Stetsko on July 4, 1941 sent greetings to Adolf Hitler, Hermann Goering, Joachim Ribbentrop, Benito Mussolini, Francisco Franco and Ante Pavelic (leader of the Croatian Ustashe). The entire "fascist international" is assembled, no one has been forgotten...

Was it worth devoting so much space and time to a discussion of the ideology and phraseology of Galician fascism within the framework of a small article? Wouldn't it have been better to immediately begin the story of the "fights of the firefighters"? I am convinced that without at least a minimal acquaintance with the history of the creation and ideology of the OUN, it is impossible to understand the entire further evolution of Ukrainian nationalism. In particular, to appreciate that stunning, unprecedented "180-degree turn" that took place at the turn of 1943-44. The organization, built on the ideas of "leaderism", terror, totalitarian dictatorship and national enmity, suddenly declares the principle of equality of all citizens of Ukraine without distinction of nationality and religion, and even supplements it with slogans of personal freedom, freedom of conscience, speech, press and **assembly**. What happened to them? Was this, perhaps the only one in history, a lightning turn from curses and mockery of the ideals of freedom and democracy to their glorification

sincere? Knowing the prehistory of the Bandera movement, mindful of its initial ideological foundations, we can easily find the answer to these questions. The answer is extremely simple - for the Bandera leaders, the concept of "sincere" did not exist at all. With the same success, one could turn to a color-blind person with the question of which wallpaper he likes best: pale pink or sky blue ... What kind of "sincerity" could people brought up in the spirit of "fanaticism, dogmatism, illusionism and immorality"? Was it difficult for them to utter "useful" words, if 15 years ago they had already sworn an oath to commit **the greatest evil** in the "interests of the cause" and crush their enemies with "hatred and treachery"? Well, and

those to whom such a conclusion seems unfounded (or even insulting in relation to the "fighters against Stalin's tyranny"), let them answer two simple questions. Did the leaders of the movement change after the 3rd Extraordinary Gathering (August 1943)? Have they condemned their previous views, programs and actions? Or the wonderful slogan "Freedom to the peoples! Freedom for man! put forward by the same figures who a little earlier adopted the program of **"repeated adoption of all loans from Ukrainian lands"**, and so great success in implementing this very adoption that they were covered with the blood of innocent victims not even to the elbow, but to the very

crown? And, finally, the most important criterion - to hell with them, with words and programs, have the deeds of Bandera changed after the words? Now

is the time to turn to the history of cases. About the activities of the OUN in the 30s (constant provocation of the Polish authorities in order to "keep the masses in a state of revolutionary boiling", torn and trampled into the mud Polish flags, beatings of Polish teachers, shots from around the corner, "expropriations", terrorist attacks against Polish officials, the constant search and murder of "traitors" among their own, the murder of "accomplices of the Polish occupiers" from among sane Ukrainian intellectuals) a lot has been written, all those who are interested can easily find the relevant literature. In the most brief summary, we recall that the reaction of the Polish authorities was quite predictable: thousands of Ukrainians were arrested, hundreds of peasant huts were burned during the "cleansing operations" carried out by the Polish gendarmerie in Ukrainian villages during the so-called. "pacification" ("pacification") of 1930 (although, according to Polish historians, "pacification" was caused by a wave of mass arsons of Polish peasant farms). The pinnacle of the "achievements" of the OUN militants was the assassination on June 15, 1934 of Minister of the Interior Peratsky. As you can see, the murder

of Peratsky and the murder of Kirov took place in the same year. The administrative "weight" of these officials was quite comparable. Even the circumstances of the murder were similar (Peratsky, without any guards, arrived for dinner in a Warsaw restaurant, when the terrorist Matseyko approached him and shot the minister three times with a pistol). The consequences were completely different. In the Stalinist USSR, on the same (not the next!) day, December 1, 1934, the CEC Decree "On a special procedure for conducting cases of terrorist acts" was adopted. The term of the case was reduced to 10 days, the court considered the prosecution without the participation of the parties (the prosecutor and the lawyer), the sentence to death was not subject to appeal and was immediately carried out. In fact, it was a "license to shoot" slightly covered with a fig leaf of legality. In pan-Poland, the case of the

assassination of the Minister of the Interior was considered in an open trial that dragged on

for 56 days, turned into a grandiose political show and attracted the attention of "the entire progressive public." As a result, none of the 12 defendants (Matseyko himself fled safely abroad and lived peacefully in Argentina until 1966) - among them were Stepan Bandera (25 years old) and Mykola Lebed (24 years old) - was executed; they all received long prison terms, Bandera and Lebed were sentenced to life imprisonment. The Czech police (before that very

condescending about the presence of OUN structures on its territory) arrested in Prague one of the major functionaries of the movement, Yemelyan Senyk, from whom the OUN archive was confiscated, containing the records of 2000 activists and financial documents of the organization; all this was placed at the disposal of the Polish authorities (according to another, less common version, the Polish police seized the OUN archive with the help of an informer embedded in the organization, and the story about the "Czech police" was fictitious for disinformation purposes). Immediately after the murder of Peratsky, a concentration camp was created in the town of Bereza-Kartuzsk (Brest region of modern Belarus), where, without trial or investigation, by a simple decision of the administrative authorities, they were sent for a 3-month "re-education" through beatings and sophisticated bullying of activists of the OUN and the underground Communist Party of the Western Ukraine; in total, more than 3 thousand people passed through this concentration camp before the start of the German-Polish war. In 1938, Yevgen Konovalov was killed in Rotterdam (as it is believed, by the NKVD agent Sudoplatov). In general, the leading structures and militant activists of the OUN suffered a serious blow, and the organization had

considerable chances to disappear forever into the darkness of history. The war that began on September 1, 1939 turned everything upside down. Poland, against which the Ukrainian nationalists fought for many years, disappeared from the political map of the world in one month. S. Bandera and his "accomplices" fled (left) from the prison in Brest, which was dilapidated by German bombs. Galicia and Volyn were occupied by Soviet troops and solemnly joined to the "fraternal family of the Soviet peoples" - this is how the Galicians for the first time in history found themselves part of a state with a capital in Moscow. In comparison with the methods by which the NKVD bodies brought Western Ukraine t

former Polish authorities could seem like a non-strict reprimand in kindergarten ... An acute internal crisis began

in the OUN. After the death of Konovalets, Andrei Melnik, a long-time ally and close friend of Konovalets (their wives were sisters), was appointed to the role of "leader". Perhaps the decision was also influenced by the position of the head of the Uniate Church (a Polish count by origin) Metropolitan Sheptytsky, an extremely influential figure in Galicia (Melnik not only knew Sheptytsky, but at one time worked as a manager in his estate). The "young heroes" who were released did not agree that the "old functionaries", who cooled off in a well-fed and safe emigration, were at the head of the movement. As is always the case in such organizations (i.e., fundamentally rejecting democratic methods of management and coordination of interests), the conflict resulted in a split with mutual accusations of "betrayal of ideals" and "provocateurship." In February 1940, Bandera's supporters proclaimed the creation of a new, "revolutionary" party. By the beginning of 1941, the Bandera OUN (b) and the Melnikov OUN underground paramilitary structures, (m) actually existed as two separate, competing and largely hostile extremist organizations.

The armed underground demands money, and a lot of it. Unlike today's Afghan Taliban or Burmese "Maoists", the OUN could not finance its activities through the sale of heroin and raw poppy seeds. In such circumstances, cooperation with the secret services of foreign states hostile to Poland was quite natural and predictable. In the interwar period, the main financial sponsor of the Galician fascists was Lithuania (which, in particular, was confirmed by the documents of the "Senyk archive"), and E. Konovalets himself had Lithuanian citizenship until the end of his life, which allowed him to move freely around Europe. Contacts with the secret services of Germany (first - Weimar democratic, then - Hitler's) began as early as 1923 and were very "fruitful" - several hundred militants were trained in German intelligence schools, and the total amount of financial assistance (from 1923 to 1938) some authors evaluate

5 million marks. On the other hand, after the murder of Peratsky, the German police, at the first request of the Polish authorities, arrested and deported to Poland M. Lebed, arrested and imprisoned in a German prison another OUN activist closely associated with the German special services, Riko Yarogo (a native of Austria, a German by father and Hungarian on the maternal side). At

the stage of preparation for the Soviet-German war (as far as one can judge from the documents of the OUN and the memoirs of its activists, no one even doubted the inevitability of an imminent war between the partners in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), cooperation between all groups of Ukrainian nationalists and German special services sharply intensified. Funding also increased significantly - in 1940 alone, both factions (OUN (m) and OUN (b)) received more than 5 million marks. In the training camps of the Abwehr (military intelligence) in Germany and Austria, two reconnaissance and sabotage battalions (sometimes called "legions") were trained, staffed by Bandera OUN activists. The battalions, called "Roland" and "Nachtigal" (nightingale), were organizationally subordinate to German military intelligence (and not at all to the SS, as they sometimes mistakenly write), they were equipped in the standard uniform of the Wehrmacht, but with two special emblems: a yellow-black **patch** on sleeve and "**Vladimir's trident**" on the cockade. From the point of view of the rally rhetoric, the fact of receiving German

money, and even serving in German sabotage units, is exceptionally "valuable". It is not surprising that Soviet propaganda strenuously pedaled these circumstances, and the Bandera apologists just as strenuously and clumsily disguised themselves. But I do not consider it appropriate to attach decisive importance to these particulars - they did not determine the "face", goals and tasks of the Galician fascists. Ulyanov (Lenin), most likely, received German money, but it is simply ridiculous to reduce the grandiose phenomenon of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia to the "intrigues of German agents". Yes, and the popularly beloved Stirlitz wore a German uniform (and what a black SS uniform, and not the modest gray-green Wehrmacht tunic that Shukhevych wore), drove around Berlin in a German car and received a salary at the PCXA box office not in rubles ...

I would very much like the modern political heirs of Bandera to present their idols in the role of a kind of "Stirlitz" who deftly deceived the careless Germans, rubbed their trust, but in reality ... But, alas, even under an electron microscope it is impossible to detect at least one grain of sand, which the Nachtigall fighters poured into the engine of a German tank, and even the reconnaissance "Eustaces" sent by the Moscow) "Center", reports, OUN to the London (Washington, does not exist in nature, but there are plump volumes of documents testifying to intelligence (in the interests of Germany, of course) the activities of the Bandera underground in Poland and the USSR. Therefore, inspired by the principle of "illusionism" prescribed by D. Dontsov, they went the other way: it turns out that the Bandera people did not deceive the Germans, but, on the contrary, they themselves were vilely deceived by them; It turns out that the leaders of the OUN hoped that the replacement of Soviet "occupiers" with German ones would make the Ukrainian people happy, but they were deceived in their best feelings... These arguments

always seemed to me something incomprehensible. After all, they were not in New Zealand in 1940-1941. Bandera leaders, but on the territory of German-occupied Poland; They saw the "new order" that the Nazis were establishing in enslaved Europe from the closest distance. And you didn't see anything? Didn't understand anything? Have you guessed anything? However, there are quite specific answers to all these questions. It was given by the most authoritative expert on the history of the Bandera movement, Stepan Bandera himself. In July 1948, in West Germany, a separate pamphlet was published by his article entitled **"The Word to the Ukrainian Nationalist-Revolutionaries Beyond the Cordon."** It says in plain text, without any equivocation: **"On the 3rd spring of 1941,**

***before the eve of the German-Soviet war, Hitler's plans for the opposite of Ukraine became obvious:., harness to your imperial cart, and then work from Ukraine Teren colonization, state (economic, economic ) exploitation and dzherelo (source) of the slave labor force". And a little further: "It became clear that the Nazi Germany did not think positively put up to the right (to the point) sovereignty of Ukraine."***

Agree, such a text would look great on the front page of the Pravda newspaper. But, of course, with one necessary addition - it is necessary to put in place those words that I cunningly hid from the reader, replacing them with three dots. And these words are as follows: **“Speak with vague cries and obitsanki.”** Here, it turns out, what's the matter! The damned have lured the naive and gullible Bandera **out of his mind**; so clouded his head that he ordered his comrades-in-arms to support the colonialists with weapons in their hands, who (which became obvious to Bandera already in the spring of 1941!) intended to turn Ukraine into a "zone of exploitation and a source of forced labor." Everything is clear, one thing is not clear

- why? How, with what kind of **“obitsyanki”** did the Germans introduce Bandera into such a temptation? What and, most importantly, to whom did they promise? To date, multi-volume collections of documents of the Bandera movement have been published, dozens of plump monographs have been written, hundreds of dissertations have been defended, many thousands of articles have been published - and at least one piece of paper, one piece of someone's memoirs with an answer to the simple and most obvious question: “What good did the Germans promise to

do for the Ukrainian people? That's right - for the Ukrainian people, and not for the self-proclaimed "leaders" **of the Khyzhak** breed, seized with an unbridled desire **to sit and panuvati** (own and rule). Have there been any promises from the German side - promises to build in Ukraine (at German expense, of course) a couple more DneproGESs and Zaporizhstal, to establish the production of cheap Volkswagens at the former tank factory in Kharkov, to build 100 million square meters of comfortable housing (approximately so many were built after the war in Soviet Ukraine), provide annually 10,000 scholarships for Ukrainian youth to study at German universities (I think that no less number of Ukrainians annually received higher education in Soviet universities) ... The apologists of Bandera are silent, they do not give an answer. Let me fill the prolonged awkward pause with

an anecdote, an old Jewish anecdote. A little girl comes running from the yard into the house, all in tears, and shouts:



- Mom, mom, there ... on the street ... evil boys are torturing the cat!  
"Oh,  
they are rascals! Do not cry, daughter, I will drive them away now. -  
Yes, mother, drive them away, drive them away quickly! I myself want it  
muuuuch...

Is such an insulting analogy between the intentions of the "kind" girl  
from the joke and the plans of, unfortunately, the real leaders of the OUN,  
appropriate? In search of an answer to this question, let us return to the  
history of real events. **"There**

**were a lot of people, maybe more than a hundred, of the Ukrainian  
intelligentsia. I say "signed" to the one that the first day I will enter the  
Nimtsiv to Lvov. They shot at the town, and in the distance one could  
feel the gurkit garmat (a shootout sounded in the city, the rumble of  
cannons was heard from afar). People were afraid to go out into the  
street, but those who went out did not go far from the house. Among  
those in attendance (present) there were not a few (there were many)  
Greek Catholic priests, the Banderist chaplain Fr. The representative  
of the Metropolitan was co-adjutor Joseph Slipiy, who, having shown  
himself here, did not sound like a protector, who called out to the  
crowd (meeting). It turned out that this is not an easy narada. It was  
stunned that all the attacks (present) are "people's assemblies", that  
they can vote for the approval of the Ukrainian state and establish the  
"order" (government), the formation of Stepan Bandery's orders, like  
(some) Yaroslav Stetsky ... Taking the head**

**"in order" (head of government) Yaroslav Stetsko is a mirshaven  
(nondescript) little man, who, not able to hold himself in public (who  
does not know how to behave in public), in a three-handed (trembling)  
voice, read the Act of pronouncement of the "sovereign conciliar  
independent Ukraine" and voted, so bimoviti (so to speak), I will  
declaratively declare "to order". From the fact that having stunned  
and said this worldly little man, who called himself a "order" with his  
head, two features were forgotten: unperfected (unsurpassed) praise  
to the German Führer and his unstoppable (invincible) army, and  
threaten, fear do not threaten everyone who shows disobedience  
"Orders" of the "Ukrainian state", who, in the words of Stetsko, "will  
work in unity with the Great Fuhrer".**

***“We will work politics without sentimentality,” trying to take a fearful tone, as a whole seriously provoking (announcing) the worldly little man. We blame everyone, without a blame, hgao put us on the crossroads (we will destroy everyone, without exception, who will harm us). The guardians (leaders) of all the galleys (sides) of life will be Ukrainians and only Ukrainians, and not foreign enemies: Muscovites, Poles, Jews, Our government (power) will be the political and military dictatorship of the OUN, a dictatorship, for the eorse / e it’s scary yu i navblaganny (inexorable) ... ”.***

Thus, in his post-war memoirs, Doctor of Theology Gavriil Kostelnik describes the very event that the Banderaites and their political heirs consider the greatest achievement - the proclamation of the Act of the Restoration of Ukrainian Statehood of June 30, 1941. But, perhaps, memory failed Fr. Gavriil, and no praise for The "Führer" of Great Germany and his "invincible army" did not sound that day? Perhaps, as some authors who have lost the remnants of any shame write, “from the first days of the Nazi occupation, the OUN, led by S. Bandera, led an active underground struggle against them”? Let's turn to the documents, to the very "Declaration of the

Ukrainian Power", which ***was read out in a three-voice voice by a worldly little man.*** There, in particular, it was said: ***“The new Ukrainian State, based on the new sovereignty of***

***its own power, becomes voluntary within the framework of the new mode (order) of Europe, as the leader of the German Army and the German people, Adolf Hitler. Mi little I can finish (had the opportunity to carry out) the act of recognizing our sovereignty itself (it is thanks to) the appearance of the Glorious German Army, as if under the wire (leadership) of its great leader, she went to fight for this new way. Vihodyachi z tsyïï foundations, tying further until the interstate act of 1918. (here the authors of the Declaration refer to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 1918, one of the participants of which was Ukraine), to the point of feeling (feelings) the greatest friendliness, like the Ukrainian zagal (society) in relation to the German Army and svÿtogyadovyh (ideological) ideological b Ukrainian Revolutionary Nationalism , New Ukrainian State i***

***“Vlada is standing by the process of life (building) a new way in Europe and the whole world...”***

Having indecently divided portfolios in the “government” of a non-existent state and declaring their readiness to take part in building a fascist “new order” throughout Europe (and even in the whole **world**), Bandera did not bother to restore the minimum order in the city engulfed by mass insanity. Lvov experienced terrible days in June 1941. On June 23–25, real street battles took place in the city between units of the retreating Red Army and armed detachments of Ukrainian nationalists. Leaving the city, the executioners of the NKVD destroyed in Lviv prisons (judging by the report of the head of the prison department of the NKVD of Ukraine, Captain of State Security A.F. Filippov dated July 12, 1941) 2464 prisoners. In a very restrained (the number of victims in it was even significantly underestimated), for the needs of propaganda by no means intended, German document (report of the headquarters of the 49th mountain rifle corps to the headquarters of the 17th army dated 12.00 01.07.41) this “evacuation along 1 th category” was described as follows:

***“After the entry of German troops into Lvov on June 30, 1941, several hundred corpses of men and women were found in three prisons of the city, who had been killed during the last days. So, in the cellars of the military prison in Lvov, about 120 corpses of men and women, stacked on top of each other, were found in only one cell ... In the cells of the GPU prison there are also many dead, the exact number of which could not be established, since the entrance to these cells was walled up. As the examination of the discovered corpses showed, the murder was preceded by severe torture and torture. On all parts of the body of the corpses there are severe wounds from blows and injections. Some of the corpses had crushed and broken fingers and***

***legs...”***

To put it in “high calm”, the Bandera activists who entered Lvov on June 30 should have seen off their martyred comrades-in-arms with prayer and proper military honors.

Speaking extremely cynically and rudely, it was necessary immediately, in order to avoid an outbreak of epidemics, to bury thousands of corpses decomposing in a 30-degree heat (from the stories

eyewitnesses know that a terrible corpse stench hung over the city, and it was simply impossible to be in the prison area without a gas mask). Instead, Stetsko and Co., seized by the **greed of panuvannya praised by D. Dontsov**, hurried to round up a hundred who did not understand anything, almost random people and declared themselves to be **"orders"**.

Immediately after the occupation of Lvov by German troops (which included the Nachtigall battalion under the command of Roman Shukhevych), massacres of Jews and representatives of the Polish intelligentsia began in the city. The word "pogrom" in this case will hardly be appropriate. **"Ti terrible podÿÿ were not on the right wild, soldered soldiers. I saw the anger (I got the impression) that everything was working in the organization way, everything was reportedly working, like in a car, "** writes one of the eyewitnesses of the events. The question of participation / non-participation in this crime of the Nachtigall battalion and its commander has been the subject of fierce, irreconcilable disputes for many decades. Without digressing to them (those who wish can familiarize themselves with the extensive literature on this issue) and recognizing that there was no convincing evidence of Shukhevych's involvement in the massacres in Lvov, it should be noted that even the most supportive of the Bandera authors could not find any traces of that that **the "Stetska squad"** at least tried to stop the brutal extrajudicial killings. Nothing of the kind - the idea that the coveted **power** is associated with responsibility for the lives of citizens was as alien to them as to the communists who fled the city.

Despite endless praises and assurances of devotion, despite posters and leaflets with the slogan "Heil Hitler! Glory to Hitler!", pasted by Bandera all over the city, the Germans were extremely indignant at the fact of the unauthorized creation of a "government" that was not coordinated with Berlin. They expressed their position very clearly: "We will not allow self-proclaimed "governments" to appear on the territory occupied at the cost of the blood of German soldiers. In my opinion, the position is quite logical. On the other hand, there is no reason to exaggerate the significance and, most importantly, the consequences of the conflict that has arisen. Despite the later efforts of Bandera propagandists to "pull in" the events of September 41 by June 30, no "brutal repressions" from

German authorities in response to the arbitrariness of Stetsko and K. followed.

0 Not

On July 9, Stetsko was arrested and taken to the Lvov Gestapo, where (as he himself writes in his post-war memoirs) he was not beaten or tortured, but “brought cocoa with bread for dinner”, after which he was taken to Krakow and from there to Berlin, at the disposal of the colonel of the Abwehr E. Stolze. There Stetsko "reunited" with Bandera, also brought under escort from Krakow to Berlin. For several days, Abwehr officers explained to the leaders of the OUN(b) in words, without any assault, that the place of a footman was in the footman's room. On July 15, they were released safe and sound, but with an obligation not to leave Berlin. To put it bluntly, they treated Mumu the dog in an incomparably more cruel way, which disturbed the peace of the capricious and cruel lady with her innocent barking ... Bandera's lesson

understood and began to bombard the Germans with letters of repentance.

On August 14, they wrote another “memorandum”, which in its style resembles a task from a grammar school textbook, in which the child must learn the rules for conjugation of the verb “ **spývpracyuvati**” (**cooperate**):

***“For the OUN, spivpratsya with Nimechchina was not just empty words (words); spývpratsyu zdýysnenno protyazh rokýv (for many years) great and grievous sacrifices. The OUN itself led the fight for the sovereign independence of Ukraine on aphids (along the way) spivpratsi z Nimechchina; for the price she herself bears the same recognition before Ukrainian history. The OUN and Nadal (and further) try to work on the Ukrainian state's freedom of action on the way to spivpraci z Nimechchina ... sword, at the door and wide (in an open and sincere) spivpratsi ... Nimechchina is guilty buti zatsýkavlena (should be interested) in the fact that spývpratsyuvati with ideological, dynamic Ukrainian forces, which caused (came to) to tsýýý spývpratsý z ideological, political and patriotic reasons ... ”.*** Stetsko, who felt himself the main culprit, tried especially hard. Not limited to a "memorandum", he decided to inform the Germans of his life credo in a lengthy text called

**"My Life"** It was not an ordinary, clerical autobiography, but a sugary-flattering "oath of allegiance" to fascist ideas:

**"... In the political plane, I stand at the station (at the position) of the mono-party and authoritarian structure of Ukraine; in the social plane — national solidarism, which is close to the national socialist program... I respect (recognize) that in the current world war the share of Ukraine is hanging on a long time ago, and I know that (I realize that) that it's only possible through victory (victory) Nymechchini is possible y v'ydbudova (construction, creation) of the Sovereign and Collective Ukrainian State ... khidna (required) for Nymechchini, gospodarska pydtrimki (economic support) in all possible ways (in all possible ways) from the side of Ukraine, but here it's about success (because here we are talking about general success), something unsuccessful. Tim more, scho great sacrifices, like blaspheming the German army in the fight for Moscow, we (and we are aware of this), musyat recopenzatu (should receive compensation) for the German people. Sovereign Cathedral of the Ukrainian State to give recompensation and y goitre to give ... "**

While in distant Berlin Stetsko promised to "compensate" with Ukrainian bread, coal, steel and all other possible **inputs** for Germany's military expenses related to the occupation of Ukraine,

in Lvov and further to the east a very real spivpratsia was in full **swing**. The dispersal of the self-proclaimed **"Stetska squad"** did not prevent this in the least. On July 12, at the very time when Bandera and Stetsko were summoned "on the carpet" to Berlin, Mykola Lebed (head of the Bandera Security Service and since August 1941 head of the Regional Executive of the OUN (b) in the Western Ukrainian lands, t ie Bandera's de facto deputy in Ukraine) met in Lvov with Theodor Oberländer (professor of economics, a prominent member of the Nazi Party, with the outbreak of World War II, an Abwehr employee who served as the German "political commissar" under the Ukrainian nationalists). In the report of this meeting, Oberländer writes: **"I promised Lebed further support and stressed that his earlier work was highly appreciated by the chief of police"**

**security and SD in Lvov... Mr. Lebed assured me that he willingly puts himself at our disposal in the interests of the joint struggle against Bolshevism and Jewry."** The so-called

"marching groups" of the OUN (with a total number of more than 4 thousand people) moved behind the advancing German troops and kindled the flame of the "national revolution" in every occupied city and village, that is, according to the lists prepared in advance by local activists, they grabbed (the word "arrest" would be inappropriate here) and killed real and potential opponents of the "new order", created local government structures, recruited future burgomasters and elders, organized "auxiliary police" (Hilfspolizei, or, as the people called them, "policemen"). Appeals were regularly hung on the streets of Ukrainian cities: **"Lyahyŭ, zhidyŭ, kommunistyŭ roam without mercy, do not spare the enemies of the Ukrainian National Revolution!"**

On August 1, 1941, the German invaders dealt a crushing (and insulting, moreover) blow to the ambitions of Ukrainian nationalists - their native Galicia was returned to Poland, i.e. officially included in the "General Government" (in commemoration of this event on paper occupation "zloty" even images of Lviv castles and churches appeared). A month later, vast areas of southern Ukraine in the interfluvium of the Dniester and the Southern Bug (that is, part of the Odessa, Vinnitsa and Nikolaev regions), together with Northern Bukovina, were transferred to the disposal of Romania. The "Reichskommissariat Ukraine" created on August 20, 1941 included only a part of the Right Bank (the territory east of the Dnieper was considered the rear area of the active army and was subordinate to the military administration). Now it has become clear even to the blind - how Berlin treats the plans to create an "independent conciliar Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caspian Sea", however, **the fight between** Bandera and the Nazi invaders continued successfully until September 15, 1941. The gap was caused by the same unbridled **panuvannya greed that**

tormented the soul of Bandera. Implementing the precepts of D. Dontsov (**"expansion is not only self-assertion of the sovereign (one's) will until life, but also listing it (rejection of it) in others"**), they began a systematic shooting of their fellow competitors from

groupings of A. Melnik. The minimum figures given by experts in their studies are dozens of OUN(m) activists killed by Bandera militants in the summer of 1941 (there are also much higher estimates of the scale of terror). The German army was successfully advancing towards Kiev, the front of the Red Army was cracking and collapsing, the victory over the "Muscovites" seemed close and inevitable, and in such a situation, the Bandera people did not want to share even a small piece of the skin of a Russian bear with the "Melnikovites" who had long been tired of them.

On August 30, 1941, Yemelyan Senyk and Mykola Stsyborsky, well-known and very influential veterans of the OUN, who were part of the "inner circle" of A. Melnik, were killed in Zhytomyr. At this terrorist attack, the measure of patience of the Germans overflowed. And it's not that the killed were dear to them as a memory of the millions of marks spent on the OUN (m), but by this act of arbitrariness, Bandera's – probably not wanting it themselves – violated the most important principle on which any dictatorship rested and is maintained. Ivan the Terrible, I remember, formulated it this way: "But we are free to pardon our lackeys, and we are free to execute them." Five centuries later, Hermann Goering, descending the stairs of the Gestapo officers who came to arrest one of the not quite "Aryan" officers of the Luftwaffe headquarters, expressed the same idea with the words: "At

my headquarters, I decide who is a Jew and who is not" . Having encroached on the right of the Master to execute and pardon, the Bandera finally strengthened the Germans in the opinion that Abwehr Colonel E. Stolze expressed in his memorandum a year ago: "If Melnik is a calm, intelligent official, then Bandera is a careerist, fanatic **and bandit.**" Since the Germans had very serious intentions about the exploitation of the raw materials, human and industrial resources of Ukraine, and for this a real German "**ordnung**" had to be installed in the occupied territory, then it's not surprising that they made a choice in favor of a "calm official" account for. For

the sake of truth, it should be noted that all the same Stolze, who lived to the dock of the Nuremberg trials, testified, from which it follows that the murder of Senyk and Stsyborsky was not the only reason for the indignation of the Germans: "The arrest was the fact that, having received in 1940 . **from the Abwehr a large amount of money to finance the OUN underground and organize an intelligence**



**activities against the USSR, he (Bandera) tried to appropriate them and transferred them to one of the Swiss banks.** However, this story is dark - Bandera seems to have returned the money, and Stolze in Nuremberg may have slandered the OUN leader, shielding himself. Be that

as it may, but on September 13, 1941, the head of the Imperial Security Administration (RSHA), SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich himself, issued the order "Measures against the Bandera group." Heydrich's subordinates were instructed: **"To arrest all leaders playing**

**any role in the Bandera movement on suspicion of facilitating the murder of representatives of the Melnik movement. To ensure complete success, carry out arrests within the state, in the general government and in the area of operations simultaneously, namely on Monday, September 15, 1941 in the morning. First of all, they must be arrested (the following is a list of 39 names, including S. Bandera, Y. Stetsko, M. Lebed) ... Those adherents of Bandera who are not mentioned here, but which, during the investigation, it turns out that they held important positions in Bandera's movement, also arrest. I ask you to inform me without delay about the names and details of the identity of each arrested person, indicating what role they played in the Bandera movement and whether they were directly involved in the murder of Melnik's adherents ... A commission is being created to investigate the murders of representatives of the Melnik movement, which will be located in Lviv ... About the incoming and concerning the murder, the commission should immediately be placed in**

**fame..."**

The well-oiled machine of repression clanged and began to work with its characteristic energy. Within 2-3 days, about 500 people were arrested, several dozen were shot immediately after the arrest. Bandera, Stetsko, Lenkavsky, Rebet, Stakhiv and many other OUN(b) leaders were sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp; the same infamous "death camp", over the gates of which there was a mocking inscription "Work makes you free."

If for Soviet propagandists the whole history of Bandera and Bandera was reduced to German money in the OUN box office and German uniforms on the fighters of the Nachtigal battalion, then for apologists

Ukrainian nationalism's favorite topic is "Bandera in Sachsenhausen". Still, "do you need additional evidence that the OUN selflessly fought against the German occupiers, if the leaders of the organization languished in a fascist concentration camp!"

Needed. First of all, because, taking into account the well-known cruelty of the German occupation regime, it looks very strange when the arrested "leaders of the armed resistance" do not die in a torture cellar or on gallows, and for a long time "languish in the dungeons", after which they are released safe and sound, without losing a single hair on their heads. Second, repression and resistance are by no means always linked, especially under a totalitarian dictatorship. On the territory of Ukraine (taking into account its western, former Polish part), the Nazi fascists destroyed 1.5 million Jews, including the elderly and infants, who obviously did not pose the slightest threat to the occupation regime. Nevertheless, they were repressed, and not just repressed, but killed. During the years of the Great Terror of 1937-1938. in Ukraine, hundreds of thousands of people died at the hands of another, red dictatorship, the vast majority of whom did not even think about any struggle against Stalin's tyranny. Finally, it's time to remember - in which Sachsenhausen did Bandera languish?

The arrested OUN members were placed in a special department "Zellenbau", which contained VIPs from all over Europe. The Banderaites ended up in the same company with the former Chancellor of Austria Schuschnigg, the son of Marshal of Italy Badoglio, the son of Stalin Yakov Dzhugashvili, the leader of the German Communist Party Ernst Thälmann, the former French Prime Ministers Paul Reynaud and Edouard Daladier, the Minister of Defense of Latvia, General Dambritis, etc. Let's be honest, in peaceful life to politicians of this level, Bandera would not be allowed on the threshold. The prisoners were under the protection of the international Red Cross, received letters and parcels, could have small amounts of cash, move freely around the camp, and meet each other. There was no question of any work in mines and quarries. In fact, they were in the position of internees, and by no means prisoners of the "death camp".

Of course, it is even better at home and at large, but be that as it may, in October 1944 the leaders of the OUN (by that time there were already "Melnikovites" there, led by Andrey Melnik himself!) Left the "Zellenbau" in good health. Bandera, after his release, was honored with a personal meeting with SS Reichsfuehrer Himmler (although a number of authors deny this fact, reporting that everything was limited to a reception with SS Brigadefuehrer Berger), after which everyone (Bandera, Melnik, and Hetman Skoropadsky extracted from naphthalene) went to secret dacha of the Gestapo, where they began to form the next "Ukrainian national

Committee"...

Let us return, however, to the events of the autumn of 1941. What happened to the OUN(b) after the arrest of its leaders? Nationalist historiographers give a unanimous answer to this: "The organization has gone underground." Let's say, but in this case, we must admit that it was the most amazing underground in history. There are no blown up bridges, no derailed trains, no daring attacks on account of this "underground" - it's hard to believe that it was led by the same people who in the early 30s kept the whole of Galicia in a nervous suspense with their terrorist attacks. At the same time, the "auxiliary (auxiliary in relation to the German occupation authorities!) Police", formed with the direct participation of the OUN and staffed to a large extent by Bandera activists, continued to rage in the occupied territory of Ukraine; regularly cooperated with the occupiers and the local administration of cities and villages, created by the "marching groups" of the OUN. Where and when was there a situation in history when one half of the organization "fights underground", and the other half serves in the police and brutally cracks down on real underground fighters and partisans?

In early October 1941, the OUN(b), under the leadership of M. Lebed, held its First Conference (in the occupied territory, mind you!). According to modern Ukrainian historians: ***"It clearly formulated political goals and emphasized the need to publish materials that would educate the population in the spirit of political consciousness, reveal German plans for the exploitation and colonization of Ukraine."***

***This propaganda was considered as a preparatory stage for an active struggle.*** To this it remains to add that, in addition to "education in the spirit of consciousness," the conference set the task of more actively attracting **Svidomo** (conscious) youth to serve in the "police." Probably, in order for her to "reveal the German plans for the exploitation and colonization of Ukraine" by her own example.

Month after month passed, the winter of 41-42 began and ended, the Germans reached the walls of Moscow and were driven back from it, the United States entered the world war, the Rzhev offensive operation of the Red Army was drowned in blood, and the Bandera "underground" was still gathering with forces. In April 1942, the OUN(b) held the Second Conference - with similar results in terms of "active struggle". ***"In their activities, the underground organizations of the OUN focused on promoting the ideas of independence of Ukraine ... The OUN underground did not carry out actions that would cause serious economic or military damage to the Germans."*** Already warmer. It remains only to clarify - were there any actions that caused the Germans at least frivolous military damage? And could they be, if - as even the most ardent supporters of Banderaism admit - Mykola Lebed ***"Ibýlyýe shukav (searched) for the enemies of the middle ground (of his entourage), lowerly organizing support for them ... Výn didn't want to (didn't want to hear) about the organization of partisan driving (detachments) - as if writing in one letter (appeal) "You can't spray (spray) forces on a partisan."*** In June 1942, the leadership of the OUN(b) issued a special leaflet in which the Ukrainians were urged not to succumb to the "Soviet

Polish sabotage", that is, not to provide any support to the partisans. The same call (order) was repeated at the end of the year in a leaflet entitled "Partisans and our attitude towards them" (the document stored in the Ukrainian state archive went through two translations - from Ukrainian into German and from German into Russian, so one cannot speak of the literal accuracy of the text ). In it, in particular, it was said: ***"We are hostile to the partisans and therefore we destroy them. Our time has not yet come. It must find us united under the banner of the OUN... Our goal is not partisan struggle, but the national liberation revolution of the Ukrainian***

***masses..."***

If anyone was conducting a real armed struggle at that moment, it was the future "commander of the Army of the Invincible", the future head of the "General Secretariat" of the UGVR,

Roman Shukhevych. On August 13, 1941, the Nachtigal battalion was withdrawn from the front and on August 27 returned to Germany, to a training camp in Neuhammer. The Roland battalion soon arrived there from the south of Ukraine. Both units ("squads of Ukrainian nationalists," as they are also called in historical literature) were disbanded, and on October 21, 1941, the personnel (including commanders) were turned to the formation of a completely standard, this time without any yellow-**blakyt** stripes on the sleeve, security police battalion ("Schutzmannschaftsbattalion"). E. Pobigugtsy was appointed commander of the battalion, R. Shukhevych became the commander of one of the companies with the rank of Hauptmann (captain) of the Wehrmacht.

For several months, the battalion underwent combat training, after which, at the end of March 1942, it arrived in Belarus, where it was operationally subordinated to the 201st Security Division. Until December 1942, the battalion fought to protect the rear area of the 3rd Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht together with the punitive SS units under the general leadership of the well-known war criminal, SS Obergruppenführer von Bach-Zelewski. It is worth noting that the action took place in the Lepel-Vitebsk region, that is, in that part of Belarus that even the most ardent nationalists do not risk classifying as "ethnic Ukrainian lands." What did the "fighters for an independent Ukraine" do in the forests of Belarus? "They guarded the bridges," the current lawyers of the Galician fascists answer, lowering their eyes. Alas, this opinion does not coincide with what Pobigugciy himself writes in his memoirs (**"Mosaic of My Recollections"**) : **"It's crazy that there were parts of the battle against the partisans, whispering the forests (combing the forests), attacking their places I'll stand ... Chicken (battalion ) vikonav (fulfilled) his good task, as von Bach said, having affirmed that we had 9 chickens, that they were guarding the middle zapillya of the Skhidny (operational rear of the Eastern) front, - our chicken was the best task ... "**

As soon as found in the events of 41-42 years. traces of the anti-fascist resistance of the Bandera underground fail (but I really want to!), then today's propagandists of Ukrainian nationalism decided

take advantage of the accumulated experience of Soviet propagandists (***“where fatigue is considered the measure of work”***).

As you know, one of the cornerstones of the Soviet mythology of war is the idea that "contribution to the defeat of the enemy" is measured not by the losses of the enemy, but by one's own victims. Accordingly, in order to substantiate the thesis about the "underground struggle of the OUN against the Nazi occupiers," it is necessary to find arrested (and even better - shot) nationalists. As K. Pankivsky rightly noted (during the war years he was the head of the collaborationist Ukrainian Regional Committee in Lviv), ***“the skin bazhaï (wishes) to show that he was an enemy of the Nazis and Hitler’s enemy, by the Germans. And navpaki, (moreover) like a bula yogo role in the opposition against the Nazis, like that yogo was persecuted and caught (kept in prisons), that somehow miraculously survived the fates of the German occupation ... ”***.

Meet one of ***the "opponents of the Germans and Hitler's enemies"***, who only ***"miraculously survived the fates of the German occupation."*** Orest Sidorovich Masikevich was born on August 9, 1911 in Bukovina; poet, musician, journalist. As a graduate student of Chernivtsi University writes about him (I won't give her last name, the girl is young, God willing, she will learn), ***“At the end of June 1941, Orest Masikevich arrived in Nikolaev with a group of patriot students. Not caring about their safety, this group organizes anti-German propaganda actions. At one of these actions, Orest said: “The Germans came to make a German colony out of our Ukraine. But they will not succeed, they will lose the war!”*** Oh ... If the future candidate of historical sciences had opened some

history textbook, he would have easily found out that not only at the end of June, but even at the end of July of the 41st, that “the enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours ”, in Nikolaev it was possible to shout completely without restraint - the city was occupied by the Germans only on August 16th. However, is it worth reproaching a young graduate student, if the book “History of the OUN UPA. Events, facts, documents, comments” we read: ***“Poet Orest Masikevich was elected mayor of Nikolaev.***

***Active Ukrainization irritated the Nazis, who resorted to repressive measures. Masikevich was arrested and sentenced to death. Many of his comrades-in-arms also paid with their lives."***

The group of "patriotic students", at the head of which Masikevich arrived in Nikolaev, is the "marching group" of the OUN (m), which received the name "PUMA" from the first letters of the names of the commanders: Abwehr lieutenant Pulyuy and centurion of the "Bukovinian kuren" Masikevich. On August 23, the German military commandant appointed (of course, there was no question of any "elections") Masikevich as mayor of the city of Nikolaev. He stayed in this position for exactly four months, during which he managed to sign three hundred orders and orders, many of which ended with the words "to be shot." The work

of the burgomaster was in full swing and argued, the Jewish population was completely destroyed, in November the first 8 thousand "ostarbeiters" were sent for forced labor in Germany. In the order for the "Ministry of Eastern Territories" A. Rosenberg, Masikevich was noted as "the youngest and most promising burgomaster of the Reichskommissariat "Ukraine". And suddenly, on December 24, Masikevich was arrested by the Gestapo. On the same day, the burgomasters of Zhytomyr and Kyiv were arrested. For what? As established by Vladimir Ginda and Sergei Gavrilov (whose article materials are used here) - for rampant bribery. Everything was sold: warrants for those "freed" after the arrest of the owners of the apartment, exemption from theft to work in Germany, information about the upcoming raids in the markets of the city, Reichsmarks ... The Germans tried to establish an "ordnung" in the occupied territory, and not a bazaar for the sale of what they already considered "property of the Reich".

However, nothing terrible happened to Masikevich. Instead of being shot, he was released from prison a few months later (didn't corruption send its tentacles there too?). After that, Masikevich left for Bucharest, where in October 1945 he was found by the long arm of Soviet justice. After serving "top ten from bell to bell", the former burgomaster returned to Romania, where he lived peacefully until 1980. He wrote poetry, translated into Romanian I. Franko and P. Tychina ... This, quite tragic farcical, story gives a clear example of how they mold new myths. Yes, indeed, the OUN (like Bandera,

and Melnikovskaya) was most directly related to the formation of the German-controlled local administration and auxiliary police in Ukraine. Tens of thousands of accomplices of the invaders committed the gravest crimes, but at any mention of them, the apologists of Bandera make their eyes square with indignation: "How dare you! What does the heroic OUN have to do with the despicable "policemen?" But as soon as one of the thousands of collaborators is found, repressed by the Germans, he is immediately credited to the martyrology of the "underground OUN who died in the fight against the Nazis." Of course, I do not call for smearing everyone

with the same tar. Not every burgomaster or village headman arrested by the Germans became a victim of his own bribery. In that terrible war, the most confusing situations arose. Someone was forced into a "double game" by real underground workers, forced by the threat of death and reprisals against the family - yes, there was such a time, and no one stood on ceremony with the "family of the traitor to the Motherland". Someone was deliberately discredited in the eyes of the Germans - this could be done either by competitors who wanted to take a "bread place", or by Soviet underground workers. Finally, there were - and by no means in a single number - cases of sincere repentance, sincere unwillingness to continue to remain in the role of an accomplice in the atrocities of the occupiers. People who at one time believed the agitation of the leaders of the nationalists found themselves in a tragic situation of choosing between the scaffold and dishonor. Those who chose the scaffold undoubtedly deserve the grateful memory of their descendants, but

what does Bandera and Melnik have to do with it? 1942 ended, 1943 began; on the southern flank of the Eastern Front, German troops reached the Volga and almost captured the oil fields of Baku and Grozny, in North Africa they almost defeated the British and advanced towards Suez; then it turned out that "almost" does not count in the war - the 100,000-strong Wehrmacht group surrounded near Stalingrad was completely defeated, the Germans barely escaped from a similar "mousetrap" in the North Caucasus, and with huge losses, Rommel's African corps capitulated. In the north, the troops of the Red Army broke through the months-long blockade of Leningrad and restored land communications with the city, in the south, building on the success of Stalingrad,



went over to the offensive and in February-March occupied Voronezh, Kharkov and Belgorod. It was not possible to keep the last two points, but the general turning point in the situation on the Eastern Front has already become a fait accompli. By the spring of 1943, all sensible people - some with joy and hope, some with fear and despair - realized that in the war against the coalition of the three great powers, Germany would face inevitable

defeat. Serious changes were also brewing in western Ukraine. In 41-42 years. there was no noticeable partisan movement there at all; a few NKVD sabotage detachments, parachuted from the air or penetrating Volhynia through the boundless forest massif of the Belarusian Polissya, were immediately destroyed, most often with the active assistance of the local population. However, during the 1.5-2 years of occupation, the Ukrainian peasant lost his last illusions about the German "new order", which immediately affected the military-political situation. It is noteworthy that this "change in consciousness" is being stated (and almost in the same words) on both sides of the front. Thus, the head of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, Erich

Koch, reported to Berlin in March 1943: ***"The population worked obediently for a year***

***and a half under German leadership and could never believe in the return of the Bolsheviks. It goes without saying that due to the situation at the front and similar circumstances (meaning the raid of the partisan formation under the command of M. Naumov. - M.S.), the passive resistance of the population has greatly***

***increased. As a result of the events of war, the activities of the gangs intensified everywhere and even spread to the treeless southern regions.***

And in the memorandum of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine D. Korotchenko dated July 22, 1943, we read: ***"The mood of the population of the occupied territory in comparison with 1941-1942. changed radically.***

***Previously, part of the population argued: "We don't care what kind of government will be. The Germans are people too, we will adapt and survive." Now, after two years of fascist slavery, the***

***entire population, with the exception of the notorious enemies of the Soviet re***

To understand the course of further events, it is important to note that the situations in Galicia and Volhynia (two parts of what is in

domestic literature, it is customary to unite under the general name "Western Ukraine") differed significantly. To the differences in history, tradition, religion (Uniate Galicia and Orthodox Volyn) was added a very noticeable "subjective factor". Galicia, as noted above, was included by the

Germans in the "General Government" (i.e., occupied Poland). Governor-General G. Frank and the head of the "District of Galicia" O. Wachter pursued a policy of supporting the Ukrainians, traditional for the former Austria-Hungary, as opposed to the Poles; in addition, Wächter himself was inclined to pursue a rather flexible line in the style of "both the wolves are fed and the sheep are safe." In this he was fully supported by local Ukrainian collaborators.

Back in 1939, immediately after the defeat of Poland, the so-called. "Ukrainian Central Committee" (UCC), headed by Professor V. Kubyiovych. After the occupation of Galicia by German troops, the committee moved to Lvov, where its structural subdivision UCC (Ukrainian Regional Committee headed by K. Pankivsky) was created. Dozens of Ukrainian newspapers were published in Galicia, schools and colleges, hospitals and theaters worked. For the population - with the exception of the completely destroyed Jews - the arrival of the Germans meant a return to the understandable and habitual ways of "Austro-Ugrianism" since childhood. A remarkable detail is that the Galicians recruited (and not always voluntarily) for work in Germany had the "U" sign (Ukrainian) on their clothes and a much milder regime than the Ostarbeiters from the "Reich Commissariat".

Volyn, included in the "Reich Commissariat Ukraine", was given to the Nazi fanatic Erich Koch, whom all historians without exception ("right" and "left", Soviet and anti-Soviet) historians with rare unanimity call the "executioner of Ukraine". In a short time, E. Koch managed not only to turn the local population against the German authorities, but also to disrupt the fulfillment of "economic tasks", which caused the next round of repressions against the Ukrainian peasant robbed "to the skin", etc., up to complete edge destruction. To this it remains to add the fact that a significant part of Volhynia (especially its northeastern part, the Ukrainian Polissya) is covered

impenetrable forests, created by nature itself to shelter partisan detachments ..

Through these dense forests, almost strictly from west to east, two branches of the main railways stretched: Warsaw - Brest - Pinsk and Lublin - Kovel - Sarny. Another highway passed to the south, through Galicia along the line Krakow - Lvov - Ternopil. That's all. The fourth highway did not exist, and still does not exist to this day. On these three "strings" the supply of the entire southern flank of the German Eastern Front hung. Every projectile, every cartridge, every liter of gasoline used by the German army in the battles of Stalingrad, Kharkov, Orel and Kursk had to pass through these three points: Brest, Kovel, Lvov. Taking into account the fact that the regions of Southern Belarus with Brest and Pinsk were then part of the "Reich Commissariat Ukraine", it becomes clear that partisan activity in Volhynia was not a minor "nuisance of a district scale" for the Germans, but a strategic threat. The warfare technologies of the mid-20th century were based on the expenditure of a

colossal amount of ammunition - the quantity was trying to compensate for the low accuracy of fire control systems. Thus, in order to suppress all the fire weapons of an enemy infantry (rifle) division, according to the generous Soviet standards of the final period of the war, it was considered necessary to use 50,000 shells for a 122-mm howitzer. Taking into account the weight of the artillery shot and shell boxes, this weighs more than 2.5 thousand tons! And this is for one enemy division ... During the 50 days of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army used up 14 million mines and shells of all calibers. And besides, the front needed gasoline, spare parts for the repair of equipment, food and fodder, medicines; it was necessary to take out the wounded from the front to the rear, during periods of major offensive operations - up to 20 thousand per day. Even for economical Germans, the Eastern Front demanded 120-150 echelons (not wagons, but echelons) per day.

Unfortunately, the leadership of the Soviet partisan movement did not immediately realize the significance of fighting on enemy communications; the understanding that the effectiveness of partisan actions is measured not by the number of villages "liberated" for half a day, but by the number of villages put under

derailment of trains. Be that as it may, but from the end of 1942, the number and effectiveness of sabotage on railway lines began to grow like an avalanche: if in June 1942 80 locomotives and 240 wagons were damaged and destroyed, then in September 1943 - 650 and 2250, respectively ( it is important to note that these are German data, not reports of partisan commanders!). In other words, in the fall of 1943, an average of more than 20

trains per day.

Events developed in Ukraine in a similar way: if in June 1942 (according to the operational department of the Ukrainian broadband operations) 22 echelons were blown up, then in April 1943 - already 116. In the summer - autumn of 1943, i.e. in the midst of the Battle of Kursk , only one partisan unit under the command of A.F. Fedorov during the operation "Kovel Knot" derailed 274 German echelons. According to Soviet data, the capacity of the Kovel-Sarny highway was reduced by 6 times, traffic at night was almost completely stopped.

It was precisely at this moment, when German communications in western Ukraine for the first time came under serious threat, that the leadership of the Bandera OUN decided: "It's time! It's time to start building a rebel army!" And not in Galicia, where the nationalists had the greatest strength and influence, namely in Volhynia. Closer to highways. In parentheses, we note that in accordance with

the Decree of the former President of Ukraine V. Yushchenko, the date of the creation of the UPA should be considered October 14, 1942. This is the day of the Intercession of the Most Holy Theotokos, who, according to centuries-old tradition, is considered the patron and protector of the Orthodox people. On this date, a certain episode of a military clash between an armed detachment of the OUN and the Germans was also found ... With all due respect to the feelings of believers, this method of dating historical events is not much different from that adopted in the former USSR (and now in Russia) on the day of the creation of the Red Army, timed to 23 February 1918, that is, the day of the stampede of the sailors of Comrade Dybenko from the coast of Narva.

A political decision on the need to create their own armed forces (at that time they were called **"Ukrainian Volunteer Army"**, under the name "Ukrainian Insurgent

army" at that time the armed detachments of Taras Borovets operated) was adopted at the Third Conference of the OUN (b), which took place on February 17-21, 1943. The OUN activists who served in the "auxiliary police" became the core of the personnel of the future army; in the period from March 15 to April 10, 1943, on the orders of the Bandera leadership, at least 4-5 thousand "policemen" in organized groups, several hundred people each (which partisan intelligence noted with some surprise in their reports), left with weapons and ammunition V

forest.

The junior and middle command staff was largely formed from the fighters of the Schutzmann-Schaftsbattalion under the command of Pobigushchiy, who had accumulated rich experience in fighting against Soviet partisans in Belarus. As the chanuvalniks of the Bandera region unanimously assure us, "in December 1942, the battalion fighters refused to continue further service in the Wehrmacht." This is how it turns out to be the vaunted German "order" - I don't want to fight, and I won't!

Instead of shooting the "refuseniks" in the nearest ravine, SS Obergruppenführer von Bach-Zelewski thanks them for their faithful service and releases them on "free bread". The fighters and german command V face commanders arrive in Lvov, where "the Gestapo tried to arrest them, but Pobigushchiy and Shukhevych miraculously escaped arrest."

After this miraculous rescue (well, how can one not recall the anecdote about the "elusive Joe"), Wehrmacht Major Pobigushchiy turns into the commander of the regiment of the Waffen-SS division "Galicia", the formation of which began in Lvov in early March 1943 (an interesting coincidence of dates?). Shukhevych safely leaves Lviv, moves to Volyn, where he becomes one of the main organizers of the emerging Bandera "army" (although the first commander was the head of the OUN (b) in the North-Western Ukrainian lands, i.e., in Volyn and Polissya, 32- summer Dmitro Klyachivsky; Shukhevych replaced him in this post only in the late autumn of 1943). If you believe the Bandera propagandists, the newborn army has achieved tremendous success.

***"Throughout 1942-1944. under the exclusive control of the UPA were entire areas of Polissya, Volyn,***

***Carpathians, individual forests of Galicia, "* we read**

we are in the brochure "Who are the Banderaites and what are they fighting for" (published underground in 1950 in Ukrainian and Russian, the author is the head of the political education department of the Main Staff of the UPA Pyotr Fedun - "Poltava"). If this were true, then the discussion about who and against whom the UPA fought could be considered closed. If "entire regions of Polissya and Volhynia" were under the control of Bandera (and even under "exclusive control"! ) And for two years German trains with ammunition were moving through this territory from west to east, then the role of the OUN and UPA is understandable - they are allies of Germany. Not even "benevolent neutrals" (the transit of military cargo, and even during hostilities, is incompatible with the concept of neutrality), but allies. But since "exclusive control" existed only in illusions, the question of the goals and objectives set for the Bandera UPA still remains open.

This question is really very complex, and even diligently confused by the many years of propaganda "war". Without daring to resolve it within the framework of a small review article, I will cite only a few authoritative opinions and evidence.

On August 2, 1943, Vasyl Makar (at that time the head of the Bandera Security Service in the northwestern Ukrainian lands, i.e., a major leader who was directly involved in the creation of the UPA) wrote a letter to his brother Vladimir, in which he tells about the circumstances of this case: "**... For the rebel, the action**

**on the pŷvnŷchno-zahŷdnyh and partly similar (on the north-western and partly eastern) tereny mi mu force (should have started) and it didn't happen in advance (and it wasn't premature), like something else (as some say) , ale virivavsya us from the hands. From one side, the otamans began to multiply, like Bulba-Borovets, and from the other side, the red partisan began to flood the teren ... Another (Secondly): further, if they did not start the rebel actions, numbness (nemchura) began to massively blame the village ... All the people were seen, and the forgetfulness (buildings) were fired. At the meeting, the masses of people began to vt\_kati (run) into the fox and bluff the samopass. Robbery began, others went to the communist partisan, to Bulbi and so on. Evaluate two ambush (main) causes of our insurgent action.**

***And thirdly, moral character. Voices were felt: "Where is that wire? Why don't you give a charge (task) to beat the Nazis? it. p, "... Now our mouths have been gagged, and the revolution has been usspilled (made the business of the whole society). They laid the burden (burdens) of the struggle on the shoulders of the yawning suspylstva, if you want it to be hard, to bear yoga ... "***

You can't say better: the situation began to "get out of hand", and the masses began to ***"blunt self-propelled guns"*** or even go into partisans and beat the Germans, without waiting for guidance from the Bandera ***wire ...*** Not the last person in that ***wire*** was the recipient of the letter, Vladimir Makar, an employee of the agitation and propaganda department. In the same summer of 1943, he writes an article in which he describes the situation in Volhynia:

***"Before the beginning (before the beginning) of 1943, the fate of the German occupants of the Ukrainians was threatened with death in the field or in penal servitude in the "Reich", were forced to live (mainly) shukati (search) for shelter in the ranks of the red partisans, give birth ( hostile attitude) to self-supporting efforts (aspirations) of Ukraine... In 1942, the Bolshovitskaya partisan woman completely destroyed Polissya and the pivnÿchnu lýsova smuga (northern forest belt) of Volin... fall on lyuty - birch (February - March) 1943 fate. Headquarters of the UPA thought about getting better (first of all, the headquarters of the UPA had to provide for the mastery) of good strategic positions for igniting further planning actions. The best positions on PZU3 (Volyn and Polissya) were in the hands of red partisans. we will try it out, we need to get well. So it came to the first battles of the UPA with red partisans ... "*** You can be sure that the "first battles" were followed by more and more.

In the dispatches, summaries, reports and memoirs of partisan commanders, this topic - battles against armed detachments of Ukrainian nationalists - is constantly present.

***"Squad them. On June 14, Khrushchev sent the wounded to the airfield. In the forests near Rakitno (100 km northeast of Rovno. - M.S.), up to 600 Bandera men attacked the accompanying 130 partisans. For two and a half hours they fought a fierce battle, converged almost hand-to-hand ... The nationalists are fighting hard. They only re***

***when they suffered heavy losses - about 40 killed and up to 150 wounded ... "***

July 8, the commander of the detachment. Stalin (connection of A. Fedorov)

G. Balitsky: ***"Yesterday 300 people came across an enemy detachment, armed with machine guns, machine guns and mortars. The situation is bad, but the mood is cheerful ... At one time, every bush was a fortress for a partisan, but now this bush is death for partisans, because the enemy is now sitting in the forest, he knows him well ... An insidious enemy, to be sure. The German does not always go into the forest, but this bastard is in the forest and in small farms, and therefore the nationalist gangs are***

***far more dangerous than the German punitive detachments ...***  
". He, on August 7, the area of the Kovel railway junction: ***"They prevent us, the partisans, from approaching the railway by all means, they ambush us everywhere, thereby preventing us from***

***approaching the railway track, but we use our weapons, our we burn with spirit, will and send (them) to ... "*** The Soviet ("Red") partisans were the strongest, but not the only armed enemy of Bandera. First of all, they dealt a crushing blow to the troops of Taras Borovets (pseudonym "Bulba"). Borovets was not "red", it cannot even be called "pale pink". The ataman acted on behalf of the émigré government of the Ukrainian People's Republic (the anti-Bolshevik, "Petliura" government that controlled a significant part of Ukraine in 1918-1920) and its "president" Andrei Levitsky. As early as the end of 1932, Borovets created an underground organization in Polissya called the Ukrainian National Revival; the organization was small, and its leader eventually ended up in Bereza-Kartuzska. The military defeat of Poland freed the prisoners of the concentration camp, among whom was Borovets; in August 1940, he illegally crossed the border of the now Soviet Ukraine and began to form the structures of the future Ukrainian Insurgent Army. In a book of memoirs

written in Canada after the war (***"An Army without a Power"***), Borovets describes the first days of the Soviet-German war in this style:



***“Some of the front-line Chekists and commissars, if they were not defeated and shot down by a Soviet soldier, fortunately, on cars and stolen horses, day and night, run through forests and swamps to the east. Behind them climbs a cloud of local NKVD officers, policemen, secretaries and heads of all districts, regional committees, who before that, like midges and leeches, whetted the living blood***

Borovets did not just observe these events, the armed detachments he created took an active part in them - they fired at the retreating units of the Red Army, destroyed the NKVD sabotage groups, and created local governments. In agreement with the command of the Wehrmacht, Borovets created something like an "anti-partisan republic" in the Sarny-Olevsk region (north-east of Volyn). In a word, for the Bandera people, he should have been “quite his own”, and he strove to join forces with the OUN, went to Lviv for negotiations, but the reluctance of Lebed and Co. to share with anyone even crumbs of “ **power** ”.

By the spring of 1943, there were about 5-6 thousand people in the detachments of Borovets (they are also the UPA, they are also the "Polesskaya Sich"). It was a serious force, and the Bandera people took it very seriously. Having created a significant numerical advantage (by the summer of 1943, the Bandera "army" numbered about 20-30 thousand people), reinforced by superiority in weapons and military training of command personnel, Bandera presented an ultimatum to Borovets: surrender everything, surrender the name ("Ukrainian Insurgent Army" ), weapons, personnel. In vain did the ataman try to appeal to the conscience **of the blinded totalitarians**, in vain (“Open letter” dated August 4, 1943) bombarded them with a stream of rhetorical questions (***“Through these categorical glances, let me ask you: what are you fighting for? For Ukraine, for the OUN? For Ukrainian state for dictatorship in this state? For the Ukrainian people, for their own party?”***); in vain he appealed to the population crushed by terror (***“Working Ukraine!.. As Bandera fascists start throwing democratic slogans at the people and say that they are also fighting for unity and for the complete freedom of workers, then why should the stink of unity smash (desire) to establish an uncontrollable dictatorship...”***).

One by one, the Polesskaya Sich detachments were surrounded and destroyed - the commanders were handed over for "interrogation" into the hands of the Security Service, ordinary rebels were disarmed and offered to voluntarily join the Bandera UPA. Those who did not want to join were voluntarily shot on the spot. Those who entered "voluntarily" remained under constant surveillance by the Security Council and were destroyed at the slightest suspicion, or simply as part of the next "cleansing the ranks" campaign. On August 19, 1943, the militants of the Bandera Security Council attacked the headquarters of the "Polesskaya Sich", where they captured the wife of the ataman, who was tortured to death during interrogation. The leadership of the OUN(b) even explained in a special report that Anna Borovets **"became a Polish spy (spy) among Ukrainians"**, for

which she was **"judged by the Revolutionary Tribunal"** ... With such employment, did the Bandera people have time and strength to fight against the Germans? Strange question, isn't it? Who does not remember the famous line from Commissar Rudnev's diary: **"The nationalists are our enemies, but they beat the Germans."** She has been quoted a thousand and one times; still - the commissar of the legendary Kovpak himself (and, it seems, even a Jew)

admits ... Well, call me, gentlemen, it was not I who started the conversation

about Rudnev's diary. The above line is in the diary. Here is the entry dated June 24, 1943: **"... Over these days, and especially over the last day, my nerves are so tense that for the second day I eat almost nothing. Since there is such a political interweaving that you need to think hard. To kill is a very simple thing; but you have to do something to avoid i**

Neither I, nor most of my readers, "sniffed real gunpowder." Thank fate. But, I hope, everyone has happened to be on a camping trip, therefore everyone can assess for himself - to what degree of nervous and physical stress a person must go so that in the forest, "in the fresh air", a piece does not go down the throat ... In such a state, nothing but imagine... Judging by the diary, the commissar did not repeat such a breakdown in the future, but the mentions of "nationalists" go one after another. June 30

entry:

***"... Tired of this comedy with this bastard. Any nationalist rabble has gathered, there is no difficulty in defeating them, but it will play into the hands of the Germans, and we will oppose the Western Ukrainians against ourselves. Among them, only the top is ideologically strong, and the bulk is a blind weapon in the hands of nationalist scoundrels. At the first blow, all this will shatter ... "***

An entry dated

July 2: ***"... A number of valuable nationalist documents fell into our hands, which show the complete merging of German fascists with Ukrainian nationalists. There is a letter from Melnik, one of the nationalist leaders, to the German authorities (with a request) to help them with weapons to fight Muscovy ... There is no doubt that the top nationalists are deceiving the rank and file that they are fighting against the Germans, but in fact they are together with the Germans and with their support, the fight against the Soviet regime ... "***

An entry dated

July 5: ***"... The backbone and backbone of the insurgent Ukrainian army are the policemen of the western regions. After the Germans occupied the western regions of Ukraine, kulaks and repressed elements went to the police, who robbed and killed Jewish families, and lived on this robbery, and when the Germans put them on rations, all this Black Hundred bastard, led by nationalists, took away the weapons given by the Germans and went to forests. Here they united in hundreds and set their first task to declare a merciless massacre of the entire Polish population. A terrible massacre began, entire villages, districts, the Polish population were killed in the most brutal way, and children, women and the elderly were brutally tortured and killed, and all buildings were set on fire. There is no doubt that the***

***German Okhrana played a major role here in this national massacre ... "*** An entry in Rudnev's diary dated July 5, 1943 is a hot pursuit (alas, in this case, the common expression acquires a very gloomy overtone) evidence of the most important, most large-scale action committed by the Bandera UPA and SB. It is no coincidence that the fact of committing this gravest crime (and according to the current norms of international law, the crimes of genocide do not have a statute of limitations

denied and denied by the apologists of Bandera. To be more precise, no one denies the very fact of the massacres of the Polish population in Volhynia. There is practically no room left for a discussion about the scale of the massacre - 60 thousand people were killed only in Volhynia (not counting Galicia, where, however, the massacre began later and took place on a smaller scale), and this is only in those settlements in which Polish researchers managed to draw up specific lists of the dead; it is clear that the total number of victims is much higher. The subject of a furious discussion are the reasons for what happened and the role of the leadership of the OUN (b) in all this. The most **shameless** authors call the massacre "armed clashes between the UPA and the Home Army". This is how it turns out, the Polish partisan army, three-quarters consisting of women and children ... Or: "the Poles started first."

It remains to be asked - why? Before the start of the war, in 1939, in Volhynia (according to estimates by various authors), Poles made up no more than 15-18% of the population, and most of them were concentrated in cities; the village was predominantly Ukrainian. After the annexation of these territories by the Soviet Union, a significant part of the Polish population was deported to Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan; in particular, almost without exception, the so-called "siegiemen" were expelled (if not arrested as "spies and enemies of the Soviet government") - Polish peasants, to whom the authorities of the 2nd Rzeczpospolita provided the best lands on sprouts ("eastern outskirts") . By the time the second, Nazi occupation of Volhynia began, the Poles made up no more than 7-8% of the rural population, dispersed among the sea of Ukrainian villages and farms. And it was precisely those who lived on these lands side by side with the Ukrainians for hundreds of years who remained. And so, in a fit of mass madness, they began to cut their Ukrainian neighbors ten times their number?

The last "line of defense" of the Bandera advocates looks like this:  
***"Terror developed spontaneously and massively as a reaction to twenty years of humiliation and violence by the Polish authorities... The leadership of the OUN and the command of the UPA for some time simply turned a blind eye to what was happening."*** They just closed their eyes. From shame, I guess...

Before moving on to quoting documents, let's turn to a fragment from the book "The Bitter Truth", written in Canada by the Ukrainian historian Viktor Polishchuk. The author was born and raised in Volyn, in a peasant family; he saw life, orders and customs of this deaf, poor land with his own eyes:

***"I, like my sisters, vykhovuvavsya (brought up) in the Ukrainian patriotic homeland (family), but, however, not a little common (common) with znevago (contempt) to Poles and Jews. Our nearest land was the Jew Hershko, with which father and mother were spoken exclusively in Ukrainian, just like you, children, with your children. There was no welding between us, but on the Jewish Passover, susid gave us matzah.***

***There was no Ukrainian school in our little town, and I also went to Polish to read and write in Ukrainian and taught my father. Having finished 1939 the year of seven (seven) classes, I passed the exam to the commercial gymnasium in our city, prote (however) the war and the arrest of the father on 17 spring (September) 1939, the Bilshovs crossed the plans of my future day channa (learning). All holidays, children, were spent in the countryside, in grandparents. Not in them, not in sight of anyone in the village, I did not feel a filthy word at the address of Poles and Jews. The village was one-national, Ukrainian, calm, practical (working). Characteristically, in no way, n / vletku, l / and / d the hour of the holidays of the great holy days (neither in the summer, nor on Christmas or Easter), I don't see a drunken people there. In my grandparents and women on the river (per year) it didn't take more, like a fire of three burners: they drank the baby from the small charts, the old father and uncle Ivan. Hati didn't make locks (they didn't have locks), the doors flickered with a kilochka (stick), which means little that there is no one in t***

We can read the same thing in a great many other reminiscences; those who are older could hear it from their parents as well. This is how they lived: they worked from dawn to dusk, on great holidays they drank ***small portions of moonshine***, the doors were locked with a stick. Now they want to convince us that these people were so offended by the Polish authorities that four years after the defeat and disappearance of the 2nd Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth "spontaneously and massively" they went to cut, chop with axes, stab with bayonets, and saw their Polish neighbors with saws? Moreover, this "spontaneous explosion of popular indignation" occurred precisely there and precisely then, where and when

armed units of the UPA appeared. At the same time, in all other regions of Ukraine, there were no mass or even isolated cases of anti-Polish demonstrations, and in Galicia the massacre began about six months later and, again, "coincided" in time with the organization of armed groups of Ukrainian nationalists (UPA and UNS ). And this is called "spontaneity? Total ethnic cleansing (**"to**

**remove all borrowers from Ukrainian lands")** was programmed by the "founding fathers" of the OUN back in 1929. In 1943, finally, an instrument (UPA) appeared with which it was possible to start this adoption. What kind of "spontaneity" can we talk about here? So no one (none of those who were personally familiar with the situation) talks about "spontaneity". Mykola Lebed ( who safely escaped punishment and moved across the ocean) in his memoirs proudly (!) writes: **(performed); yhný neruhome mineno (real estate) passed to the power (property) of the Ukrainian people.**

The document preserved in the Ukrainian State Archives makes it possible to clarify the specific content of what Lebed calls an "order" and its "voluntary" implementation : **usuvati**

**(expel) Poles from our lands. I ask you to think this way: give the rural population an order (instruction) until a few days (within a few days) to be vaccinated on the native (indigenous, primordial) Polish lands. If it doesn't vikonaý (perform) this, then send the fights, like men will be liquidated, and hati and mine fire (select). Once again, with all due respect (I pay attention) to the fact that the Poles call (call) before they leave the lands, and until the first time (and only after that) liquidate, and not navpaki (and not vice versa). I ask for a special respect for this...".** Taking into account the personnel composition of the UPA during the summer of 1943 ("the backbone and basis of the insurgent Ukrainian army are the policemen of the western regions") and

the habits and needs formed among the "policemen" over a year and a half, it is not necessary

to be surprised that the practical execution of the order for the ethnic cleansing of Volhynia was accompanied by massive "violations of nationalist legality" and went far beyond the "voluntary" expulsion of Poles prescribed by the OUN leadership. Countless eyewitness

accounts of the "Volyn massacre" have preserved such details that no horror film would dare to show. Equally unwilling to turn this article into a manual for novice sadists, or to face the accusation of trying to "put pressure on the reader's psyche", I will only cite V. Polishchuk's story about the events that happened to his close relatives; the story is very restrained and terrible, precisely because of the ordinary routine of the crimes committed: ***"Influence of 1943. my, by mother, aunt Anastasia***

***Vitkovska went with a Ukrainian sudosa the day before it was stashed for three kilometers from the Dubna metro station, the village of Tarakaniv. They spoke Polish language (they spoke Polish), because the woman, an illiterate woman, comes from the Lublin region, did not know how to learn Ukrainian. They sent stinks to remember the deshcho (to exchange something) for bread, more in titki - six children. Not at all, not uncle Anton Vitkovsky, the same person is, by definition, illiterate, not only did not bother about any kind of politics, but they did not even think about it (they did not have the slightest idea about it). I yy, and also a Ukrainian woman was beaten up by Banderivtsi only for those who stank spoke in Polish.***

***They beat him like a beast, with axes (axes) and threw him at the roadside rŷv (ditch) ... My father's squad (my wife's parents) lived before the war in Polissŷ; yy father is Czech, and mother is Polish. If on the cob 1943r. we started on the pivdenny (southern) Polissya masovŷ vbivstva poles - all this went to Kremenechchina to the father's relatives, to the village of Ugorsk. Once I knew a Ukrainian, having told a woman's dad (told my wife's father) that the UPA was getting ready to destroy his homeland (family). The stench flowed (ran away) to Kremenets. Htos bachiv Rozmov (someone saw the conversation) of that young Ukrainian with a woman's father. Yogo, suspecting at the "zradi", they hung in the middle of the July 1943 became the bloodiest.***

settlements where the Poles lived. According to various estimates, from 12 to 30 thousand people died during these three days. It was precisely after such events that the 3rd Great (Extraordinary) Gathering of the Bandera OUN took place, at which resolutions about the "freedom of peoples", the equality of all citizens of Ukraine and other rights of brutally murdered people were adopted. For the sake of truth, it should be noted that even among the members of the bureau of the Central **Provid** (leadership) of the OUN (b) disagreements arose over the attitude towards the massacre unleashed in Volyn, but in the end the majority (including, in particular, Roman Shukhevych) sided with the commander of the UPA Klyachivsky - the main organizer of the anti-Polish campaign. **"The UPA is**

**fighting against the Russian-Bolshevik and German invaders,"** is written in the resolution of the 3rd Great Gathering. I am unable to understand the hidden meaning of this formula. How can you fight both at the same time? No, of course, a mighty elephant with one blow of his huge leg can kill two fighting pugs. You can also imagine a crazy pug ("we sing a song to the madness of the brave"), which decided to attack two elephants at once. But how can a fly (and in comparison with the military potential of Germany and the USSR, several tens of thousands of UPA fighters armed with small arms were just a "fly") can fight two fighting elephants at the same time? Any blow to the "red" partisans, of course, helped the Germans, consolidated their

positions in the occupied territory. Each blown up German echelon weakened the combat power of the Wehrmacht and brought closer the day the Red Army arrived in Western Ukraine (maybe that is why not a single sabotage on the railways was ever found on the account of the UPA). However, contrary to all logic, armed clashes between the Germans and the UPA fighters took place. Moreover, in a considerable amount (nowadays a collection of "100 victorious battles of the UPA against German troops" has even been published in Ukraine). True, with close acquaintance with such facts, questions become even more. **"Sickle 19, 1943. zdÿysnenno attack on m. Kamin Kashirsky. The following took part in the action: the chickens of Nazar-Kriga, the hundred of Lisy and the hundred of the Cube. Well planned action started early in the month and ended about 17 years**



***By the stretch of the day, all the places were cleared from the gate. Spend the enemy: 120 driven in (Polish policemen and soldiers of the Wehrmacht). Spend UPA: 2 wounded."***

Did you understand something? Me not. From early morning until five o'clock in the evening there was a battle, the enemy had 120 killed, his own losses - two wounded? Is there really an ordinary story of a pogrom hiding behind this victorious report? From morning to evening, slowly, "on the hunt" they slaughtered the Poles, the killed men were recorded as "Polish policemen"; To their misfortune, there were also several German soldiers in the town who tried to stop the robbery - so two wounded among the attackers appear ...

Or a high-profile story about the destruction by UPA fighters of a veteran of the Nazi party, SS Obergruppenführer (and this is no less than a colonel general on the "scale" of military ranks!), Chief of Staff of the SA Viktor Lutze. On May 2, 1943, this hardened Nazi allegedly personally led a tank column that went to battle with the UPA, but was ingloriously defeated along with its commander. Lutze really died on that day. Together with him, in the same car accident, his daughter Irma died; 8-year-old Frida and her grandmother Gisela were taken alive to a military hospital in the city of Potsdam, but it only happened two thousand miles from the nearest UPA detachment ... Everyone, as in their youth, taught: "dogmatism, fanaticism, illusionism." Have you forgotten, dear reader, how it all began? Be that as it may, the "strange war" of the UPA against the Germans and Soviet partisans did not last long at the same time - from early spring to autumn 1943. In a report dated November 13, 1943, the head of the "Reich Commissariat Ukraine" Erich Koch

states with satisfaction that the armed detachments nationalists are fighting with the partisans, not showing activity in relation to the Germans. And this is not surprising, considering that as early as October 27, 1943, the "chief assistant" of the Security Service Mykola Arsenich (pseudonym "Mikhailo") signed an order in which, under pain of execution, any

"unauthorized" attacks on the Germans.

In October-November 1943, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper and crossed it on a wide front; in early January 1944, units of the Red Army crossed the former Soviet-Polish border and

occupied the city of Sarny. A big war came to Western Ukraine. By mid-April 1944, the front was already passing along the lines of Kovel, Brody, Ternopil, Chernivtsi. Then came a long "operational pause", which on July 13, 1944 was replaced by the roar of the cannonade of the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation that had begun. By the end of the month, almost all of Galicia was in the hands of the Red Army, the Germans held only the Drohobych region in the interfluvium of the Dniester and San. By that time, the

Bandera games with the "war on two fronts" were finally stopped. In January-February 1944, the first meetings and negotiations began - still at the level of "field commanders", but already on April 18, 1944, Klyachivsky himself (at that time the commander of the Sever UPA) wrote a letter to the commander of the Wehrmacht army group "Severnaya Ukraine", in which he offers cooperation and asks to provide the actions of the UPA units with weapons and ammunition. At the beginning of June 1944, completely official negotiations were held in Lvov between the representative of the Central OUN (b) Ivan Grinyokh ("Gerasimovsky"), a former chaplain of the Nachtigall battalion, one of the organizers of the "Declaration of Independence" on June 30, 1941, and representatives of the command Wehrmacht and Abwehr.

The parties agreed on a plan of further action, according to which the OUN was supposed to provide the Germans with intelligence information and conduct large-scale sabotage work in the rear of the advancing Red Army, while the Germans took upon themselves the obligation to transfer to Bandera a large amount of small arms, ammunition, radio communications, medicines. As modern Ukrainian historians point out, in 1944 the Germans handed over to the UPA about 10,000 heavy and light machine guns, 26,000 machine guns, 72,000 rifles, 22,000 pistols, 100,000 hand grenades, 300 field radio stations. At the same time, the Bandera tried to "test the ground" for rapprochement with the Western allies.

To do this, yielding to the traditions and norms of the despicable Anglo-Saxon democracy, it was necessary to depict a certain "representative body" that was not explicitly connected with Bandera, the OUN and the previous long-term cooperation with Germany. July 11–15, 1944 in the Carpathians, in the forest

near Sambir, 20 people gathered who declared themselves the Ukrainian Main Liberation Council. A "president" was even appointed, which was Kirill Osmak, who was not formally affiliated with the OUN. R. Shukhevych, who more and more actively pushed Lebed out of the "first roles", took the post of head of the General Secretariat of the UGVR. However, all these efforts turned out to be completely fruitless - after everything that happened, after the complicity of Ukrainian nationalists in the genocide of Jews and the massacre of Poles directly organized by them, there could no longer be any political union, no recognition by the West of the Bandera "governments" and "parliaments"

speech. After the complete expulsion of the German occupiers from the territory of Ukraine (August 1944), a new - and the last - stage in the history of the OUN begins, the stage of the struggle against the Soviet government, the Red Army and the NKVD. It was at this time that the rapid growth in the number of the UPA began; if by the end of 1943 it did not exceed 30-40 thousand people, then a year later, according to the estimates of various authors, there were already about 70-100 thousand people in the UPA. A huge amount of weapons left behind by the departing Germans became an important, but far from the only reason for the growth of the ranks of the UPA. The insurrectionary army ceased to be such even in name - Bandera moved on to the "voluntary-compulsory" mobilization of peasant youth; for evading the "call" they beat with ramrods, ruined farms, and especially malicious "evaders" were shot. An important (perhaps the most significant) source of many thousands of replenishment became "deviators" of a completely different kind - conscripts running into the forest who did not

want to serve in the Red Army. A lot has been written about this period, about this terrible page in the history of Ukraine, so much that some readers have completely forgotten that the history of the OUN began 15 years earlier, and the UPA did not arise at all as a result of an immaculate conception in the summer of 1944. Oddly enough, but modern Ukrainian and traditional Soviet historiography (more precisely, pseudo-historical mythology) turned out to be united in their unwillingness to remember the first pages of the history of the OUN, the events of 1929-1944, when the leading cadres of the OUN were formed, the "face" of the movement was determined, its ideology, priorities, allies and opponent.

The position of the apologists is understandable - no matter how you practice verbal balancing act, the fascist ideology of the movement and many years of cooperation with Nazi Germany do not adorn the portrait of noble heroes; it is easier and more convenient to erase these years from history altogether. Soviet propaganda, on the other hand, was convinced that it was impossible to come up with a greater crime than unwillingness to join a collective farm, therefore, in solving the problem of defamation of "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists", it focused precisely on the events of the post-war years. In addition, any mention that Poles lived in the territories of eastern Poland, "liberated" in September 1939 by agreement with Hitler, was not very pleasant for communist historians; as a result, the main crime of Bandera - the "Volyn massacre" - was completely forgotten, erased from memory, forbidden to be mentioned in all textbooks. Without trying to embrace the immensity within the framework of one article, we note only three points that

are important for understanding the events of the last stage in the history of the OUN. The notion that a 100,000-strong "army of the unconquered"

fought and fought and fought until every last person died in unequal battles, to put it mildly, is erroneous.

***The first amnesty for the members of the Bandera movement was announced on February 12, 1944*** ("in the name of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, we guarantee to all members of the UPA who will go over to the side of the Soviet government, who will honestly and completely break all ties with the OUN, who will sincerely and completely renounce all struggle and hostile intrigues against the Red Army and Soviet power - a complete forgiveness of their grave mistake, their past offenses against the Motherland"). ***On November 27, 1944, a second amnesty was announced, and the document stated that the government of the Ukrainian SSR would amnesty both ordinary members of the underground and leaders if they "honestly repent before the people and take the path of labor."***

These appeals did not go unanswered - by the beginning of 1945, about 17 thousand members of the UPA and the OUN underground had come to confession. There were even cases of organized mass exit from the forest. So, in February 1945 in the Vizhnitsky district of the Chernivtsi region, in full

consisting of (about 400 people) laid down the arms *of the chickens* (battalion) under the command of a

certain "*Perebinis*". ***After the end of the war, on May 19, 1945, the third amnesty was announced, and on November 5, the fourth amnesty.*** This time the "turnout" turned out to be much higher - the war was over, and the "deviators" hiding in the forests considered it good to surrender to the authorities. In total, judging by the report of the NKVD of the USSR of November 22, 1945, in the period from February 1944 to November 1, 1945, 99,219 "bandits and those who evaded service in the Red Army" turned themselves in to Western Ukraine. A similar report by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR states that by May 25, 1946, 115,000 people had turned themselves in. The modern Ukrainian historian D. Vedeneev (who, by the way, is very supportive of the OUN and its leaders) writes about 113,000 "active members of the resistance movement and those who evaded service in the Red Army," who surrendered to the authorities from 1944 to September 1949. Despite all the reservations related to the additions that are inevitable for the Soviet bureaucratic system, these figures show that the majority of the OUN did not "persist in madness" and laid down their arms during the first 10–15 months after the expulsion of the Germans from the territory of Western Ukraine.

The second point, also related to the question of the actual duration of the armed confrontation and the motivation of its participants, refers to the scale and cruelty of the "internal terror" carried out by the Bandera Security Council. As in any extremist, anti-

democratic organization of the "leader" type, a secret punitive service arose in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which, over time, more and more "crushed" the organization as a whole; in this sense, the history of interaction between the OUN and the Security Council exactly repeats the history of the CPSU (b) and the GPU / NKVD. By 1943, the Security Council had become a strictly "vertical" structure, accountable to no one; individual "referentura" of the Security Council were subordinate only to the "chief referent of the Security Council" and at the same time had the right to arrest any activist of the movement, including the leaders of the territorial organizations of the OUN. The arrest was followed by an "inquest", after which the prisoner, who confessed to everything, could only be hanged. It was only in rare cases that an arrested person could turn out to be innocent.

So, in Volhynia from January to October 1945, out of 938 people who were under investigation in the Security Council, 889 were executed, and in the Kovelsky and Lyubomlsky districts, the number of those executed turned out to be

exactly equal to the number of those arrested. B. Kozak (pseudonym "Smok"), who led these reprisals, was later transferred to the Ternopil region, where he carried out a massive "cleansing of the ranks" in the UPA-South district. In a few months, fifty commanders were destroyed, including the chief of staff of the "district", a political assistant, the head of the school of miners, and a dozen commanders of kurens (battalions). In total - together with the members of the families of the "traitors" - 6 thousand people were executed! And there were quite a few such "Smoks" in the SB system. The "chief referent" of the Bandera Security Council, Mykola Arsenich ("Mikhailo"), was also a sinister figure. On his initiative, starting in the autumn of 1943, so-called. "major purges" (autumn 43, September 44, spring and November 45), during which the "suspicious" were massively arrested and destroyed, which included the former "Bulbovtsy" and "Melnikovtsy", immigrants from the eastern regions Ukraine (*skhýdnimi*), Russians and Jews who joined the movement. In a

number of cases, it came to armed clashes between the "operatives" of the Security Council and the UPA fighters outraged by the unbridled terror. So, in the area of the village of Maryanovka, Sarnensky district, a real battle took place between the UPA and SB detachments, after which 18 captured "ESBists" were hanged. In this blazing "bonfire" the NKVD deftly threw "firewood" in the form of **"special combat units" staffed by former OUN members**. During 45-46 years. One and a half hundred such groups were created with a total number of more than 1800 people. Acting under the guise of **"militants"** of the Security Council, these "false Bandera" terrorized the population, introduced additional nervousness and confusion in the ranks of the nationalist underground.

In general, the terror of the Security Council had a twofold effect on the fate of the movement. On the one hand, the fear of reprisals (of which the whole family **of the sanctuary usually became a victim**) kept many from leaving the forest; on the other hand, terror increased the demoralization of the UPA and, strange as it may seem at first glance, pushed many to cooperate with the NKVD. As the former writes in his memo

UPA kuren commander M. Skorupsky, ***“the first seksots (informants) came mainly from those families and villages where there were victims of the Security Council, where we ourselves sowed grief and hatred.”*** And there were quite a few informers: 18,165 informers (not counting 2,249 agents introduced into the ranks of the underground) were registered with the NKVD as of January 1,

1946. And here we turn to the third important point: who fought against the UPA, who hunted down and arrested armed underground activists? The scheme imposed by the current propagandists, in which ***“Ukrainians fought against alien Muscovites at the threshold of their native hut,”*** has nothing to do with reality. As for the senior and middle command staff, on the Soviet side it was almost completely formed from the commanders of partisan detachments and officers of the USHPD (Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement). All of them were Ukrainians, or at least natives of Ukraine. So, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR was V. Ryasny, then - T. Strokach, the People's Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR - S. Savchenko, the head of the NKVD border troops of the Ukrainian district - P. Burmak, the head of the Internal Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian district - Marchenkov, the head of the NKVD Directorate for the Lviv region - E. Grushko ... The general political leadership was in the hands of the head of the Communist Party of Ukraine N.S. Khrushchev - no matter how we evaluate this extraordinary figure in Soviet history today, call him "an alien

Muscovite" is difficult.

At the grassroots level, the fight against Bandera was carried out by about 25 thousand fighters of the so-called. "destroyer squads" formed from among the locals; only locals, natives of Galicia and Volyn, could be many thousands of secret informants and NKVD agents embedded in the underground structures - a skhidnyak who did not speak the local dialect perfectly would be "deciphered" immediately. In fact, in 1944-1949. in Western Ukraine there was a real civil war, and this war grew out of the bloody events of the period of German occupation; this is precisely what determined the transcendent level of cruelty shown by each of the warring parties. It is worth noting that attempts to spread the terrorist activities of the Bandera underground to the central and eastern

regions of Ukraine were unsuccessful. The movement returned to where it started - to Galicia. So, for three years (from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1949) in Galicia (Lviv, Stanislav, Ternopil, Drohobych regions) 2459 "actions" were noted (acts of terrorism, sabotage, arson, etc.), in Volyn (Brest, Volyn, Rivne regions) - 560, in the Zhytomyr region - 75, Kamenetz Podolsk - 15, Chernihiv - 3, Kiev - 3. In cruelty, in absolute disregard for the fate of the civilian population,

against their will involved in a bloody orgy, the parties did not yield to each other. In all other respects, absolute superiority was on the side of the Red Army and the NKVD troops. Miracles do not happen, and by the spring of 1946 the UPA was almost completely defeated. Without a shadow of embarrassment in the report of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR on May 25, 1946, the expression "bandits and others were killed" was used. The quantitative ratio of "bandits" and "others" can be judged by the fact that for 111 (one hundred and eleven) thousand killed and 251 thousand arrested, there are only 83 thousand seized weapons. After such losses (and taking into account one hundred thousand who confessed), only separate, scattered groups remained from the Bandera "army", which for several years, hiding in the forests and mountains, senselessly and mercilessly terrorized the population. ***The last, fifth, amnesty, announced in December 1949***, was almost ineffectual - by that time only those who firmly decided to fulfill the first paragraph of the OUN Decalogue (***"You will get the Ukrainian State, otherwise you will perish in the struggle for it)"*** remained in the "cache" ").

On February 12, 1945, the first commander of the UPA, Dmytro Klyachivsky, died in battle. On January 23, 1947, Mykola Arsenich, the chief assistant of the Bandera Security Service, shot himself blocked in the forest "cache". On March 5, 1950, UPA commander Roman Shukhevych was killed during arrest. After his death, Vasyl Kuk, who was arrested on May 23, 1954, acted as army commander for four years. As for Stepan Bandera himself, after his release in October 1944, he was under "house arrest" in Berlin; On the eve of the collapse of Nazi Germany, the Germans took him to the American zone of occupation - so to speak, "handed over from hand to hand." Subsequently, Bandera lived in Munich (and this is the richest and most expensive city in Germany) and led an endless series of bloody



intrigues, squabbles and conflicts in the so-called. "foreign part of the OUN". Killed in Munich by a KGB agent on October 15, 1959

## Spring of Victory. Stalin's forgotten crime

"Patriotism is defined by the measure of shame a person feels for crimes committed on behalf of his people."

***Adam Michnik***

To say that in the USSR a strict ban was imposed on the discussion of this topic is to say nothing. To say that ridiculous excuses were invented for this crime after the fact is to tell a deliberate lie. There were no excuses. Nobody tried to justify anything. The people and the party, fathers and children, "tops" and "bottoms" were united in a categorical denial of the existence of the very subject for discussion, much less condemnation. There were no questions - but there was an answer: indestructible, multi-ton, for centuries. In granite and marble, a Soviet soldier-liberator stood above Treptow Park in Berlin with a rescued German girl in his arms, and every spring fresh flowers obediently lay down at the foot of the monument. And even after rare and scattered reminiscences began to be published in the early years of glasnost that a German girl could end up in the hands of a Soviet soldier in a different situation and with different consequences for the girl, no one wanted to hear these voices. In other words, I couldn't hear. Such a truth did not fit into the consciousness of a normal Soviet person.

Help, oddly enough, came from the West. Foreign countries once again helped us. They have already developed a whole "scientific tradition" there, in which the topic of violence against the civilian population of Germany (i.e. mass brutal murders, torture, robberies, destruction of dwellings) was playfully designated by the term "sexual violence". And that allowed me to breathe a sigh of relief. No, no one argues with the fact that rape - both according to the laws, and even according to thieves' "concepts" - is a serious crime. But this

special kind of crime. The accused always has the opportunity - with an impudent smirk (or frightened shifting eyes, depending on the circumstances) - to say: "Come on, you ... What violence ... Yes, she herself came ... ". So the word has been

found. Further - easier. Then it remained to reduce the most difficult historical and moral problem to the topic of the notorious "sexual violence", and then question both the mass nature of the phenomenon and the very fact of violence. Of the many examples of such "offensive counter-propaganda" I will cite only one, but it is very characteristic and remarkable. This publication is noteworthy both in terms of where it appeared (the oldest and one of the most widely circulated newspapers in the country) and the high formal status of the persons involved in the discussion. The reason for the "discussion" was the publication in Russia of the well-known book by the English historian E. Beevor "The Fall of Berlin". On July 21, 2005, Trud journalist S. Turchenko decided to deal with the uninvited "foreign consultant". Understand all the meanings that this word has in Russian.

A decisive rebuff began from the very first words. From the very title of the article: **"Violence on the facts."** Further, in the subtitle, a very clear hint was given to whose echo Beevor is and to whose mill the unnamed renegades pour water on him: "Why does the **British historian and some media retell Goebbels' fables?**" Finally, a completely infernal picture arose in the creative imagination of the journalist: **"Goebbels is rubbing his hands in his coffin..."**. The first to speak was M. A.

Gareev himself (general of the army, president of the Academy of Military Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, professor, doctor of historical sciences, doctor of military sciences, former deputy chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army), etc. No doubts or questions the venerable scientist did not have and does not

have. **Beevor and his sing-alongs are commonplace plagiarists. The real author of the myth about the "aggressive sexuality" of our soldiers is Goebbels. However, Beevor surpassed Goebbels... Another libel on the Soviet soldier-liberator... Personally, I participated in the liberation of East Prussia. I speak as if in spirit: about sexu**

***I didn't even hear violence. I remember that before the formation we were read the decision of the military tribunal. The essence of the matter was that several soldiers broke into the yard of a wealthy bauer, caught several chickens, geese, and began to cook. When the battle for the farm ended, the owners got out of the basement where they were hiding and raised a cry. The noise came from a patrol. The soldier was detained. The commander of the 184th division, Major General Basan Gorodovikov, ordered a show trial of a military tribunal. The fighters were given five years in the camps. It is not difficult to assume that the***

***punishment would be immeasurably more severe if one of them coveted, say, the hostess.*** The next army general, Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor I. Tretyak was not so categorical. He

is even ready to admit that not only geese and ducks became victims of violence: ***"Of course, in such a huge military grouping that entered Germany in 1945, anything happened. The men had not seen women for several years. Someone didn't resist. But today, many recognize that sexual relations between our fighters and German women were by no means always of a violent nature. There was also mutual interest. It is strange today to read how a certain Englishman suddenly became preoccupied with sexual conflicts 60 ye***

The President of the Association of World War II Historians, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor O. Rzheshevsky also does not hide his indignation at another attempt to ***"recreate the image of the "Asian hordes", which Nazi propaganda drove into the heads of the Germans, and then a small group of neo-fascist historians, who had long been turned away in Germany (highlighted by me. — M.S.)"***. As expected, the professor, President of the Association of Historians, is particularly indignant at the groundlessness of the accusations:

***"It would be necessary to have good reasons, to have documents, if we were to put forward such a heavy accusation against the army, which bore the brunt of the fight against the fascist invasion on its shoulders. But they are not in Beevor's book. Information about "mass violence" is based on evidence such as***

***“Berliners remember...”, “one doctor calculated...”, which is not acceptable for the scientific research that the book claims to be.***

The truth, according to Professor Rzhesheshevsky, is that ***“an avalanche of revenge could have overwhelmed Germany, but this did not happen. Servicemen of both the Soviet and other allied armies in***

***In general, they showed a humane attitude towards civilian German residents ...***

***The headquarters took extraordinary measures to prevent atrocities against the peaceful German population.*** After this statement, Rzhesheshevsky, as befits a professional historian, cites a

documented fact. A very interesting (but, unfortunately, indistinctly stated) fact: ***“In the first months of 1945, 4148 officers and a large number of privates were convicted by military tribunals for committed atrocities against the local population.”*** "And a large number of privates." Big is how much? No answer. You have to make assumptions. There are at least 10 soldiers per officer in the active army. If we accept on faith the thesis that the reason for the "outrages" was that ***"the men had not seen women for several years"***, then

the average expected probability of committing "outrages" among the rank and file should be higher than among the officers. The officers of the Red Army (especially in the last years of the war) saw women. Comrade Stalin took care of this.

In the spring of 1942 alone, more than 450,000 women were called up as part of the “mass voluntary mobilization” (that is what the GKO Decree called it). With particular pride, Soviet historians reported that 70% of them were sent to the Army. Along with those mobilized under the Decrees of the State Defense Committee, there were civilian women in the Active Army, the number of which in 1945 amounted to 234 thousand people. In parentheses, we note that in 1943-1945. in the rear units and institutions of the Armed Forces of the USSR there were about 5 million men called up for military service, so sending hundreds of thousands of women to the front, to the most advanced front line, could in no way be explained by the catastrophic lack of personal

composition...

Returning to the fact cited by Professor Rzhesheshevsky, we can assume as a first approximation that those convicted of

There were 10 times more **"outrages in relation to the local population"** among the privates than among the officers. In this case, the total number of convicts (not the total number of outrageous people, but only the number of convicts!) will be 40-50 thousand people. For the spring of 45, this is the size of one combined arms army. But that's

not all. Continuing to demonstrate his "zeal beyond reason", S. Turchenko hurries to supplement Professor Rzheshhevsky's message with a quote from the following document: **"Report of**

**the head of the political department of the 8th Guards Army of the Guard Major General M. Skosyrev dated 04/25/45:.**

**In recent days, the number of cases of hoarding, rape of women and other immoral phenomena on the part of military personnel has sharply decreased. 2-3 cases are registered in each**

**locality, while before the number of cases**

**there were a lot more immoral phenomena..."**

So, what did respected, authoritative people tell us? Nobody said the word "murder". M.A. Gareev knows about stolen chickens, but he has never even heard of rape; General of the Army I. Tretiak admits the presence of certain "sexual conflicts" that, however, do not deserve mention and discussion; the historian Rzheshhevsky does not know of any documents that could confirm the fact of "mass violence", but recognizes the fact that many thousands of soldiers and officers of the Red Army were condemned for atrocities, which, according to Gareev, did not exist at all. Major General of the Guard proudly announces that the number of rapes and other immoral phenomena invented by Goebbels' propaganda "drastically decreased" and "in each locality" only 2-3 cases are recorded. Sheer nonsense. **"Before, the number of cases of immoral phenomena was much higher."**

Now let's turn to the documents and facts collected by **"a small group of neo-fascist historians who have long been turned away in Germany."** I must immediately admit that in this case, Professor Rzheshhevsky was not very mistaken in the wording. In post-war (and, quite strangely, in post-Soviet) Germany, historians who do not agree that the very fact of a violent military clash between brown and red fascism can serve as an excuse for any of these criminal dictatorships remain in the position

"lepers", with whom those who apply for a political career and state "grants" are wary of dealing. Nevertheless, in the course of many years of hard work of researchers, a huge array of facts and documents was collected and summarized.

First of all, we should name the 11-volume collection Documentation of the Expulsion of the Germans, work on which began in August 1949 and lasted more than 4 years. Survivors spoke of crimes that their relatives and neighbors were victims of; the testimonies of teachers, doctors and government officials were recorded. Based on this information, the researchers came to a figure of 12 million Germans expelled from their homes, of which 2 million were still considered "missing", which, in relation to the situation of the mid-50s, could be considered synonymous with the word "dead".

Calculations made using the demographic balance method led to the conclusion that in the "eastern regions" that became part of the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia after the war, **2,484 thousand** civilians died (not counting the men who died at the front). Of course, the demographic balance method itself is obviously inaccurate, and each figure in it can be subjected to justified criticism. It is worth recalling, however, that the now canonized figure of the losses of the Soviet Union (27 million people) was obtained by almost the same method. The clause "almost" refers to the fact that German historians used data from the 1948 census, i.e., a census conducted three years after the end of the war, while Soviet historians used data from the 1959 census (14 years after the war) and the falsified Stalinist one. the 1939 census. A much lower estimate of the number of deaths was given by the

Church Tracing Service of the FRG. In 1964, a report was published, from which it follows that in all areas from which the Germans were expelled (East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, Sudetenland), a total of 473 thousand **people died**. True, here we must take into account that the Tracing Service did not include the "missing" in the total. From the point of view of arithmetic, the number 473, of course, is five times less than the number 2484. For a legal assessment of events, the difference is negligible: 473 thousand civilians who died within a few

months is long enough to raise the question of "war crimes and crimes against humanity". It is also important to note that the list of 473 thousand dead civilians did not include the victims of the bombing of Dresden and other cities of East Germany (the future GDR), did not include the residents of Berlin who died during and after the storming of the city, did not include tens of thousands of ethnic Germans who "disappeared" during the exile from Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania. One of the most

prominent representatives of the "small group of historians" was (he died in 2002) I. Hoffmann (Hoffmann). For 35 years (from 1960 to 1995) Hoffmann worked at the Research Center for Military History of the Bundeswehr, going through the ranks from a young specialist to scientific director of the Center. In 1995, I. Hoffmann's book "Stalin's War of Annihilation" ("Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945") was published, reprinted four times before the end of the century. The reaction of the "left circles" of Germany to Hoffmann's research reached such intensity that on February 28, 1996, the deputies of a number of Bundestag factions sent "six inquiries and 14 additional questions" to the German government (whose competence, by the way, does not include the management of scientific and historical discussion). Commenting on this deplorable attempt to turn the parliament of a democratic country into a kind of inquisitorial tribunal, Hoffmann writes in the preface to the fourth edition of his book:

***"If a researcher is sometimes forced to argue, as if appealing to a wall, then this is due to reasons that are deeply rooted in German post-war psychology and therefore can hardly have a rational explanation ... Many Germans, in their self-absorption, simply did not notice that they were demanding from the Russians that they, Russians, continued to live in peace with the Stalinist propaganda lies, if only the Germans had an alibi in the person of Hitler. They needed to present themselves in the proper light before the whole world, and at the expense of the Russians, and demonstrate how great the distance between them and Hitler has become today."***

Further, extensive excerpts from those chapters of the book will be given (I. Hoffman. "Stalin's War of Annihilation", M., AST-Astrel, 2006, pp. 305–347), which deal with the events of the winter-spring of 1945. Most episodes and quotes are accompanied by a link



to the relevant funds of the Federal Military Archive in Freiburg, but, given the practical inaccessibility of this archive for the average Russian reader, I did not reproduce these footnotes. The surnames of Soviet servicemen in most cases will be replaced by the first letter. So: "...What the propaganda of hatred among the

Red Army soldiers was doing was truthfully reflected in the captured front-line letters, some of which we will cite here. They were written by servicemen of motorized units (field mail number 20 739) between January and February 1945. ***"Every day we move further along East Prussia," S. wrote, for example, to***

***his parents in Smolensk, "and we take revenge on the Germans for all their meanness that they have done to us... We are now allowed to do everything with the German scoundrels." "The Germans are all running away, they are afraid of***

***our revenge," says the letter that L. wrote on January 30, 1945, "but not everyone manages to slip away. Let the German mother curse the day she gave birth to her son. Let German women now feel the horrors of war. Let them now themselves survive what they intended for other peoples.***

***"The civilian population is no longer fleeing," K. wrote on January 30, 1945, to the Vladimir region. - What's in here it's just creepy." "Now we***

***are waging war in the truest sense of the word," P. wrote to his parents in Alma-Ata on February 1, 1945, "we are crushing reptiles in their lair in East Prussia ... Now our soldiers can see how their shelters are burning, how their families wander and drag their serpent offspring with them ... They probably hope to stay alive, but they have***

***no mercy. "There are enough German women," E. wrote on February 3, 1945, "they don't need to be persuaded, you just put on the revolver and command" Lie down!***

***", Do the job and move on." In a letter from Captain K. dated the same day, it is written: "We are here smoking out the Prussians so that feathers fly. Our guys have already "tasted" all the German women. In***

Even Yu. U., the officer already mentioned above, is in himself a dreamy, almost philosophical,

humanistic ideals, a man who had long been tired of the war and complained about the victims and destruction, nevertheless, did not remain unaffected by the propaganda of hatred. ***“We really hate Germany and the Germans,” he writes in his diary on January 27, 1945 in Starkenberg, “in one house, for example, our guys saw a murdered woman with 2 children. And on the street you often see civilians killed... Of course, it is incredibly cruel to kill children... But the Germans deserved***

***these atrocities...”***. ... Incited by Soviet military propaganda and the command structures of the Red Army, the soldiers of the 16th Guards Rifle Division of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of the 11th Guards Army in the last decade of October 1944 began to massacre the peasant population in the ledge south of Gumbinnen. In this place, the Germans, having recaptured it, were able, as an exception, to conduct more detailed investigations. In Nemmersdorf alone, at least 72 men, women and children were killed. Women and even girls were raped before that, several women were nailed to the barn gate. Not far from there, a large number of Germans and French prisoners of war, who were still in German captivity, fell at the hands of Soviet assassins.

Everywhere in the surrounding settlements, the bodies of brutally murdered residents were found - for example, in Banfeld, the Teichhof estate, Alt Wusterwitz (there were also found in the barn the remains of several burned alive) and in other places. ***“The corpses of civilians were lying in masses by the road and in the courtyards of houses ...,” Ober Lieutenant Amberger said. “In particular, I saw many women who... were raped and then killed with shots in the back of the head, and some children were also***

***killed nearby.”*** About what he saw in Shillmeishen near Heidekrug in the Memel region, where on October 26, 1944 units of the 93rd Rifle Corps of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front entered, gunner Erich Cherkus from the 121st Artillery Regiment reported the following during his military judicial interrogation:

***“Near the shed, I found my father, lying face to the ground with a bullet hole in the back of his head... A man and a woman were lying in the same room, their hands were tied behind their backs, and both were tied to each other with one cord... In another farmstead,***

***nailed to a large table. Despite an intense search, I did not find a trace of my mother ... On the way, we saw 5 girls tied with one cord, their clothes were almost completely removed, their backs were severely torn. It looked like the girls had been dragged quite far along the ground. In addition, we saw several completely crushed carts by the road.***

It is impossible to display all the terrible details, much less to present a complete picture of what happened. Let a number of selected examples give an idea of the actions of the Red Army in the eastern provinces after the resumption of the offensive in January 1945. The Federal Archives, in its report "On expulsion and crimes during exile" dated May 28, 1974, published accurate data from the so-called "summary lists" about atrocities in two selected districts, namely in the East Prussian border district of Johannesburg (now Pisz, Poland) and in the Silesian border district of Oppeln (now Opole, Poland). According to these official investigations, in the

district of Johannesburg, in the section of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front, along with other countless murders, the murder on January 24, 1945 of 120 (according to other sources - 97) civilians, as well as several German soldiers and French prisoners of war from a column of refugees near the Nickelsberg-Herzogdorf road south of Arys (now Orzysz, Poland). On the Stollendorf-Arys road, 32 refugees were shot, and on the Arys-Driegelsdorf road near Shlagakrug on February 1, on the orders of a Soviet officer, about 50 people, mostly children and youth, were torn from their parents and relatives in refugee wagons. Near Gross Rosen, at the end of January 1945, about 30 people were burned alive in a field shed. One witness saw how ***"one corpse after another" lay near the road to Arys.*** In Arys itself, ***"a large number of executions"*** were carried out, apparently at the assembly point, and in the torture cellar of the NKVD, ***"tortures of the most cruel kind" were carried out,*** right up to death. In the Silesian district of Oppeln, servicemen of the 32nd and 34th Guards

Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front by the end of January 1945 killed at least 1264 German civilians ... In Gottesdorf, on January 23, 1945, Soviet soldiers shot about 270 inhabitants, including small ones

children and 20–40 members of the Marian Brotherhood. In Karlsruhe (now Pokuj, Poland), 110 residents were shot, including residents of the Anninsky orphanage, in Kuplya - 60–70 residents, among them also residents of a nursing home and a priest who wanted to protect women from rape. But Johannesburg (now Opole, Poland) and Oppeln were only two of the many districts in the eastern provinces of the German Reich occupied by the Red Army in 1945. Based on the reports of the field command

services, the department of the "foreign armies of the East" of the General Staff of the Ground Forces compiled several lists "**On Violations of International Law and Atrocities Committed by the Red Army in the Occupied German Territories**", which, although also not giving a general picture, but in the fresh wake of events, document many Soviet atrocities with a certain degree of reliability.

Thus, on January 20, 1945, Army Group A reported that all the inhabitants of the newly occupied settlements of Reichtal (Rychtal) and Glaushe near Namslau (now Namysłów, Poland) were shot dead by Soviet soldiers of the 9th mechanized corps of the 3rd guards tank army. On January 22, 1945, according to a report from the Army Group Center, near Grünhain in the Velau district (now Znamensk), the tanks of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps "overtaken, fired with tank shells and machine-gun bursts at a column of refugees 4 km long , **mostly women and children, and the rest were laid down by submachine gunners.** A similar thing happened on the same day, not far from there, near Gertlauken, where 50 people from the refugee column were killed by Soviet soldiers, partially by shots in the back of the head. In West Prussia, in an

unspecified locality, at the end of January, a long convoy of refugees was also overtaken by advanced Soviet tank detachments. According to several female survivors, "**soldiers threw the wagons into the ditches on the roadside and attacked the women; children rushing to help them were shot. The Soviet colonel present at the same time regulated the line of rapists, while another officer shot the children and the elderly who were beating in hysterics.** Tankers of the 5th Guards Tank Army doused horses and wagons with gasoline and

set fire to them: **"Some of the civilians, who consisted mostly of women and children, jumped off the wagons and tried to escape, and some already looked like living torches. After that, the Bolsheviks opened fire. Only a few managed to**

**escape."** In the same way, in the Plonene region, at the end of January, the tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army attacked and shot down a refugee column. **"The corpses of women, old people, children, lying among mountains of rags and overturned wagons, littered the sides of the road to the very horizon."** All women from 13 to 60 years old from this settlement, located near Elbing (now Elblag, Poland), were continuously raped by the Red Army in the most cruel way. German soldiers from a tank reconnaissance found one woman with the lower part of her stomach torn open with a bayonet, and another young woman on wooden planks with a crushed face. Destroyed and plundered carts of refugees on both sides of the road, the corpses of passengers lying nearby in a roadside ditch, were also found in Maislatine near Elbing. The deliberate destruction

by caterpillars or shelling of refugee convoys, which stretched along the roads everywhere and are well recognized as such, was reported everywhere from the eastern provinces, for example, from the area of \u200b\u200boperations of the Soviet 2nd Guards Tank Army. In the district of Waldrode on January 18 and 19, 1945, in several places, such columns were stopped, attacked and partially destroyed; **"falling women and children were shot or crushed"** or, as another account says, **"most of the women and children were killed."** Soviet tanks fired at the German hospital transport from guns and machine guns near Waldrode, as a result of which **"out of 1,000 wounded, only 80 were saved ."** In addition, there are reports of Soviet tank attacks on refugee columns from Schauerkirch, Gombin, where **"about 800 women and children were killed"** ... In the forest gatehouse near Zoldin,

Soviet soldiers of the 2nd Guards Tank Army killed the forester's family and all the refugees who were there , not far from there, German soldiers were burned alive, who took refuge in a barn. Only in 1995 near Zoldin (now Myslibuz, Poland) was a mass grave with the remains of 120 civilians discovered.

Of the atrocities that continued to be recorded in East Prussia, only a few can also be cited. So, the Red Army soldiers of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps near the small village of Tollnikken were shot: a family of 7 people, including small children, because the parents opposed the rape of their two daughters, as well as a young man, a peasant, and three German soldiers.

More detailed investigations, as near Gumbinnen, Goldap, Elbing and in some other places, could only be carried out in the event of a new occupation of the lost territory by German troops, which happened quite rarely: for example, in those captured on January 28–30, 1945 by units of the 10th Panzer corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the settlements around Preussisch Holland (now Paslenk, Poland). The report of the Army Group North of February 2, 1945 says, for example, that in Göttchendorf, Döbern, Bordenen, the inhabitants were killed or shot. ***“In Göttchendorf near Preussisch Holland,” the report says, “only in one room are 7 dead civilians, among them 2 elderly women, 2 men, a boy of about 14 years old. Crouching in the corner is a 9-year-old boy with a completely broken skull, and above him is a 15-year-old girl with punctured hands and scratched face, chest and stomach cut with a bayonet, the lower part of the body is completely naked. An 80-year-old man lay shot dead in front of the door.”*** When German troops managed to liberate

the Pomeranian town of Preussisch Friedland (now Debzchno, Poland) and the surrounding settlements at the end of January, judicial and sanitary officers of the German 32nd Infantry Division interrogated the survivors. The report of the command of the 2nd Army on February 14, 1945 states: ***“In Preussisch Friedland and in the village of Ziskau, on January 29 and 30, most of the men who were there were shot after the most painful torture. Houses and apartments were looted, destroyed and set on fire. At the women and children who wanted to flee, the Bolshevik killers fired from rifles and machine guns.*** In a manor located two kilometers from the highway, the corpses of children, the elderly, raped and shot women were found in all rooms.

In Preussisch Friedland and neighboring communities, investigations uncovered other atrocities as well. In Linda on January 29, 1945, 16 residents were killed, at least 50 women were raped, at least 4 women were killed after being raped. In particular, an 18-year-old girl, who was shot dead in her blood, was also raped. Five dead women and three dead girls were found in three rooms of a large house, all of the victims had empty wine bottles between their legs. In Ziskau, civilians were also shot ***“after the most painful***

***tortures”***, as well as hiding soldiers, including a Navy soldier, and women were raped, partly repeatedly, among them ***“an 86-year-old old woman and an 18-year-old girl from Bromberg (now Bydgoszcz, Poland), died in terrible agony.” “In Ziskau,” the conclusion of the report of the command of the 2nd Army says, “the officer’s wife was nailed to the floor. After that, the Bolsheviks desecrated it to death...”***. The available official material is, of course, incomplete and, moreover, can only be given in this

context in a wide selection, briefly and fragmentarily. But since the corresponding reports are available from the entire territory of the provinces of Silesia, Brandenburg, Pomerania and East Prussia, and everywhere they contain the same corpus delicti: murders, rapes, robberies, looting and arson, on the whole they nevertheless create a true picture of terrible events. ... Near the border of the Reich, west of Velun, Soviet soldiers of the 1st Ukrainian Front doused the wagons of the refugees with gasoline and burned them along

with the passengers. Countless bodies of German men, women and children lay on the roads, partly in a mutilated state - with their throats cut, their tongues cut off, their stomachs ripped open. Also west of Wieluni, 25 employees of the Organization Todt were shot by tank crews of the 3rd Guards Tank Army. All men were shot in Heinersdorf, women were raped, and near Kunzendorf 25-30 Volkssturm men were shot in the back of the head.

In Beatengof near Olau (now Olawa, Poland), after re-occupying it, all the men were found dead by shots in the back of the head. The perpetrators were servicemen of the 5th Guards

army. In Grünberg (now Zielona Góra, Poland), 8 families were killed by servicemen of the 9th Guards Tank Corps. The scene of terrible crimes was the estate of Tannenfeld near Grottkau (now Grodkow, Poland). There, the Red Army soldiers from the 229th Infantry Division raped two girls, and then killed them, abused them. One man had his eyes gouged out and his tongue cut out. The same thing happened to a 43-year-old Polish woman who was then tortured to death. In Alt-

Grottkau, servicemen of the same division killed 14 prisoners of war, cut off their heads, gouged out their eyes and crushed them with tanks. The Red Army soldiers of the same rifle division were also responsible for the atrocities in the Schwarzengrund near Grottkau. They raped women, including monastic sisters, shot the peasant Kalert, cut open his wife's stomach, cut off her hands, shot the peasant Christoph and his son, and also a young girl. At the Eisdorf estate near Merzdorf, Soviet soldiers from the 5th Guards Army gouged out the eyes of an elderly man and an elderly woman, apparently a married couple, and cut off their noses and fingers. Nearby, 11 wounded Luftwaffe soldiers were found brutally murdered. Similarly, in Guthersdorf near Glogau (now

Glogow, Poland), 21 German prisoners of war were found killed by Red Army soldiers from the 4th Panzer Army. In the village of Heslich near Striegau (now Strzeg, Poland), Maria Heinke found her husband, still showing signs of life, dying in a Soviet guardhouse. A medical examination revealed that his eyes had been gouged out, his tongue had been cut off, his arm had been broken several times and his skull had been crushed. Soldiers of the 7th Guards Tank Corps in Ossig near Striegau raped women, killed 6-7

girls, shot 12 peasants and committed similar heinous crimes in Hertswisswaldau near Jauer (now Jawor, Poland). In Liegnitz (now Legnica, Poland), the corpses of numerous civilians shot by Soviet soldiers from the 6th Army were found. In the town of Kostenblut near Neumarkt (now Sroda-Slanska, Poland), captured by units of the 7th Guards Tank Corps, women and girls were raped, including one who was on demolition



mother of 8 children. Her brother, who tried to intercede for her, was shot dead. All foreign prisoners of war were shot, as well as 6 men and 3 women ...

Not far from Skampe, on the road to Renchen (now Zbonszyn, Poland), the corpses of a man and a woman were found. The woman's stomach was torn open, the fetus was torn out, and the hole in the stomach was filled with sewage and straw. Nearby were the bodies of three hanged men from the Volkssturm. In Kai near Züllichau, servicemen of the 33rd Army shot the wounded, as well as women and children from one convoy, with shots in the back of the head. The city of Neu-Benchen (now Zbonszyk, Poland) was plundered by the Red Army and then deliberately set on fire. On the road Schwibus (now Swiebodzin, Poland) - Frankfurt, the Red Army soldiers from the 69th Army shot civilians, including women and children, so that **"the corpses lay on top of each other."** In Reppen, all the men from the passing convoy of refugees were shot by Soviet

soldiers from the 19th Army, and the women were raped ... On February 9, 1945, the shock group of the Vlasov Army, led by Colonel Sakharov, with the support of the Germans, again occupied the settlements of Neulevin and Kerstenbruch. According to a German report dated March 15, 1945, the population of both points **"was subjected to the most terrible abuses."** In Neulevin, a burgomaster was found shot dead, as well as a Wehrmacht soldier who was on vacation. In one shed lay the corpses of three desecrated and murdered women, two of whom had their legs tied. One German woman lay shot dead at the door of her house. An elderly couple was strangled. In Neubarnim, 19 inhabitants were found dead. The body of the innkeeper was mutilated, her legs tied with wire. Here, as in other settlements, women and girls were desecrated, and in Kerstenbruch even a 71-year-old old woman with amputated legs was desecrated. The picture of the violent crimes of the Soviet troops in these villages of the Oder bend, as elsewhere, is supplemented by robberies and deliberate destruction ...

... Only relatively few reports were received from Pomerania in February 1945, since the battles for a breakthrough here really began only at the end of the month ... In Edersdorf, soldiers of the 2nd Guards Tank Army shot 10 evacuated women

and a 15-year-old boy, finished off the living victims with bayonets and pistol shots ... In Gross-Silber near Kallis, the Red Army soldiers from the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps raped a young woman with a broom stick, cut off her left breast and crushed her skull ... The commander of the German tank engineer battalion of the 7th tank division. At the end of February 1945, Soviet officers from the 1st (or 160th) rifle division north of Konitz drove children aged 10–12 years old to reconnaissance into a minefield. German soldiers heard the plaintive cries of children, seriously wounded by exploding mines, **"powerlessly bleeding, which poured from torn bodies."** In East Prussia, for which fierce battles were fought, in February 1945, atrocities continued with unrelenting force, despite orders of the opposite nature ... Thus, in Landsberg, Soviet soldiers from the 331st Rifle Division herded the stunned population, including women and children, into basements, set fire to houses and began to shoot at people running in panic. Many were burned alive. In a village near the Landsberg-Heilsberg road, servicemen of the same rifle division kept women and girls locked up in the basement for 6 days and nights, some of whom were chained, and raped many times daily with the participation of officers. Due to desperate screams, two of these Soviet officers cut out the tongues of two women with a "semicircular knife" in front of everyone. German tank soldiers managed to free only a few of the unfortunate, 20 women died from abuse.

In Hanshagen near Preisch-Eylau (now Bagrationovsk), Red Army soldiers from the 331st Infantry Division shot two mothers who opposed the rape of their daughters, and a father, whose daughter was at the same time pulled out of the kitchen and raped by a Soviet officer. Further, the following were killed: a married couple of teachers with 3 children, an unknown refugee girl, an innkeeper and a farmer, whose 21-year-old daughter was raped. In Petershagen near Preussisch Eylau, soldiers of this division killed two men and a 16-year-old boy named Richard von Hoffmann, subjecting women and girls to severe violence. In early

February 1945, Soviet troops unexpectedly broke into the western part of Samland, capturing a large number of people

points. A few days later, the Germans managed to defeat and partially push back the forward forces and, in the course of a bold offensive operation on a large scale, on February 19-20, 1945, restore the interrupted land and sea communications with Königsberg. The command of the Samland Army Group and the Army Group North, with the help of the police, conducted investigations into the fate of the population in the newly liberated territory, the results of which are available, however,

only for a few settlements. Thus, servicemen of the 39th Army killed 4 civilians in Georgenwald and threw the corpses into the flames of a set fire to the estate ... In Kragau, servicemen of the 91st Guards Rifle Division raped and strangled two young women, in Medenau, servicemen of the 358th Rifle Division killed at least 11 civilians. Here, in front of a house, lay the corpses of two murdered women, a small child and a nursing infant. Two elderly men and a 14-year-old boy were beaten, in the same way - two women and two girls after being raped. The completely naked body of a 30-year-old woman had stab wounds on her chest, her skull was dissected, she was riddled with gunshots. In Gross-Ladtkaime, servicemen of the 91st Guards Rifle Division shot 2 German prisoners of war and 4 civilians, including the burgomaster and his wife. There was no trace of their 18-year-old daughter. However, the corpse of a young girl was found, whose breasts were cut off and her eyes gouged out after being raped.

In Krattlau, servicemen of the 275th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 91st Guards Rifle Division killed 6 men and two German soldiers. All women and girls, including 13-year-olds, were continuously raped, some women **"were sexually abused by 6-8 soldiers 5-8 times a day."** In Annenthal, the German liberators found the bodies of two women, who were desecrated (one on a dunghill) and then strangled.

A detailed investigation was carried out in Germau, where the headquarters of the 91st Guards Rifle Division and the 275th Guards Rifle Regiment were located. In Germau, the bodies of 21 dead were found - men, women and children. 11 people could not stand the monstrous torture and committed suicide themselves. 15 German wounded were killed by breaking their heads, one of them was pushed into the throa

an accordion ... Two girls were found near the Germau-Palmnikken (now Yantarny) road. Both were shot in the head at close range, one had its eyes gouged out ... On the

approaches to Metgeten (a resort suburb of Königsberg), the corpses of several hundred German soldiers were found, partly mutilated beyond recognition. Killed men, women and children were lying in almost all houses and gardens, women had obvious signs of rape, their breasts were often cut off, two 20-year-old girls were torn apart by cars. There was at least one train with refugees from Königsberg at the station. In each carriage lay the bodies of **"brutally murdered refugees of every age and sex."** The tennis court at Metgethen was packed to capacity with German prisoners of war and civilians, and then an explosive charge was set off. Parts of human bodies were found even 200 meters from a giant explosive funnel. On February 27, 1945, the captain from the headquarters of the commandant of the fortress Sommer accidentally discovered behind one house in a gravel pit at the road intersection in front of Metgeten the corpses of 12 completely naked women and children, lying together in a "messy **pile**", they were torn to pieces by bayonets and knives. In addition to individual corpses

scattered throughout the resort village, of which there were hundreds, several large earthen mounds were discovered, under which, as it turned out, hundreds (according to Captain Sommer and Professor Dr. Ipsen - 3000) of those killed were buried. The investigation by the Commission, appointed by the commandant of the fortress, General of the Infantry Lasch, was difficult, as the Soviet troops doused the heaps of corpses with gasoline and tried to burn them. Nevertheless, it was possible to establish that most of the victims were not shot, but often brutally killed with chopping and stabbing weapons ... West of Metgeten, as Captain Sommer reported, the

corpses of civilians lay everywhere along the road up to Powayen, either killed by shots in the back of the head, or "**completely stripped, raped and then brutally killed by blows of bayonets or rifle butts.**" At a road junction in front of Powayen, four naked women were crushed by a Soviet tank. Captain Sommer and Major Prof. Dr. Ipsen

downright symbolic infamy was witnessed: a young girl was crucified in the church of Gross-Heidekrug, and a German soldier was hanged to the right and left of her.

All this happened at the gates of the provincial center of Königsberg. The unspeakable atrocities and crimes committed by the incited Soviet soldiers later, after the capture of the city on April 7-9, 1945, defy any description and could only be schematically reflected also in the diaries of the doctors Deichelman and Count von Lendorf ... ". This is where we will stop the kaleidoscope of

monstrous events reflected in the documents collected by I. Hoffmann from the German archives. Now let's try to "tweak up the sharpness" and see how THIS happened in one, separately taken German city. Not even a city, but a small Silesian town with a population of only 17 thousand people.

Human.

Striegau. Until recently, this name did not mean anything to anyone (unlike, for example, Nemmersdorf, where a lot of paper has already been written about the tragic events). One of the many German cities and towns of Saxony, at the behest of Stalin, after the Second World War, turned out to be part of Poland. Before the war, about 17-20 thousand people lived in Striegau, by the beginning of February 1945 the flow of refugees increased the population of the town to 30 thousand (although, of course, no one can give exact numbers today). On February 13, 1945, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front occupied Striegau. Four weeks later, the town was back in German hands in one of the last attempts by the Wehrmacht to launch a counteroffensive.

In Striegau, German troops found 30 (thirty) living inhabitants and about two hundred uncleaned corpses. Presumably, 13–15 thousand people fled the city before it was occupied by Soviet troops, the rest were expelled from their homes, partially sent to forced labor in the USSR (in total, 267 thousand Germans were taken from Germany and Eastern European countries for forced labor in the USSR (excluding prisoners of war).

Employees of the German criminal police and members of the funeral teams in their written reports described what appeared to their eyes in the deserted city. Two German historians ("neo-fascists", in terms of Comrade Rzheshhevsky), Martin

Bojanowski and Erich Bosdorff published these testimonies in their book Striegau. The Fate of a Silesian City", which the German Federal Government's Scientific Commission for the Study of the History of the Expulsion has attracted as documentary material.

Reports of the dead in Striegau were divided into "group finds and single finds" with an exact indication of the street and house. It looked like this:

— *“the corpse of a teenager about 14 years old crushed by heavy vehicles lies in the sewer rope, shot in the back of the head”; - “a partially naked dead woman lies on the sofa, two shots in the mouth”; - “the corpse of a 72-year-old woman with gouged out eyes”; - “the corpse of a shot woman crushed by a box”; - “among the fragments of glass and porcelain in a looted store, the corpse of an elderly woman who was shot dead with a bare lower part*

*bodies”;*

*“Three men, two women and a child about two years old, shot”;*

*- “a woman 30-35 years old with a bare lower part of her body, a few meters nearby an older woman, clasping a tree with her arms, were shot”; - “the corpse of a man with leg prostheses, next to his wife and child,*

*shot”;*

*- “Three elderly women with naked lower body and traces of rape, shot dead; in the attic of the house is the corpse of an elderly man, hung upside down”;*

*- “a man’s corpse hangs on the door latch, two naked female corpses with traces of sadistic rape lie in the attic, shot dead; a boy about 12 years old shot dead on the couch, on the bed the naked corpse of an 18-year-old girl with traces of sadistic rape, shot dead”; - “in the basement, an elderly couple shot dead, eyes*

*knocked out...”.*

In addition to numerous brutal murders, funeral teams recorded numerous cases of suicides in Striegau, including group ones:

**- "three female corpses and one child, suicide by means of gas"; - "the suicide**

**of a married couple by hanging on a window frame; in the basement the corpses of one man and two girls of different ages, suicide by hanging"; - "four female**

**corpses and one teenager, death through gassing"; - "two**

**female corpses, suicide by poisoning gas"; -**

**"mother and daughter, sitting at the table, suicide by means of gas poisoning"; -**

**"a woman opened her arteries, but before that she strangled her daughter, who was lying next to her, with a**

**rolled towel"; "In the attic, next to each other, two elderly women, one young woman, a girl of about 20 years old and a girl of 10-11 years old are hanged, all with signs of**

**rape."** The details of this collective suicide in the attic at No. 5 Ziegenstraße are known, unbelievable as it may seem, from one of the participants in the terrible event. A letter from this woman (she was then 47 years old), which she wrote to the son of one of the dead women, has been preserved. Omitting, out of respect for the reader, the description of the endless group rapes ("sexual conflicts," as General of the Army I. Tretiak put it), let's go straight to the end of the letter:

**"... At about 10 o'clock in the morning it became calmer, and we all went to the apartment of the young Frau K., her 11-year-old daughter Trauteul was also raped. We cooked some food there. But then footsteps were heard again, and everything happened again. We screamed, we begged them to finally leave us alone, but they knew no pity. We all agreed to hang ourselves. But again someone came. When they finally left, we ran as fast as we could to the attic. Frau R. hanged herself first. The young Frau K. first hanged her daughter Trauteul, and then hanged herself. Your mother did the same with your sister (that is, the mother hanged her own**

**daughter. - M.S.). And here we are, just the two of us, your mother and I. I asked her to make a noose for me, I myself was not able to do this due to excitement. We hugged one more time and**

***threw away the travel basket on which they were standing. I still got my feet to the floor, the rope was too long. I looked to the right, then to the left, everyone was hanging in a row, everyone was dead. I had no choice but to try to free myself from the rope ... "*** Are the above information

correct? Is it possible to trust

documents, reports, testimonies from only one side, that is, the German side? Where is the expert opinion of independent and unbiased witnesses? Alas, he is not. Where are the documents of the investigation files of the Soviet military tribunals? Where are the reports of the Soviet military prosecutor's office? They don't exist either. Why should we believe the statements of one, and clearly interested, side?

The question is good. A strong question. It is fully consistent with the "new thinking", the norms and principles of the rule of law. The rule of law, as you know, implies the presence of a large population of lawyers. The unshakable principle of advocacy is known: "For example, I am interested in whether my client committed the crime he is accused of, but I will prove that the accusation does not correspond to the letter of the law." Judging by that

that many lawyers become wealthy people, this principle works well. And yet,

not always and not all murderers and rapists, brazenly smiling, go free directly from the courtroom. Fortunately, a paid lawyer is not the only participant in the process - there are still jurors, there are judges who have the same legal right to make a decision *ex aequo et bono* (in conscience and justice), relying not only on the letter of the law, but also on "inner conviction" (this, by the way, is a term completely legalized by the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure). In conscience and fairness, it should be clear to everyone that

the monstrous crimes committed during the Second World War are far from always (if not to put it harsher - "almost never") can be established within the framework of formal bureaucratic procedures. What "commission of independent experts from neutral Switzerland" established the fact of the brutal murder of the inhabitants of the Belarusian village of Khatyn? Where are the documents? Where are the independent witnesses? However, some documents, oddly enough,



preserved. In the archive. Therefore, they can rightly be called "archival documents" (for some readers, these two words have a magical effect). In the report of the commander of the 118th police battalion (formed from prisoners of war of the Red Army in Kiev), the punitive operation carried out in Khatyn on March 22, 1943, is described as follows: "... The village was surrounded **and**

**attacked from all sides. At the same time, the enemy offered stubborn resistance and fired from all the houses, so heavy weapons had to be used - anti-tank guns and heavy mortars. During the fighting, along with 34 bandits, many villagers were killed. Some of them died in the flames ...**". You can see for yourself - archival documents

"irrefutably" testify: the battle, the enemy, bandits, part of the inhabitants died in the flames. Accidentally, presumably... And if we - quite rightly - consider such reasoning as blasphemy, as well as any other attempts to cast doubt on the reality of the mass crimes committed by the Nazis and their accomplices on Soviet soil, then why, in relation to the crimes of which the Germans became victims? women and children, should a different standard apply? On August 31, 1941, Pravda published an article by A.N. Tolstoy "The face of the Nazi army". 66 years

later, a book by A. Dyukov was published, in which, with reference to this article, it was reported that **"on the outskirts of a village near Bialystok, five corpses of women were stuck on five pointed stakes. The corpses were naked, with open bellies, cut off breasts and severed heads. The heads of women lay in a pool of blood along with the corpses of murdered children."** How could an outstanding Soviet writer, being a thousand kilometers from Bialystok, occupied by the Germans in the first days of the war, be convinced of such horrific details of the crime?

And if an article in Pravda of the wartime (and even written by an author known for his "principledness", who two years earlier in the same newspaper and in almost the same terms depicted the atrocities of the Polish army, fleeing under the blows of a friendly at that time Wehrmacht) should be considered a "document", why should thousands of testimonies given under

sworn by very specific people and published on behalf of the Commission of the Federal Government of Democratic Germany?

Yes, each individual report of war crimes can, when carefully checked, turn out to be inaccurate, exaggerated, or even completely fictitious (not to mention the fact that in the vast majority of cases, verification according to strict legal norms will turn out to be practically impossible). And at the same time, the entire set of events recorded in such an "archive" as folk memory cannot but be true. However, one should not think that attempts to verify (more precisely, to refute at any cost) reports

of brutal massacres against the civilian population of Germany were not made. Even as they were undertaken, with great noise and fanfare. For example, in 2008, the Yauza-EKSMO publishing house published a collection of articles entitled "We have nothing to repent for!" (a stunning call for a country whose population, according to sociological surveys of recent years, considers itself Orthodox by three-quarters). In the preface to the collection, the above-mentioned A. Dyukov writes (more correctly, shouts):

***"... They are trying to deprive us of the Great Victory. We are told that the Victory turned into the enslavement of Eastern Europe, that Soviet soldiers raped Germany ... Russia will have no choice but to pay and repent, repent and pay, turning from a subject into an object of international politics (in a strange way, Mr. Dyukov does not notice , that democratic Germany both pays and repents, and at the same time remains one of the most influential subjects of world politics) ... Time does not wait. If we don't want our grandfathers and great-grandfathers to be called murderers, drunkards and marauders, if we don't want our children to be taught to spit on the graves of their***

***ancestors...***". After such "artificial preparation", an article entitled "Nemmersdorf: Between Truth and Propaganda" (author I. Petrov) appears in the collection.

So what's the truth? The article begins with the fact that I. Petrov quite frankly admits: ***"I will say right away: the materials available at the moment practically do not allow one to doubt that the murder***

**civilians in Nemmersdorf - the work of soldiers and officers of the Red Army.** Further, he states another, very strange and undoubtedly regrettable fact: **"If some archives contain reports of the "specialists" about what happened in Nemmersdorf, then historians have not yet received access to them."** I remind you: **"bye"** is 64 years later. What then is the

multi-page article about? The whole clumsy attempt to "exposure" comes down to the search for small and smallest inaccuracies, inconsistencies and inconsistencies in the available German documents and evidence (**"Lieutenant Zirn saw 7 killed, non-commissioned officer Scheible - 11, and only Major Braumüller talks**

**about 15 ... Not a single report there is no mention of a shot in the right eye, which, according to Hinrichs' report, killed one of the girls ... no one saw the person nailed to the door, the conclusion is made on the basis of wounds on the hands and the testimony of a seriously wounded witness, then taken away in an unknown direction and subsequently unidentified..."**).

Of course, there are many such inconsistencies. They could not be few, given the circumstances of the time and the manner of action of all the participants in the tragedy. The main "achievement" of the researcher is the assertion that "only" 26 civilians were killed in Nemmersdorf itself, and the figure 70 adopted in Western historiography refers to the number of those killed both in Nemmersdorf itself and on the farms and estates adjacent to it. There is no need to repent of killing civilians, because ... Yes, of course, because we must now, in 2008, check our words with the deeds of Dr. Goebbels: "Goebbels propaganda needed a

scarecrow for the population of the eastern provinces of the Reich, and **Soviet the soldiers, having shot the elderly, women and children, played into her hands. The creepy colors and bloody details were mostly added by the propagandists themselves..."**. Sometimes the

desperate unwillingness to call facts by their proper names acquires a completely farcical character. Thus, on January 12, 2009, the Russian Internet portal Infox.ru posted a message that a mass grave was discovered in the ancient Prussian city of Marienburg (now Malbork, Poland) during construction work.

About 1800 people, including women and children, were buried naked, without clothes, shoes, belts, glasses and dental crowns. More than 100 skulls had clear traces of bullet holes. The original article in the British newspaper The Guardian had the headline "Remains of 1,800 German civilians found in wartime mass grave". In the subtitle of the article, it was suggested that "men, women and children" (men, women and children) "have been killed as Red Army captured town" (they were killed when the Red Army occupied the city). It is hard to believe that in Moscow the golden-domed one could not find a translator who could deal with the phrase "German civilians" (German civilians). However, the article in the Russian Internet edition was titled "Mass grave of German soldiers found in Poland", and the subtitle said even more interestingly: "Experts suspect that these are Poles who died from Soviet weapons...". Times, however, are changing, and in 2008 an article

appeared in which, without the slightest reservation or equivocation, the monstrous facts were named in the most direct text: "... 14 million **Germans were expelled from their homes, only**

**12 million managed to get to Germany alive... The expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe was accompanied by a massive**

**organized violence ... the remaining German population was herded into concentration camps; adult forced labor, used on and in the winter of 1945/46, the death rate in the camps reached 50%. So, in the Potulice camp between 1947 and 1949, half of the prisoners died from hunger, cold, illness and bullying by the guards ... One of the most monstrous cases occurred on the night of June 18-19, 1945 in the city of Prerau, where 265 Germans, among whom were 120 women and 74 children. The oldest of those killed was 80 years old, and the youngest was eight months old ...**

Moreover, he published this article ("Exiled and Killed") not some kind of printed sheet of temporarily unfinished liberals, "jacking at the doors of Western embassies", but quite respectable, expensive and solid magazine Expert (No. 30 of July 28, 2008). Note that the editors of the magazine position their offspring as **"one of the most influential weekly analytical publications in Russia,**

***deserved the reputation of the undisputed leader of the business magazine press***, and the general director of the Expert media holding, Mr. Fadeev, is also the director of the Institute for Public Design, which is close to United Russia, and the chairman of the commission in the Civic Chamber of the

Russian Federation. The most amazing thing about the publication of "Expert" is that no one was outraged! Nobody! Neither comrade Gareev, who "as if in good spirits" had not heard of cases of rape (not to mention murders), nor comrade Rzheshhevsky, who invariably demanded that "weighty documentary grounds be presented for making such grave accusations", nor comrade Dyukov, who was extremely worried that Russia will have to "pay and repent" ...

And the answer is extremely simple. It boils down to a single three-letter word.

**PRO.** After the former allies under the Warsaw Pact joined NATO, and even agreed to deploy elements of the American missile defense system on their territory, some Russian historians and journalists suddenly had a flash of memory. They immediately recalled long-known facts and hurried to remind Poland and the Czech Republic some of the forgotten episodes of their post-war history.

The article in "Expert" is written in the highest degree "balanced and politically restrained." The main emphasis is on the expulsion of the German population from the Czech Republic and the areas of East Germany transferred to Poland, a short tongue twister - about the events in Hungary and Romania (there is no American missile defense system there and is not expected) and not a single word (!!!) about Yugoslavia ("fraternal Serbia opposing NATO aggression"), where in 44–45. 69 thousand people died - one in three of the 200 thousand Germans who did not have time to escape from the country. And what goes without saying - not a single word "Expert" remembered that in the cities and towns of East Prussia, which had gone to the Soviet Union, the Germans were expelled and killed in the same way as in the areas of East Prussia and Pomerania transferred to Poland; that Comrade Stalin also bears some responsibility for the events that took place in the territory of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia occupied by the Red Army; that the puppet "Polish government" of Comrade Bierut, without the consent of Mosco

million Germans - three stools in their own office would not dare to be moved from place to place ...

Completing the sad list of the facts of mass deportation and massacres of the German population, it only remains for me to inform the reader that I deceived him. And three times. In the above excerpts from I. Hoffmann's book, I inserted three episodes from the memoirs of L.N. Rabichev (senior lieutenant, at the front since December 1942, reached Prague, was awarded two Orders of the Patriotic War II degree, the Order of the Red Star, medals). His memoirs (published in the Znamya magazine, No. 2/2005) almost verbatim coincide with the testimonies cited by I. Hoffman. And this despite the fact that "plagiarism" (or unconscious copying) is impossible in principle: Hoffmann died three years before the publication of Rabichev's memoirs, and his book "Stalin's War of Annihilation" was published in Russian only in 2006. Without visible to the eye "joints" and "seams" in quotes from I. Hoffmann's

book, one could also insert this excerpt from the memorandum of the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League N. Mikhailov, sent on March 29, 1945 to the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks G. Malenkov: ***"On the night of February 23-24, a group of officers and cadets in the amount of 35 people appeared drunk on the Grutenneng manor, cordoned off the manor, put up machine guns, fired on and wounded a Red Army soldier guarding the building. After that, the organized rape of the girls and women who were on the farm began ... "*** But such an "insert" would be an unacceptable forgery, since Mikhailov's report was not at all about atrocities against the civilian population of Germany, but about ***"a wild and boorish attitude towards liberated Soviet girls and women."*** With machine guns in their hands, ***"a group of officers and cadets in the amount of 35 people"*** stormed the temporary accommodation center for "Ostarbeiters" released from fascist captivity ...

Unfortunately, I know what a significant part of readers now want to hear with growing impatience. Alas, I have to declare with all certainty: "You will not wait." The premeditated brutal murders of women and children cannot be justified. None. It's sad that the \$147 a barrel "kneeling up" has poisoned the minds of many of my

compatriots to such an extent that they are no longer able to understand what a monstrous insult to the memory of the fallen soldiers of the Great Patriotic War is the reasoning that "the Nazis ALSO killed women and children ...".

There is no topic for discussion here, and I will not waste time on empty moralizing. Normal people will understand me. I can't convince the wild ones. For those who are not hopeless, I will still quote a few lines from an article by I. Orenburg, published in Krasnaya Zvezda on March 14, 1945. They quite clearly explain the difference between bestial malice and the noble hatred of a liberator soldier for the enemy: "Yesterday I received

***a letter from a man who is no more. There is a trace of blood on a piece of paper. Officer Boris Antonovich Kurilko died on German soil, defending the freedom and honor of our Motherland. The letter was forwarded to me by his comrades, and I want Comrade Kurilko's last words to reach my readers as they reached me. Here is what an officer of the Red Army wrote on the eve of his death:***

***"The fire of hatred supported us in the most difficult days. Now we are in Germany. Our hatred leads us to Berlin. The Germans think that we will do on their soil what they did on ours. These executioners cannot understand the greatness of the Soviet warrior. We will be harsh, but fair, and never, never will our people humiliate***

***themselves ... ". Pride overflows my heart when I hold this sheet of paper: on it is the blood of a hero and on it are words written in blood, lofty, beautiful words. We are defeating fascism not only on the battlefield, we are defeating it in the moral duel between evil and good... Our hatred is a lofty feeling, it requires judgment, not reprisal, punishment, not violence.... The Soviet warrior did not come to Germany for booty, not for junk, not for concubines, he came to Germany for justice ... The defender of Stalingrad, the soldier of Yelnya, Rzhev and Sevastopol is higher than the Germans: higher not by "blood" - let's leave the low "Aryans" their low inventions are higher in consciousness, in conscience, in heart. He despises the Germans, despises their tinsel, their junk, their flags, their newspapers, their women, their yesterday's arrogance and today's obsequiousness. He did not come here as***

Another topic, which, in the opinion of many, could not be kept silent, is the bombing of Germany by Anglo-American aircraft. Yes, indeed, massive bombardments (especially non-targeted night bombings "on the squares") led to the death of hundreds of thousands of unarmed Germans, women and children; deprived millions of people of their homes and property, turned the greatest monuments of European history and architecture into piles of rubble. However, in this article, I quite consciously will not discuss this topic. And not only because the strategic bombing of Germany was carried out by the Allies, at least with the full consent of the Soviet side (as for the infamous bombing of Dresden, it took place at the direct request of Stalin, who accused the Allies in Yalta of deliberate unwillingness to destroy the transport routes of the Eastern Germany). There is a much more significant reason. The bombing of German cities by Allied aircraft was part of the VOINA strategy. Allied aircraft destroyed factories that

produced weapons for Hitler, destroyed railway stations that transported Hitler's troops, killed and terrorized German workers who (perhaps not always of their own free will) worked for Hitler. The condition under which the bombing would be stopped was brought to the attention of the Germans: the complete and unconditional surrender of the aggressor country. The Western Allies unconditionally fulfilled this promise - not a single bomb fell on a single German city after the signing of the German Surrender Act. Moreover, even during the war -

as far as I know - the Allies did not bomb a single German city in the occupied / liberated territory. Although they had enough bombs and aviation gasoline, it was possible to express "a feeling of revenge for the destroyed Coventry" in such a technically complex way. On the other hand, the brutal reprisals against the civilian population of Germany in the territories controlled by the Red Army began just after the capture of these territories and the suppression of armed resistance. I repeat once again - crimes against humanity have neither justification nor statute of limitations. The purpose of this article is by no means a belated moralizing, but a search for the real reasons why



who made possible the tragic and shameful events on German soil. Looking for explanations, not excuses. And, in my opinion, this question is not at all simple.

The desire to avenge the monstrous atrocities committed by the invaders on Soviet soil, of course, took place. However, not always and not every desire is realized in actions, and not every desire of ordinary soldiers is approved and allowed by commanders. Finally, in addition to external control, every person also has self-control. Maybe I remain an incorrigible idealist, but it is hard for me to believe that a normal Russian peasant, drafted into the army from a Smolensk village, baptized in childhood, brought up in a working family, could nail German children to the table with their tongues and crucify women on the altars of churches. Among the many peoples who inhabited the multinational Soviet Union, there were peoples who remembered the laws of "blood feud", but I have never heard that these customs involve the brutal group rape of the wives and daughters of a "blood" enemy. And it seems to me that those who attribute to the soldiers of the Red Army SUCH ways of realizing a feeling of hatred for the enemy have surpassed Goebbels himself with his thesis about the "Asian hordes of Bolsheviks" ... Having discarded the pathos, we can state that it

is quite definite, firmly established - and very strange on Against the backdrop of all of the above, it is a fact: German prisoners of war in the Soviet rear were not shot, tortured, crucified on barn doors, or crushed with bulldozers. The attitude of the civilian population of the Soviet rear towards the captured Germans was surprisingly tolerant. And this is not "red propaganda", but a fact known to millions of contemporaries of the events. No, of course, Soviet captivity was not a "rest home"; prisoners were

used for hard work, they had to live in an unusual cold climate for them and in the conditions of hunger and deprivation familiar to Soviet people. Taking into account the fact that many German soldiers were captured wounded, frostbitten, sick, the difficult conditions of detention led to a huge death rate: according to the most conservative official estimates, more than 450 thousand German soldiers and officers died in Soviet captivity.

Recognizing this by no means joyful fact, one cannot fail to see something else: cases of deliberate, especially sadistic, murders of German prisoners were extremely rare even in the front line; in the rear camps for prisoners of war, if they did occur, then only as the rarest emergency. German prisoners working at construction sites and mines received 600 g of bread (the standard ration of a Soviet worker, and this is more than the norm for non-working "dependents"), and compassionate Russian women sometimes fed unarmed and helpless enemies (which they remembered with surprise and gratitude for many years after the German soldiers). Hundreds of thousands of German prisoners in Soviet military hospitals were provided with qualified medical care that brought them back to life. With all the reservations that there is no place for normal human logic in war, it is difficult to combine the many years of humane treatment of disarmed German soldiers (and many of them had the blood of peaceful Soviet citizens on their hands) and the

supposedly "spontaneous explosion" of wild hatred for German women and children, who, for some unknown reason, overwhelmed the army in the last months of the war. At least as a working hypothesis, it should be assumed that the "thirst for revenge" that seized the soldiers of the Red Army at the moment of crossing the borders of Germany was not the only, and not the most important among the reasons that led to the terrible events on German soil. It is not so difficult to see other, more

significant factors. The first (if not the first in importance, then quite obvious and indisputable) should be called the catastrophic fall in military discipline, which fall, of course, did not fall from the sky, but was quite naturally due to open and massive looting

command staff.

Usually, with any attempt to discuss the topic of violence against the civilian population of Germany, voices are immediately heard, hastening to recall that "the Soviet command gave order after order ...". Sheer truth. Order after order (we'll talk about them a little later). But in order to understand the real picture of events, it seems to me immeasurably more important to quote not

numerous orders in which marauders were threatened with terrible punishments, up to execution, but this, now widely known, protocol of a search of the dacha of the former Commander-in-Chief of the group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany, "Marshal of Victory" G.K. Zhukov:

***"...Two rooms in the dacha have been turned into a warehouse where a huge amount of various goods and valuables are stored. For example: woolen fabrics, silk, brocade, panne velvet and other materials - over 4000 meters in total; furs - sable, monkey, fox, seal, astrakhan, astrakhan - 323 skins in total; chevro of the highest quality - 35 leather, expensive carpets and large-sized tapestries taken from Potsdam and other palaces and houses in Germany - 44 pieces in total ... valuable large-sized classical paintings in artistic frames - 55 pieces in total, hung in the rooms of the dacha and partially stored in stock; expensive sets, tableware and tea utensils (porcelain with artistic decoration, crystal) - 7 large boxes; silver cutlery and tea sets - 2 boxes; accordions with rich artistic decoration - 8 pieces; unique hunting rifles from Golland-Goland and others - only 20 pieces ... All the furnishings, from furniture, carpets, dishes, decorations and ending with curtains on the windows, are foreign, mainly German. There is literally not a single thing of Soviet origin in***

***the dacha, with the exception of the paths that lie at the entrance to the dacha. There is not a single Soviet book in the dacha, but on the other hand, in the bookcases there are a large number of books in beautiful bindings with gold***

***embossed, exclusively in German.***

***Entering the house, it is hard to imagine that you are near Moscow, and not in Germany...". This***

protocol was signed by the Minister of State Security of the USSR Abakumov on January 10, 1948. On January 20, 1948, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, ***"having heard the message of the commission composed of comrades. Zhdanov, Bulganin, Kuznetsov and Shkiryatov"*** adopted a special resolution ***"On comrade G.K. Zhukov"***, which, in particular, noted that ***"Zhukov's subordinates, pandering to him, took away paintings and other valuables in palaces and mansions, broke into a safe in a jewelry store in Lodz (this is not Ger***

**"liberated" Poland. - M.S.), seizing the valuables in it, etc. As a result of all this, the Zhukovs appropriated up to 70 valuable gold items (pendants and rings with precious stones, watches, diamond earrings, bracelets, brooches, etc.). etc.), up to 740 items of silverware and silverware and, in addition, up to 30 kilograms of various silver items ... "(RGA-SPI, f. 17, on. 3, d. 2198, l. 28–29).** In this document, the most important for us will be the mention of "Zhukov's subordinates." Of course, the marshal and commander of the front did not himself crawl through the ruins of "palaces and

mansions" in search of prey, for such cases there were colonels from his retinue. But the colonels did not personally smoke safes in a jewelry store and did not collect "monkey and astrakhan skins." The practical work was entrusted to majors and captains, who took with them - for order and protection - a platoon of submachine gunners under the command of a lieutenant, and the lieutenant had a driver in a Jeep, a junior sergeant, and the guy was also not a miss. Alas, the sergeants had to turn in diamond earrings to their superiors, but some small things were lying around in their pockets too ... This whole "logical chain" has long had a clear and quite unambiguous explanation in Russian: "Fish

rots from the head."

Exclusively and only from the head. With such behavior of senior commanders, the junior sergeant could be read out as many and as many orders as they wanted. This changed little in the situation when the Charter was tacitly replaced by "concepts". From that moment on, the Red Army began to change rapidly. Even outwardly:

**"... This avalanche of troops moving from east to west had a colorful, picturesque look. The tanks, smoky and spattered with mud, were covered with colorful, bright carpets, and on the carpets sat grubby tankers in black soaked in machine oil jackets. Someone pulled out a bottle from his bosom and, throwing back his head, drank from the neck - he passed it on to a neighbor and in a hoarse voice, trying to shout over the roar of the engine and the rattle of caterpillars, screaming out the lyrics...**

**The gun servants, whose destiny is to shake on the charging boxes, were surrounded by soft sofa cushions embroidered with silk, and felt excellent: they squealed on German lips**

***harmonicas, stretched the bellows of accordions richly trimmed with mother-of-pearl and silver.***

***In the stream of tanks, guns, motor vehicles, army gigs, one often came across an old landowner's carriage - covered, with mirrored doors and lanterns, or a long landau with lacquered flaps. Young officers and soldiers were sitting in the carriages - in overcoats with shoulder straps, machine guns over their shoulders, but in top hats and with umbrellas ...***

". Indeed, the view was very

colorful. As I. Hoffman writes, ***"The Red Army was in a state of growing savagery ... Soviet soldiers switched to wearing Napoleonic hats instead of the prescribed headdress, wearing canes, umbrellas, rubber raincoats, thereby increasingly taking on the appearance of robbers and marauders."***

Can the German "neo-fascist historian" be trusted? It is possible and necessary, because further Hoffmann quotes the orders preserved in the military archive of Germany. For example, order No. 006 of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front dated January 22, 1945, which stated that ***"along with robberies, looting, arson, mass drunkenness is observed ... cars are loaded with all kinds of household items, seized food and civilian clothes to such to the extent that they have become a burden for the troops, limit their freedom of movement and reduce the striking power of tank formations"***. About carriages, cylinders and umbrellas was also mentioned in the order of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal I.S. Konev dated January 27, 1945, where it was also noted that during the check tanks were found filled with looted junk to such an extent that there was no room for

crew.

Endemic looting has become so familiar and commonplace that even in the official report of the Main Trophy Directorate of the Red Army, 60 thousand pianos and pianos, 460 thousand radios, 190 thousand carpets, 940 thousand pieces of furniture were mentioned in the general list of "war trophies" , 265 thousand wall and table clocks. As for wrist and pocket watches, the "collection" of which in the spring of 1945 acquired the character of mass insanity in the Red Army, the number of these "trophies" is incalculable...

Military discipline, in a certain sense, is extremely similar to pregnancy: you either have it or you don't. There is no intermediate state. And if in the army it became "possible" to knock down the door with a rifle butt, break into a house, tear off gold earrings from the ears of frightened women, turn everything upside down in search of the ill-fated hours and booze, then a very thin line separated such actions from the next steps in the matter of "revenge for the desecrated Soviet land. What about orders? Yes, there were orders; those who, to their misfortune, fell "under a hot hand" could be severely punished. One of these cases is colorfully described in the autobiographical story by M.M. Koryakov (an excerpt from which was quoted above).  
Fight for discipline

looked like this:

***"... The soldier stood at attention in front of the colonel in a black ladies' hat shifted to the back of his head, decorated with flowers and fruits. In the carriage, which the soldier had taken away from the yard of some Silesian landowner, lay a yellow pig carcass, and strangled chickens were tied to the lanterns. - Do you***

***want chicken? Pork? Are you dissatisfied with our Soviet rations? the colonel shouted and hit the soldier on the cheek with a hand wrapped in a kid glove. - Did you read Comrade Stalin's order of January 19? "We did, Comrade Colonel," answered the***

***soldier, turning pale. Did you also read the order of the front commander? — Read, Comrade Colonel. - So what are you, there-y-your mother! the***

***colonel barked and looked around with drunken, bullish eyes, looking for something to do to a soldier. His eyes fell on a chicken dangling on a string near the lantern, and he plucked one, grabbed it by the neck and backhanded the chicken in the soldier's face.***

***The colonel was drunk. In the jeep, on a seat covered with a carpet, lay a pot-bellied bottle braided with rods. Swaying, legs wide apart, he approached the "jeep" and, climbing in, threatened the soldier:***

***- You will respect the orders of Comrade Stalin! I will teach you!"*** For the sake of truth, it

should be noted that this colonel was very lucky - he was drunk, and the soldier was sober. It was better not to mess with drunken Soviet soldiers in "defeated Germany". That

Koryakov (a battle captain who went through the entire war from Moscow to

Silesia) writes: ***"On the Wilhelmstrasse in Bunzaau, I survived the worst night of my life. Neither under the bombardments, say, in Volyn, where the city of Sarny was completely demolished in one night, nor at the forefront under the fire of German six-barreled mortars, nowhere did I experience such fear as here, in this peaceful German quarter ... We went to bed at ten o'clock. The door locks were broken, a table and buckets of coal were placed against the doors. In less than half an hour, the door shook, the barricade went ... Tankers ... Six. Not only soldiers, but also officers. Pistols outside, behind the belts. Paying no attention to me, they stomped up the stairs. Above, above the ceiling, there were women's cries, the crying of children. Excited, I began to dress. The girl and the old men of Wunsch begged me not to go there: they would kill me! Last night, an officer of the city commandant's office was killed, who was trying to prevent violence. All night we listened in fear to the screams of unfortunate women, the crying of children."***

Personal memories of M. Koryakov are fully confirmed by documents from the German military archives. So, on February 10, 1945, Captain B., commander of the battalion of the 510th Infantry Regiment of the 154th Infantry Division, went over to the side of the enemy. He explained his act - rather extraordinary for the last weeks of the war - by the fact that he shot two of his subordinates, who were caught at the time of the gang rape of a German girl, and ***"could no longer watch how the Red Army treated the civilian population."*** A junior lieutenant from the 287th Rifle Division, who was taken prisoner, testified during interrogation that several officers of his unit, who tried to prevent violence against the civilian population, were shot dead by inflamed Red Army soldiers. On the contrary, Captain E., a battalion commander from the 4th Guards Tank Corps, on February 2, 1945, shot his subordinate, who tried to intercede for a woman raped by Captain E.. In the village of Germau, occupied by units of the 91st Guards Rifle Division, the Soviet military commandant, in order to save German women from violence, gathered them in

the premises of the church and put up armed guards, who were ordered to shoot at the Red Army soldiers if necessary ...

The "growing savagery" of the Red Army had another reason - a radical change in the composition and human "quality" of the draft contingent.

Russia is great, but even she could not endlessly feed the gluttonous monster of many years of war with millions of young men. Nearly five million people were in the Armed Forces of the USSR by the time the war began. According to the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of June 22, 1941, 10 million people were mobilized. Then, according to the decree of the State Defense Committee of August 11, 1941 - another 4 million. In the autumn of 1941, those already born in 1890, that is, men of fifty, were called up. Another 2 million entered the army

through the so-called. "civil uprising". The waves of mobilization in 1941 swallowed up without a trace the entire stock of trained reservists who had completed active military service accumulated in the pre-war decade. But the voracious monster demanded more and more new blood. From January 1 to March 1, 1942, another 700 thousand people were mobilized ... Of course, many millions of men remained in the rear, but the army of the 20th century could not fight and win with sticks and stones. And in order to fight with tanks, cannons and aircraft, in order to provide all these mountains of military equipment with ammunition, fuel, spare parts, at least five workers and grain growers had to work behind the back of

one soldier. By the second half of 1944, by the time the advancing Red Army approached the borders of Germany and its allies, there were practically no Komsomol volunteers left in its ranks who besieged military registration and enlistment offices in June 41st. The phrase "passed the whole war from the Bug to the Volga and from the Volga to the Elbe" - unless it is a newspaper stamp on duty - can only be applied to people of a completely unique fate, "born in a shirt" ... Five months in the infantry. Eleven months in tank troops. Statistics mercilessly testify that after that the next unit of "personnel" passed into the category of irretrievable (killed, missing) or sanitary (wounded, sick,



frostbitten) losses. Moreover, these are the statistics of 43–45, which do not reflect the catastrophic losses of the first year of the war!

Nevertheless, by the end of 1944, there were 6.7 million people in the Active Army alone (that is, without taking into account the rear, training, transport, sanitary units and institutions of the Armed Forces). Where did they get them from? The boys of the

war years grew up and reached draft age - hungry, thin, who grew up in conditions of virtual homelessness (father at the front, mother - from dawn to dusk at the factory), brought up by a fairly criminalized street due to military hard times. Throughout the war, the GULAG remained the "special reserve" of the draft contingents, and it was mainly "criminals" who were sent to the front, to the Active Army (the 58th criminals seemed trustworthy). But the last crumbs were swept out even earlier from these "bottlenecks". The main source of draft contingents in the year of the war was ~~the territory of the western regions of the~~ not enough USSR liberated from German occupation.

There was someone to call on: 1.5 million people born in 1905–1918 who did not fall under the 1st military mobilization (they evaded the draft or the military registration and enlistment office itself disappeared before it had time to send out summonses); 3.6 million men born in 1890-1904, left and / or remaining in the occupied territory by the time the 2nd wave of mobilization was announced (August 41st). The exact number of teenagers who reached military age by 1944 is not known exactly. And at least 1-1.5 million more "encircled", deserters, "stragglers from their unit", etc. Theoretically, all these people should have existed and, after the arrival of the Red Army, arrived at the newly organized military registration and enlistment office. Almost everything was much more difficult - it was not easy for a man of

military age to survive three years of occupation. He raised too many questions from the German authorities: if a former soldier of the Red Army, then why not in a prison camp? If a partisan intelligence officer, then why hasn't he been arrested yet? Dodged the call - or left by the NKVD to organize sabotage work? Loyalty to the "new order" had to be proved.

Each proved in his own way. 511 thousand Soviet people worked on the railways - the same ones that Soviet partisans periodically blew up. Hundreds of thousands went to serve in the police battalions organized by the occupiers, Cossack regiments, "local self-defense" detachments, and all kinds of "national" armed formations. So, only as part of the infamous Russian Liberation People's Army (later the "liberation army" was transformed into the 29th SS division) of B. Kaminsky, more than 10 thousand people fought against the partisans in the Bryansk region. And if those who fought on the side of the Nazis with weapons in their hands were still relatively few, then a much larger number of former Soviet citizens managed to "hurry over the little things": someone quietly denounced a neighbor, someone helped the Germans find Jewish family hiding in the basement. Someone did not betray or denounce anyone at all, on the contrary, at the risk to health and life, they robbed empty apartments, while engaging in a fierce battle with other marauders ...

Life under the German occupation (if it could be called life) quickly made me forget Katyusha, Three Tankmen, If Tomorrow there is War, and other wonderful Soviet songs. The new concepts were much simpler: "Man is a wolf to man", "You die today, and I will die tomorrow." And now the Soviet people "taught dialectics not according to Hegel" - starting from the middle of 1943, a mass transition of "policemen" to the side of the partisans began. So massive that the 7,000th "Russian national SS brigade" under the command of Gil Rodionov turned into the "1st anti-fascist partisan brigade", and by the summer of 1944, a fourth of all partisans in Belarus were former "policemen" and "volunteers" of the Wehrmacht.

A great simplification of the real picture of events will be the idea that the remaining three-quarters were only engaged in derailing German trains. Some (we will not argue now about quantitative estimates) number of "partisan detachments" throughout the war was mainly engaged in "self-supply", that is, ordinary robbery of local residents. Some activists even set up a regular collection of grain from the surrounding villages, distilled it for moonshine on an industrial scale and controlled the "sales markets" with an armed hand ...

After a more or less superficial check, the "authorities" handed over all this motley audience to the military registration and enlistment offices. Former "policemen", former deserters, former "partisans" and just bandits, all equally cut bald, dressed in Red Army uniforms and went to the front. I don't know the exact numbers. I can't say with certainty whether among the Soviet soldiers who rampaged in Nemmersdorf and Strigau (as well as in hundreds of other cities and towns in Germany) there were "reforged" punishers from the 118th police battalion, who burned Khatyn along with the inhabitants. But the number of the battalion in this case is not so important.

Maybe former punishers, scammers, marauders, criminals made up 5% of the total draft contingent of the 44th year. Maybe 55%. Historians must eventually figure out these details, but for the purposes of this article they are of no fundamental importance. In any case, tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of morally degraded people, who have lost all moral guidelines, accustomed to sadistic violence, joined the Red Army. Under certain conditions, this was already enough to commit those bloody atrocities, which were discussed above. It is not percentages that are important (social psychology has long come to the conclusion that the norms of behavior of the human masses are determined by a minority of 5-10%), but just "certain conditions". In one situation, the scum would try to be quieter than the water, lower than the grass, in another, they would actively begin to impose their criminal "concepts" on the majority. And here we finally come to the main thing - to the one who set the tasks and established the conditions. To that main thing, without mentioning whom no serious discussion of the history of the war is possible. To Comrade Stalin.

Supreme Commander-in-Chief Generalissimo Stalin bears personal responsibility for war crimes committed on German soil, by virtue of the obvious and indisputable rule that a commander is responsible for the actions of his subordinates. I hope that all those who like to repeat: "Stalin won the war" will immediately agree with this statement. Well, if he alone won it, then he alone should be tried for war crimes that do not have a statute of limitations ...

There are, however, more serious reasons to assume that the mass brutal violence against the civilian population of Germany was organized with criminal intent by Stalin and his henchmen. What at first superficial glance seems to be an explosion of the "blind element of revenge" could be an operation planned in advance and carried out with a cynical and selfish calculation. In order not to waste any more words, let's go straight to the transcript of the talks of the "Big Three" in Potsdam.

Fifth meeting, Saturday, July 21, 1945: **Stalin:** *"The*

*American and British governments proposed several times that we should not allow Polish administration in the western regions until the question of Poland's western border is finally resolved. We could not follow these proposals, as the German population followed west along with the retreating German troops ... "*

**Truman:** *"Determining future boundaries is the task of the peace conference."* **Stalin:**

*"Very hard to recover.*

**German**

*administration in this territory, all the Germans fled.*

**Truman:** *"I believe that in due time we will be able to reach an agreement on the future borders of Poland, but now I am interested in the question of these areas during the occupation."*

**Stalin:** *"These regions on paper belong to the territory of the German state, in fact they are Polish territories, since there is no longer a German population on them."*

**Truman:** *"Nine million Germans is a lot."* **Stalin:** *"They all fled."*

**Churchill:** *"... One more remark*

*on the statement of Generalissimo Stalin that all Germans left these areas.*

*There are other data that suggest that there are still between two and two and a half million people left there. This situation needs to be looked into."* **Stalin:** *"The war led to the fact that almost none of these eight million Germans remained there ... When we arrived in that zone,*

*which was considered as an addition to Polish territory, none of the Germans remained there. Such was the course of things ... "*

**Churchill: "The immediate resettlement of eight million people is a cause which I cannot support. Large-scale resettlement will be a shock to my country... If the German population is not provided with enough food, then conditions similar to German concentration camps will prevail in our own zone of occupation, only in even greater sizes."**

**Stalin: "But you can buy grain from Poland."**

**Churchill: "We do not consider this area to be Polish territory."**

**Stalin: "Poles**

**live there, they sowed the fields. We can not demand from the Poles who sowed the fields to give the harvest to the Germans.**

**Truman: "It seems like a fait accompli that a large part of Germany has been given to the Poles ... I believe that the Poles have no right to appropriate this part of Germany and wrest it from the German**

**economy ...".** The next day, July 22, 1945, the deceived Western Allies tried to launch a diplomatic "offensive." But Stalin firmly stood his ground: **Churchill: First. We agreed that the**

**border would be established only after a peaceful settlement. Second. Poland would not benefit from accepting such a large German territory. Third. The economic structure of Germany will be torn apart, and a very large overload will fall on the occupying authorities. Fourth. Together with the resettlement of large masses of the population, a very great moral responsibility will have to be taken on. I must say that I think it is wrong to resettle eight and a half to nine million people. Fifth. There are no exact figures for this item. According to our information, there are from eight to nine million people in this territory. The Soviet delegation claims that they are no longer there. This issue needs to be clarified..."**

**Stalin: "There are neither eight, nor six, nor even three million Germans on this territory. Mass mobilization was carried out there, and many people died. Very few Germans remained there, and those that remained fled from the Red Army ...**

**".** So what were the high contracting parties arguing about?

If there was one thing that Comrade Stalin could not be suspected of, it was love for Poland and the Poles. Rather, on the contrary, it was precisely to "punish Poland" (this country was not called differently in Soviet newspapers) and to everything connected with it that Stalin experienced a special, almost undisguised, hatred. Both in the secret Decrees of the Central Committee and in newspaper propaganda, the notorious "Polish agents" were invariably present as the primary source of all evil. It was the Polish communists in 37-38 years. a special fate awaited: Stalin did not limit himself to the execution of the entire PKP leadership in Moscow, but brought the matter to the official dissolution of the "wrecking" Polish Communist Party (which was an event completely uncommon even for the Comintern of the late 30s). In the summer of 1937, the infamous "Polish operation" began (order No. 00 485 of the People's Commissar of the NKVD Yezhov), during which 143,810 people were arrested, of which 111,091 were sentenced to death. One hundred eleven thousand. Every sixth Pole living in the USSR. A record figure even for the era of the Great Terror.

On the night of August 23-24, 1939, over a glass of champagne, Comrade Stalin agreed with Ribbentrop on the liquidation of Poland and the division of its territory, and on October 31, 1939, through the mouth of his faithful henchman V. Molotov, he called the Slavic state with a centuries-old history "the ugly brainchild of the Treaty of Versailles ". Voroshilov, People's Commissar for Defense, did not hide his triumph, who, in his holiday order of November 7, 1939, stated: **"The Polish state at the first serious military clash shattered like an old and rotten cart."** After that, a categorical ban was imposed on the very use of the term "Poland", and even in top secret, by no means intended for the public documents of the high command of the Red Army, the corresponding territory was called "former Poland" or (quite in the Hitlerian manner) "governor general".

Everything changed after the summer of 1941, when the regular Red Army **"blew up like an old and rotten cart at the first serious military clash,"** and Comrade Stalin - to his extreme amazement - found himself in the ranks of the "anti-Hitler coalition of democratic countries." The rules of conduct of the "club of democratic countries" required the observance of certain minimum standards

decency, and Stalin had to, at least in words, give up the “booty” that he had so cleverly acquired in alliance with Hitler. On July 30, 1941, an Agreement was signed with the “London” Polish government of Sikorsky, the first paragraph of which read: “ ***The government of the USSR recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 regarding territorial changes in Poland***

***invalidated.***” The long

and complicated story of how Stalin, step by step, got rid of the consequences of the “momentary weakness”, by virtue of which he agreed to recognize the “bourgeois émigré government” as legal, and his territorial acquisitions in Poland illegal, is far beyond the scope of this article. Let's go straight to the result: at the beginning of 1945, Stalin no longer wanted to hear about the "London government" of Poland; the Polish partisan Home Army was defeated, in fact, by the joint efforts of the Wehrmacht and the SS, the Red Army and the NKVD troops; a puppet "Polish" government (the Polish Committee of National Liberation) was brought to Lublin in the convoy of the advancing Soviet troops.

A pseudo-Polish army was even created (“Polish Army”), in which not only Soviet officers, but even ordinary soldiers (in particular, tank crews in full force) were enrolled in a “voluntary order” order. The state security organs of "People's Poland" were staffed from top to bottom with Soviet "advisers" and in fact represented one of the territorial departments of the NKVD. The further appointment of Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky as Minister of Defense of puppet Poland was in this

context is quite symbolic and revealing.

In such a concrete historical situation, Stalin rightly looked at the western border of "his" Poland as the frontier for the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces. And for this reason alone, he sought to move this frontier as far west as possible, as close as possible to Berlin and Dresden - there was still a lot of uncertainty in the post-war fate of Germany, while the Polish question of Stalin had already been successful by that time (in the interests of his expansion to Europe) and finally decided. As for the fate of East Prussia, here Stalin did not even see a question for discussion, and in Potsdam he briefly informed the “allies” that

takes over the northern (Baltic) part of East Prussia with the cities of Königsberg and Tilsit (now Kaliningrad and Sovetsk).

In general, the lands subject to annexation (East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia) with a total area of 114 thousand square meters. km (which is equal to Belgium, Holland and Denmark combined) accounted for a quarter of the territory of Germany within the borders of 1937. However, declaring their claims to these territories (just like in the case of the northern part of East Prussia, or indirectly through their inclusion in the puppet Polish state), Stalin also received a big problem - the multi-million German population. The "allies" hated by Stalin could appeal to some incomprehensible "rights" of these Germans, recall the "Leninist principle of the right of nations to self-determination", and ultimately change their benevolent attitude towards the claims of the Kremlin extortionist. There was only one way to radically resolve this issue, and Stalin knew it very well: "No man - no problem."

By that time, Comrade Stalin also had rich experience in such matters; more than once or twice he moved the "wrong peoples" to the right places - but with the Germans the case was special. There were too many of them. Quantity was dialectically transformed into quality. It is one thing - in a calm peaceful environment to evict from the so-called. "Western Belarus and Ukraine" 400 thousand Poles for a year and a half, and it is quite another to move 8–9 million Germans from place to place, and even during the war, when every truck, every liter of gasoline, every wagon and steam locomotive on account! And where could Stalin deport the Germans of Silesia, Pomerania and Prussia? There were exactly two possible directions: either back, to the east, deep into Soviet territory, or forward, to the west, i.e., to the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany. In both cases, the Soviet Union would have to feed 8 million dependents (and in the sixth year of the World War the population of the German rear consisted for the most part of women, children, the disabled and the elderly). The hypothesis,

which I cannot support with any direct documentary evidence, is that Stalin made the decision to expel the Germans. Drive out quickly (faster than the Western "allies" have time to understand what is happening and somehow react), and at the same time put the process of expulsion on a firm footing.



self-financing basis. Stalin decided to create such an atmosphere of terror and horror in the territories to be annexed, so that the Germans themselves, on their own, in their cars, carts, bicycles, fishing boats, sailed, rode, walked, ran, crawled to the west. West without stopping until they reach the British or American occupation zone. It was a thrice "wise" decision: the deportation did not require a single ruble of expenses from the Soviet Union, in the course of creating the prescribed "environment" the Stalinist nomenklatura was able to pretty much fill their pockets and dachas with loot, and the hated "allies" received (according to the available far from accurate estimated) 7 million hungry, sick, deprived of housing and property refugees. The question of the geographic and temporal limits of the

terror sanctioned from above against the civilian population of Germany deserves serious study. There is reason to assume (I repeat once again that at the moment I have only a question, but no answer to it) that with the entry of the advancing Red Army into the territory of the future GDR, the outrages sharply subsided. At least, in the book of I. Hoffmann mentioned above, all episodes of massacres take place in Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia, i.e., in the territories subject to annexation. In Berlin (in front of the eyes of Western Allied officers and foreign correspondents), the "thirst for revenge" was limited to just wholesale looting and

rape.

It is worth noting the fact that on April 14, 1945, i.e., two days before the start of the Berlin operation (the offensive of the Red Army from the banks of the Oder to Berlin), the famous article "Comrade Orenburg simplifies" appeared in the Pravda newspaper, published signed by the head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks G. Aleksandrov. The style and language of the article (with characteristic Stalinist repetitions, questions and answers) allows us to assume with a high degree of probability that Comrade Stalin at least dictated to Aleksandrov the main theses of the article (if only he did not write it himself). And if it is still possible to argue about the authorship of the directive (and this was the only way an article published in the central press organ of the Central Committee of the party could be perceived in the Stalinist USSR), then

The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 11 072 of April 20, 1945 bears the

quite distinct signature of Stalin. The Stavka directive was addressed **to "commanders of the troops and members of the Military Councils of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts"**, but not to the command of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, fighting in East Prussia and Pomerania!

Hardly two fronts were overlooked through forgetfulness... The operative part of Directive No. 11,072 reads:

***"The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders: Demand to change the attitude (emphasis mine. - M.S.) towards the Germans, both prisoners of war and civilians. It's better to deal with the Germans. The brutal treatment of the Germans makes them afraid and makes them resist stubbornly, not surrendering. The civilian population, fearing revenge, organizes itself into gangs. Such a situation is unfavorable for us. A more humane attitude towards the Germans will make it easier for us to conduct military operations on their territory and, undoubtedly, will reduce the stubbornness of the Germans in the regions of Germany to the west of the line, the mouth of the Oder River, Fürstenberg, then the Neisse River (to the west) to create German administrations, and in the cities to install burgomasters - Germans. The rank and file members of the National Socialist Party, if they are loyal to the Red Army, should not be touched, but only the leaders should be detained if they did not have time to escape. Improving attitudes towards the Germans should not lead to a decrease in vigilance and familiarity with the Germans. Headquarters of the Supreme High***

**Command. I. Stalin. Antonov.** It is noteworthy that this Directive was declassified and published (collection of documents "Russian Archive. Great Patriotic War. Battle for Berlin", vol. 15, M., "Terra", 1995) without stating, i.e. describing the actual situation, parts. The line indicated in paragraph 2 exactly corresponds to the border of the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany, i.e., the future GDR. It can be assumed that Stalin did not need the occupied "socialist Germany" without a population and he ordered **"to change the attitude towards the Germans"**, that is, to stop the forced expulsion.

I repeat once again - I have not seen any documents with Stalin's handwritten signature. Most likely they never existed. Comrade Stalin, of course, did not give a written order to kill German women and children. Yes, there was no need for such an order. Two decades after Stalin came to power, seven years after the Great Terror, Stalin's entourage consisted of those who understood the will of the Master like a dog, without words. Those who did not understand quickly changed to others who were more understanding. Nevertheless, the absence of a clear command, fixed in a written order, explains much of what we know for certain about the tragic events on German soil. First of all, the extreme "heterogeneity" of

the situation is fixed both by documents and by the people's memory. In one German town, incomprehensible atrocities could be committed, in the neighboring one, relative order was maintained. Let us turn once again to the book of I. Hoffman: **"... Sometimes Soviet officers**

**managed to successfully resist criminals in uniform - perhaps because they had similarly thinking bosses. So, even in the 91st Guards Rifle Division, behavior was not uniform. While the divisional headquarters and the 275th Rifle Regiment were committing terrible atrocities in and around Germau, no murders and rapes were reported from settlements such as Wilkau, which were captured by other parts of the division ... While, for example, 3 The 14th Battalion of the 14th Infantry Regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division committed serious crimes, the Red Army soldiers of the 3rd Battalion of the 187th Infantry Regiment of the same division were warned against taking liberties with the population ... Major General Gelen, to whose department all the relevant reports flocked, in some cases, he also recorded the "correct behavior" of Soviet officers and soldiers ... "**

In the absence of a clear written order (replaced, as I assume, by verbal instructions), a lot depended on the position of individual commanders. The farther away from the Kremlin and the closer to the front line, the greater was the number of middle-level commanders who did not understand (or perhaps did not want to understand) the "powerful will." Not everyone then lost their human form,

and it was more difficult to intimidate a front-line commander than a Moscow official. Finally, any commander of a regiment or battalion clearly understood that, first of all, he would be asked for the performance of a combat mission, and it became difficult. For all these reasons, many commanders of the Red Army at all levels actively opposed the "savagery of the troops."

On the other hand, in order to carry out the instructions of Comrade Stalin to expel the Germans from the territories subject to annexation, widespread (in every place without exception) terror was not required. In order for the population to rush in panic to flee, abandoning their homes and property, a certain limited number of brutal massacres was enough. In other words, the number of outrages could be replaced with complete success for the task at hand by "quality", i.e., an outrageous degree of cruelty. And here we come to "hypothesis No. 2". It is even less provable by documents (in the conditions of the NKVD/NKGB archives that remain closed to this day), but at the same time it is quite plausible. Hypothesis No. 2 is that special

terrorist groups ("special combat units" of the NKVD) were created to massacre the civilian population, and reports of children nailed to the table by tongues, women crucified in churches and other inexpressible abominations refer precisely to the consequences of their actions. I will immediately emphasize that hypothesis No. 2 does not exclude, but only supplements the above assumption about the deliberate and sanctioned from the very "top" demoralization of the Red Army (just as the not hypothetical, but quite real and active participation of the OGPU in dispossession did not exclude, did not replace, but only supplemented and strengthened the atrocities of the crowd of village lumpen). This hypothesis may seem absolutely incredible - but only within the framework

of the ideas of the old Soviet (or vice versa - the latest Russian) school textbook. In the context of the real history of the USSR, the proposed hypothesis is quite ordinary. Lies, provocation and terror have gone hand in hand since the early days.

the Bolshevik dictatorship: from the assassination attempt on Lenin, in which the half-blind (and immediately shot) F. Kaplan was accused; from the directives of Lenin himself, who called for taking advantage of the "opportune moment" when the corpses of those who died of starvation lie on the roads, and hang under this pretext as many "counter-revolutionary priests" as possible; from Operation Trust, in which the GPU organized a fake anti-Soviet organization as a "poisoned bait" ... The existence of "special

combat units" of the NKVD, which under the guise of UPA partisans terrorized the population of Western Ukraine, has long ceased to be a hypothesis. Documents

have been preserved, found and published that testify both to the scale of provocative activities (by June 1945, 156 special groups were created with a total number of 1783 people), and to the methods of their work, which exceeded even the measure of patience of the military prosecutor of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian District, Colonel Kosharsky . On February 15, 1949, he sent a memorandum to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, N. Khrushchev, ***“on the facts of gross violation of Soviet legality***

***in the activities of the so-called special groups of the MGB.”*** It reported that ***“the grossly provocative and stupid work of a number of special groups and the arbitrariness and violence committed by their members against the local population not only do not facilitate the struggle, but, on the contrary, complicate it ... Without sufficient materials, the so-called. special groups of the MGB act blindly, as a result of which the victims of their arbitrariness are often people who are not involved in the Ukrainian gangster nationalist underground...”***

Further, prosecutor Kosharsky cites a long, multi-page list of facts of “arbitrariness and violence” (“... ***in March 1948, a special group headed by the MGB agent “Winged”, twice visited the house of Palamarchuk G.S., aged 62, and, posing as UPA bandits , brutally tortured him and his two daughters... On the night of July 23, 1948, a special group from the village of Podvysotskoye took Reprnitskaya N.Ya., born in 1931, into the forest. she was beaten, hung upside down, a stick was inserted into her genitals, and then raped in turn ...”***) and

concludes it with the following statement: ***"Unfortunately, such facts from the activities of the special groups of the MGB are far from isolated."***

Returning to the events of the spring of 1945, from the Carpathian forests to the ruins of German cities, it is worth noting that here the "organs" faced an incomparably easier task. If the "special combat units" acting under the guise of Bandera were theoretically required to conduct a complex intelligence and operational "game", if they had to be specially trained, prepared, staffed with people who knew Western Ukrainian speech, local orders and customs, then in Germany everything was much easier. All that was required was to "shug the Fritz". To do this, it was necessary to find several thousand people in the multimillion-strong army, stained with past cooperation with the Nazi invaders, threaten them with exposure and execution, and then offer to "redeem with blood." And not with his own, but with the blood of civilians in Germany. In the fourth year of the war, there were a lot of scum with a corresponding biography, and they accumulated rich "experience" of brutal reprisals against women and children. It is a sin to talk about this, but one cannot deny the fact that the "threshold of sensitivity" of the Germans was completely different. Not ours. They did not have a

real "Bolshevik hardening". Germany in the 20th century did not survive a long-term civil war, accompanied by an endless series of pogroms and executions, nor dispossession, nor famine; and 37 in the memory of the German layman remained the year of economic prosperity, and not the "black crows" and the nightly disappearance of neighbors, friends and acquaintances. This layman was not ready for the arrival of real mass terror, and therefore Stalin's calculation was fully justified: after the first meeting with thugs in the form of Red Army soldiers, the civilian population of the eastern regions of Germany turned into a stampede.

And only in one single aspect, the brilliant complex Comrade Stalin's plan was not carried out:

***"Stalin's intentions were to bring the Germans in the western occupation zones to despair by the merciless expulsion of Germans from the eastern territories, approved by him, to discredit the Western powers so that in the end they turn people to Bolshevism ... The children of the people grew up in poverty and***

***looked to a future in which they could not escape from it. The revolutionary situation was evident. But the revolution did not happen. The political calculation of the East took into account almost all factors, except for one - people. Millions of Germans fled from the Red Army. Millions have witnessed what happened during the arrival of Soviet troops. Millions experienced and suffered from communist domination. Humiliated and insulted, they were lost to communism, under whatever mask and whatever arguments it might come up with...".*** With these words of the German historian and journalist Günter Beddecker, I

cannot finish my article, because the Russian historian has no right not to speak about the most numerous victims of this forgotten crime of Stalin. About the soldiers of the Red Army.

At the end of 1944, Germany, its industry, transport system, and armed forces were in a state of death throes. Hitler's "thousand-year Reich" lost all allies, lost all external sources of raw materials (in particular, Romanian oil, Swedish iron ore, Finnish and Ukrainian nickel). Anglo-American aircraft, which had seized complete air supremacy over any point in Germany, methodically destroyed city after city, factory after factory. In one raid, several kilotons of bombs were dropped on one object. The German army no longer had a safe rear. After the transport system and the chemical industry (the production of synthetic gasoline, nitrogen, explosives enterprises) became the main object of air strikes in May 1944, German military production collapsed. Factories hidden underground and dispersed throughout the remnants of the territory could still produce tanks and aircraft, but even without all this equipment turned into piles of useless scrap metal, having time to leave the assembly line - their fuel tanks were empty. But even the loss of fuel reserves, territory, transport routes, experienced pilots and tankers could not be compared with the loss of the main thing - meaning and purpose. What, besides increasing the number of victims, could Germany bring the continuation of hostilities?

In September 1944, the Red Army reached the line of the river. Vistula, and the armies of the Western allies were rapidly advancing towards the Rhine. Exodus

war was no longer the slightest doubt. Before the Tehran Conference, the Hitlerite leadership could still hope for a "political solution", that is, for a split in the camp of Germany's opponents and a separate peace with one of them; Until July 1944, one could hope that the Anglo-American troops that landed in Normandy could be surrounded and destroyed. The bomb explosion, which sounded on July 20, 1944 at Hitler's Headquarters, informed the whole world that the top command staff of the Wehrmacht had parted with the last illusions. And this concerned not only the generals of the conspirators. Colonel General A. Jodl, Chief of Staff of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, during interrogation on July 17, 1945, gave the following testimony: “ **About February 1944, I reported**

**to the Fuhrer that if the British and Americans land in France and we fail to drop at sea, we will lose the war. I made this statement in writing ... Hitler recognized my point of view as correct, but forbade this memorandum to be sent to the commanders of the Air Force, Army and Navy.** Taken at the turn of 44-45

years. the last two, desperate attempts of the Wehrmacht to go on the counteroffensive (in the Ardennes - against the Western allies, in the area of the Hungarian Lake Balaton - against the Red Army) ended in a crushing defeat, the loss of the last combat-ready tank and aviation units. The collapse of the German war machine became quite obvious.

And suddenly, dramatic changes take place on the Eastern Front. The German troops seemed to have gained a "second wind", which immediately affected both the pace of advance and the level of losses of the Red Army. Let

us turn to a completely official and reputable source - the statistical collection “Secrecy Classified Removed”, published in 1993, edited by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev. On pp. 157-159 are given the figures of the irretrievable average daily losses of the Red Army by periods and campaigns of the war. These figures are terrible - every day of the war claimed thousands of lives of Soviet soldiers. Let us digress, however, from quite understandable emotions and finally pay attention to the dynamics of these figures:



1. Summer-autumn campaign of 1943 (1.7-31.12.43, Kursk Bulge, liberation of the left-bank Ukraine, Kyiv and Smolensk); irretrievable losses - 7.6 thousand people a day. 2. Winter-spring

campaign of 1944 (January 1-31, 1944, liberation of the Right-bank Ukraine and Crimea, Leningrad and Novgorod regions); irretrievable losses - 5.3 thousand people a day.

3. Summer-autumn campaign of 1944 (1.6-31.12.44, the largest offensive operations of the Red Army: Belorussian, Lvov-Sandomierz, Iasi-Kishinev, Baltic, Belgrade); irretrievable losses - 4.5 thousand people a day.

So: 7.6-5.3-4.5. The skill of the fighters and commanders of

the Red Army is growing, its numerical and fire superiority over the enemy is constantly increasing, the material and moral resources of the Wehrmacht are dwindling. As a result, an increasingly large-scale offensive by the Soviet troops on all fronts with a steadily declining level of average daily losses. The year 1945 is coming. The numerical superiority of the Red Army

in tanks and aircraft is already expressed in double digits, the German command throws untrained boys from the Volkssturm to the front - and at the same time, the level of casualties of the Red Army not only does not decrease, but noticeably increases! 6.2 thousand people. This is the level of average daily losses of the 45th year. Finishing off the

agonizing Wehrmacht, the Red Army suffers losses one-third greater than in 1944.

Now let's look at the figures for the loss of inanimate technology (pp. 355-356). In

1943, the Red Army loses an average of 64 tanks and self-propelled guns per day, in 1944 - 65 per day. As you can see, during the two years of the war, the average daily losses of tanks and self-propelled guns remain almost constant. The year 1945 is coming. From January 1 to May 10, 1945, 13,700 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost. 105 (one hundred and five) per day. Average daily losses almost doubled.

What happened to the Soviet armored vehicles? Has she become worse than in 43-44 years? Yes, nothing like that, it was by 1945 that the rearmament to a new, much more powerful modification of the "thirty-four" (T-34/85) was basically completed; a lot

the troops began to receive the latest heavy tanks of the IS series and heavy self-propelled guns armed with monstrous 122-mm and 152-mm cannons (not to be confused with the short-barreled 152-mm howitzer on the pre-war KV-2), capable of penetrating the frontal armor of any German tank, up to the "Royal tiger" inclusive. Statistics show that if, as of January 1, 1944, there were 1.6 thousand heavy tanks and 0.8 thousand heavy self-propelled guns in the Red Army, then by May 9, 1945 there were already 5.3 thousand of them, respectively. and 2.7

thousand units. On the other hand, the Germans did not have any anti-tank "wonder weapons" in 1945. Rumors about a revolution in weapons technology made by the "faustpatron" are greatly exaggerated. Turning to the work of Colonel P. Igumnov compiled in the hot pursuit of the war ("Study of the defeat of domestic tanks", 1947), we find the following figures for the distribution of tank losses in the last months of the war:

1st Belorussian Front, January - March 1945; from faustpatrons - 5.5%;

1st Ukrainian Front, January - March 1945; from faustpatrons - 8.9%;

4th Ukrainian Front, January - May 1945; from faustpatrons - 9%;

1st Belorussian Front, April - May 1945; from faustpatrons - 10.5%.  
Cannon

artillery was and remains the main means of destroying tanks, which accounts for more than 90% of all losses. Even in the Berlin operation (that is, in the conditions of fierce street fighting in a huge city), the losses of the tanks of the 2nd Guards Tank Army were distributed as follows: 77% from cannon artillery fire, and 23% from faustpatrons.

As for the artillery, there was nothing new in service with the Wehrmacht in 1945. The same 75 mm and 88 mm "trunks". If there were changes, then only for the worse for the Germans: the shortage of tungsten forced by the end of 44 to completely curtail the production of sub-caliber armor-piercing shells; the shortage of gasoline sharply reduced the number of combat-ready tanks and self-propelled guns; thus, the most widespread means of fighting Soviet tanks again - as at the beginning of the war - was towed

an anti-tank gun, the calculation of which was protected from bullets and fragments only by a tunic and overcoat. And with all this - a twofold increase in the number of losses of Soviet tanks! The most

paradoxical, in my opinion, events took place not on the ground, but in the air. After the failure of the counter-offensive in the Ardennes, German aviation practically "ended". Gasoline and pilots were only enough for a few hundred aircraft, and those that still remained in service were involved in the Reich air defense system. In the spring of 1945, a German fighter could be seen in the sky over the Eastern Front only in very rare cases. And at the same time, the average daily losses of Soviet aircraft in the category "shot down in air combat" almost did not decrease: 7.95 aircraft in 1944 and 7.49 in 1945 (hereinafter, data from the collection "Soviet Aviation in the Great Patriotic War" are given war of 1941-1945 in numbers"; compiled with the signature stamp "Soviet secret" by the Main Headquarters of the USSR Air Force in 1962). If you look at the statistics of losses even more carefully, it turns out that the total losses in air battles of bombers and attack aircraft even increased (3.3 per day in 1944 and 4.3 in 1945). The losses of bombers and attack aircraft in the category "from anti-aircraft fire" increased by 1.7 times (5.8 per day in 1944 and 10 in 1945). So what happened on the Eastern Front in the spring of 1945? How to explain such an increase in the losses of the Red Army? Traditional Soviet historiography tried not to notice these

facts, not to ask the inevitable questions. But on occasion, words could be heard about "fanatic SS men ready to defend Hitler to the

last", about the "innate discipline" of a German soldier who cannot stop shooting without an order ... It is not necessary to deny the existence of these factors. But they should not close our attention to the main thing - the "miracle weapon" that Stalin handed over to the German soldier. Yes, that's right: Goebbels only shouted about the mysterious "wunderwaffe" that would turn the tide of the war, but he deceived. But Comrade Stalin did not disappoint, he gave the Wehrmacht

the most important thing is the goal.

After Nemmersdorf (and hundreds of other similar "Dorffs"), the German soldier on the Eastern Front did not have to explain what he was fighting for. The goal was obvious (it could be seen

to the naked eye) and - most importantly - quite achievable. The soldier saw endless columns of refugees going west, the boundless sea of people at the mooring walls of the Baltic ports, saw ships leaving one after another with thousands of refugees to the shores of Denmark and West Germany. Every day and even every hour of the delay in the offensive of the Red Army increased the number of German women, old people and children saved from violence and death. From that moment on, the Wehrmacht regained the meaning and purpose of continuing the struggle.

At the end of January 1945, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Oder near the city of Breslau (now Wroclaw, Poland). On February 15, the encirclement closed around Breslau. The garrison of the city, which, taking into account the Volkssturm, numbered no more than 50 thousand people, defended the whole of February. Then all of March. All April. 13 Soviet divisions were involved in the battles for Breslau. Far to the west, Berlin fell, the bloody tyrant Hitler committed suicide, and fierce fighting continued among the charred ruins of Breslau. The city capitulated only on May 6, 1945. The military commandant of Breslau, General Niehoff, survived the war, survived 10 years spent in Soviet camps. In his memoirs, he claims that the long defense of the city allowed 1.5 million German refugees from Silesia to go west. On March 5, 1945,

troops of the 1st Belorussian Front launched an assault on the small coastal town of Kolberg in Pomerania. At that moment, 85 thousand civilians (residents and refugees) accumulated in the city. Kolberg's garrison numbered 3,000 soldiers. This handful of people held back the onslaught of the 1st Guards Tank Army and three divisions of the Polish Army until the morning of March 18. Nothing remained of the city but ruins; the garrison lost 2,300 soldiers killed. Ships of the German Navy took 70,000 refugees out of Kolberg. On January 13, 1945, troops of the 2nd and

3rd Belorussian Fronts (117 rifle divisions, 7 tank corps, 9 separate tank brigades, 1,590 thousand personnel) launched an offensive against East Prussia. In the last days of January, the Königsberg grouping of German troops was surrounded from the west and northeast and pressed to the sea. Further progress was stopped by fierce resistance from Wehrmacht units, which were inferior in

the number of the advancing enemy by at least 6–7 times. On February 19-20, the Germans launched a counteroffensive, broke through the encirclement ring in the west and restored the land connection of East Prussia with the still unoccupied areas of East Germany.

The German troops held this "road of life" throughout March, until a new offensive of the Red Army began in early April. Königsberg was taken after fierce fighting only on April 12, 1945. But even after that, the Germans continued to hold the last point of East Prussia for two weeks - the port of Pillau (now Baltiysk), from the berths of which ships with refugees and the wounded continued to depart until April 27. After the loss of the port of Pillau, the Hel Spit (north of Danzig

in Pomerania) remained the only "harbor of hope". The East Pomeranian offensive operation of the Red Army began on February 10, 1945. The defense of Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland) continued until March 30. The Germans held the tiny strip of the Hel Spit, shot through by artillery, until May 8! During this time, 400 thousand people were taken by sea. In total, 2 million people were evacuated from the ports of East Prussia and Pomerania to the West by civilian ships and ships of the Navy - that was the largest "sea landing operation" in history. In the mass consciousness, the "Spring of Victory" is associated with the attack on Berlin. It is this operation that seems to the

inexperienced "man from the street" the main (if not the only) event of the last months of the war. Alas, this is a regrettable delusion.

In the Berlin operation (and this is not only the assault on the city itself, but also all the military operations on the offensive from the Oder to the Spree and the encirclement of the Berlin Wehrmacht group) from April 16 to May 8, 1945, 78 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers died. And during the East Prussian operation, 126 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army died. And another 53,000 were killed during the closely related East Pomeranian operation. The total irretrievable losses of the four fronts that "liberated Germany" (3rd Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian, 1st Belorussian, 1st Ukrainian) in 1945 amounted to 411 thousand people. In total, on all fronts, the Red Army, aviation and navy irretrievably lost from January 1 to May 10, 1945 801 thousand people.

Human. Eight hundred thousand dead. The Berlin operation occupies less than one tenth (!) Of this horrifying figure. Grand

Admiral K. Dönitz, appointed by Hitler to the post of "Reich President", was not a "SS fanatic". He was never even a member of the Nazi NSDAP. And by the time Dönitz assumed power

and responsibility for the remnants of Germany, Hitler himself was no longer alive. Nevertheless, the war on the Eastern Front did not stop.

Speaking at 10 p.m. on May 1, 1945, on German radio, Dönitz declared:

***"My first task is to save Germany from destruction by the Bolsheviks. Only in the name of this goal alone will the armed struggle continue. As long as the achievement of this goal is hindered by the British and Americans, we will be forced to continue defensive battles against them ... "*** The bloodshed didn't stop. German troops in the East continued to fight. Guns rumbled at

Potsdam, Breslau, Danzig. Encircled back in November 1944 in Courland (the coastal strip of modern Lithuania), the Wehrmacht group resisted until May 10, 1945. At the same time, the losses of the 1st and 2nd Baltic fronts in 1945 amounted to only 62 thousand people killed.

Human.

The strange story of the "popular uprising" in Prague (the patience of the people, who put up with the German occupation for six years, burst for some reason at the moment when the American troops were stationed 80 km from Prague) and the march of the Red Army to help the rebels increased the losses of the Red Army by another 11 thousand killed. Only the merciless position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Western Europe, General of the US Army D. Eisenhower (***"I ordered to tell Yodl that if they do not immediately stop putting forward all sorts of pretexts and dragging out time, then I will close the entire Allied front so as not to let any German refugees through our front line "- emphasized by me. - M.S.)*** forced Dönitz to stop hostilities on all fronts ...

In the statistical collection of Krivosheev, the corresponding chapter is called "The price of the liberation mission." Maybe in the 21st century it is time to think about the adequacy of such names?

The Anglo-American allies liberated Italy, Greece, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, almost all of Austria, part of the Czech Republic, more than half of the territory of Germany (more than half within the borders of 1937, four-fifths within the modern borders). In 1938, the population of these territories was more than 170 million people. At the same time, the human losses of the Allied armies turned out to be an order of magnitude less than the losses of the Red Army (in

In 1945, the Americans lost about 55 thousand people in the European theater of operations, the Anglo-Canadian

troops - another 15 thousand). Yes, of course, three-quarters of the German army was on the Eastern Front; yes, of course, in April 45 on the Western Front, German soldiers surrendered in droves. Nobody argues with this; the question is different: WHY tens of thousands of Wehrmacht soldiers surrendered in the West and fought to the last bullet and the last drop of blood in the East? Is this striking difference connected with "the class solidarity of the world bourgeoisie, its mortal hatred of the workers' and peasants' state"? Or were there other, much more earthly and significant reasons? 800 thousand dead - is this the "price of the liberation mission"? Or a payment for Stalin's sophisticated geopolitical games? Statistics,

necessary and inevitable in any military historical study, turns, alas, the immense suffering of millions of people into neat columns of numbers. This is not good, so I want to end the article with a naive account of the experience of one Hungarian woman, Alain Poltz. Who is Alain Poltz? A kind person. A very kind person (she found a job for herself as a psychotherapist in a hospice). Before reading her memoirs "Woman and War" (published in the Neva magazine, No. 2/2004), I thought that only disembodied angels could possess such kindness and humility. Unfortunately, this quite earthly woman of 19 years old found herself at the end of the war in a small Hungarian town, which became a frontline zone for several months.

Alain Poltz talks about what she saw and experienced with amazing meekness and sympathy for all people. Even what in the mouth of a modern journalist would seem to me a disgusting game of "political correctness", it sounds natural and humane. Of course, she does not forget to constantly remind the reader that

that **"Hungarian soldiers did not behave much more decently in Russian villages."** She manages to come up with explanations and justifications for everything (**"I found out that they accuse us of being spies, because exactly after the clock strikes on the bell tower, the bomb hit the Russian headquarters and killed a lot of people. They thought that "we gave signals from the church. It was impossible for them to explain that the tower clock strikes regularly, because it is wound up, this is a mere coincidence. In general, a lot of things could not be explained to the Russians. They lived in a different world, they had a completely different experience. Their logic, too was different. They didn't know what a tower clock was..."**). She even finds an excuse for this: **"By dawn, I understood how a spinal fracture occurs.**

**They do this: they put the woman on her back, throw her legs to her shoulders, and the man enters from above, kneeling. If you lean too hard, the woman's spine will crack. It turns out this is not on purpose: just in the heat of violence, no one restrains himself. The spine, twisted by a snail, is squeezed all the time, swayed at one point, and they do not notice when it breaks ... "** And ends the story of another violence with a very commendable

for the Soviet government with a remark:

**"The Russian officer, meanwhile, lit a match, first touched my eyes with his finger to see if they were open. Convinced of this, he set to work. It hurt a little. But since I still did not move, did not cry out, he lit another match to see if I was alive. He shook his head. I must not have given him much satisfaction. But when I started to get ready to take the mattress away, he sent his orderly to the basement, who also used me. Then I did not think why he sent an orderly. Now it seems to me that they are more democratic than our officers..."** And immediately refuses revenge at the moment when she has

there is a real opportunity to take revenge: **"A line of**

**soldiers was lined up in front of me, and I had to point out the one who raped me. I remember only vaguely: on a frosty winter morning, I pass in front of the formation, the soldiers stand stretched out, exactly, at attention. On the left, I am accompanied by two officers. As I walk along the line, they keep a little behind. I saw fear in the eyes of one of the soldiers. He had**



***blue eyes, the boy was quite young. From this fear, I guessed: this is it. But what flashed in his eyes was so strong, so terrible, that I immediately felt: it was impossible. There is no point in killing this boy. Why, if others go unpunished? Yes, and this, the only one of all, why?***

As it should be in the life of kind people, the end of the story is quite happy: Alain Poltz remained alive, retained her mind, was able to get to Budapest, found her mother alive ... And even the house where her parents lived was destroyed by bombing from the other side, and in the apartment left traces of pre-war prosperity and a lot of food. Why not a Christmas story? ***“Of***

***course, my mother cried and was happy and hugged me. And I, too, looked at her and rejoiced at her. I was glad that they were alive, but not too happy.***

***I didn't rejoice too much in anything and I didn't believe in anything too much. I already carried a disease in me - gonorrhea, because of which I could not give birth later, and I still did not know whether I had syphilis or not. I had a suspicion that I was very contagious, and I didn't want to infect***

***anyone. We were sitting at the table. Served tongue with tomato sauce. I looked at him in amazement and ate quietly, silently. Talked about that Russians rape women.***

***"You too?" Mom asked. "Yes," I said, "we have too." "But they didn't touch you?" Mom asked. "No one was spared," I said and continued to eat. Mom looked at me and said in surprise: "But why are you allowed?"***

***"Because they beat me," I said and continued to eat. In this question, I did not see anything important or interesting. Then someone asked casually and jokingly: "Were there***

***many of them?" "I couldn't count," I said, and continued to eat. After dinner, my mother took me aside and said: "Daughter, don't joke so rudely, they will still believe!" I looked at her: "Mommy, it's true!". Mom burst into tears, then threw herself on my neck, begging: "Daughter, tell me that this is not true ...".***

Should I quote further? Of course, Alain Poltz felt sorry for her poor mother and told her the words that she wanted to hear. Alas, I cannot and do not want to console our "zero patriots" (Russian chauvinists of the era of expensive oil in the 2000s of the 21st century) in this way. Everything written above is true. The terrible, disgusting truth.

And the gentlemen of the patriots have to decide - who are they? Masters or slaves? The slave does not know the sense of responsibility. Those who have renounced freedom and personal dignity are not responsible for their actions. But he can continue to enjoy the crimson ringing of the words of the chief of the gendarme corps, Count Benckendorff: ***"Russia's past is amazing, its present is more than magnificent, as for its future, it is higher than anything that the wildest imagination can imagine. It is from this point of view that Russian history should be considered and written."*** Free people, however, cannot agree either with the gendarmes' version

of Russian history, or with the gendarmes' monopoly right to dispose of Russia's present and future. Free people should not be afraid of their history. They must muster the courage to admit the obvious. And share with your country the responsibility for

All.

# Interview for Radio Liberty

*June 23, 2009*

**I think even your most implacable opponents will agree that your books - June 22, June 23 and June 25, dedicated to the events of 1941 - were written with genuine passion. There are cold-blooded historians who dispassionately relate to the subject of their research, but you are an undeniably passionate person, passionate about the search for the truth about the Second World War, the truth that Soviet historians hid and distorted. How was your hobby born?**

It's certainly not a hobby, it's still an occupation. It was born a long time ago; his date of birth is probably in the region of 1983-84. Naturally, I was interested in this before, but somewhere in 1983, when Andropov was still alive, I managed (this verb will seem strange to a modern listener, but it was not easy) to see the Soviet central newspapers - Pravda and Izvestia 1939 of the year.

I managed to see these newspapers and see a large map, for a whole page of Pravda, with the division of Poland, with the division of Finland, the Treaty of Friendship and Borders. But nothing was said about him in any school textbook, in any university textbook. Here it lay in front of me - the treaty of friendship and the border between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany of September 28, 1939. It was a strong impression, which I set out even then, in 1984, in a thick, very thick common notebook with a black cover, which I keep at home to this day.

**You had a wonderful predecessor - Alexander Nekrich. Sometime in Soviet times, as you got the newspapers of 1939, I got a copy of his famous book "1941, June 22". It certainly was an amazing edition. The book, officially released by a Soviet publishing house in 1965, was subsequently banned, withdrawn from libraries, everywhere**

**confiscated, and the author was persecuted in the most ruthless way. Will you agree if I call Alexander Nekrich your teacher? I**

strongly disagree with all of the previous comments. My fate is absolutely different from the fate of comrade Nekrich. Comrade Nekrich was hunted down: this means that he was expelled from a Soviet university and driven to work as a professor at an American university. This is not the heaviest punishment that fell to a Soviet person in 70 years of Soviet power, there were worse punishments. As for that book, I am a little

familiar with the history of its appearance in the Khrushchev era, when this new, next in a row, "truth of war" began to take shape - about the fact that one was only a bad person. All were good, all were heroes, wonderful commanders, like one person, the entire Soviet people rose, but there was one bad person who interfered with everything - Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. And from the point of view of these ideas, this next "truth", Nekrich's book was written. He would have received another State Prize for it, but the notorious "October Revolution" took place. Khrushchev was thrown off, Brezhnev was installed, that truth was declared false, the Khrushchev period was called "voluntarism", and in the course of uprooting the previous Khrushchev period, Nekrich's book also came under distribution. This book today is only a historical and literary monument; what is written there is now completely and unconditionally refuted

by a new array of documents that have been introduced into scientific circulation, by those works that have been done over the past twenty years. Therefore, of course, this history has nothing in common with what I call for myself and for others "the new historiography of the Great Patriotic War or the Second World War." **What is this historiography and what is your truth about the war?** This historiography, of course, began with Suvorov's books, it began with Bunich's almost

literary, artistic and journalistic book "Operation Thunderstorm, or Error in the Third Sign", and so on. Then there were, in my opinion, exceptionally valuable works

Meltyukhov on the same occasion, a large number of documents were published - which is actually the most important thing.

As for my "truth", in his books Suvorov stopped on the threshold of June 22. But what's next? We are not in a polemic relationship with him, he just wrote about one thing, and I take the next chronological step. Suvorov wrote that the Soviet Union, Stalin, "collective Stalin", tried very hard, strove to unleash a European war, he quite purposefully and consciously helped Hitler start a war, get involved, not be scared (Hitler could be scared, but he helped him a lot not frightened) start a pan-European war. Stalin himself also looted a little in this matter, and in the summer of 1941 he was already preparing to enter not just a European war, but to enter Europe, that is, to begin a large-scale offensive operation to the West from the already significantly shifted Soviet borders. This is what Suvorov wrote, and I agree with it 200 percent.

And then the following, quite logical question arises: if it took so long, diligently and with great effort to prepare for a campaign to the shores of the Atlantic, then why, after one or two weeks, the Red Army flew off to the border line of 1939, and after another three months the Germans were already near Leningrad, near Tikhvin and near Moscow? I answer this question in my books. In short, the answer lies in what is called the human factor and motivation. Let down the human factor. There were a lot of divisions, there were a

lot of tanks, there were a lot of aircraft, there was a huge line of fortifications along the new border, a huge line of reinforced concrete fortifications along the old border, a huge amount of ammunition, which was just not there. There were 4.8 million in the armed forces at the start of the war, 5 million were mobilized in the very first week after the announcement of mobilization, by the end of the year either 12 or 14, according to various sources, millions of people were mobilized. That is, the resource that was made available to such commanders as Zhukov is 5 plus 12-14 million armed men. With such a resource, the Red Army flew away from the border to Moscow in three months, because there were all the resources, but there was no motivation.

And in the absence of motivation, in the absence of skill, this really terrible fusion - "I don't know how and don't want": I don't want, because I don't know how, and I don't know how, because I didn't want to learn this, led to the fact that all these colossal mountains of equipment were abandoned on the sides of the roads and sometimes very much hindered the Germans in the offensive. There was, for example, the 1st mechanized corps, one of the best in the Leningrad district, there was the 3rd tank division, which fought with Manstein's tank division for one or two days at most, then Manstein writes in his memoirs that they advanced with great difficulty to the East, because the whole road was littered with the abandoned equipment of this division. And in the archive in Podolsk I kept with my own hands a document written on a scrap of I don't know what, maybe the cover of the Belomor cigarettes, written by the same Berzarin, who in the victorious 1945 became the military commandant of Berlin. A note in which he gives the command to the remnants of this division, which does not exist after two days: to collect the remnants of the personnel and withdraw them for reorganization.

**I would like to explain to our listeners that in your book "June 22" you analyze in detail and destroy the thesis known to all of us from school that the Soviet Union was technically unprepared for war and that in June 1941 it was armed with much worse than Germany. You prove that everything was exactly the opposite.**

There is not the slightest

merit or novelty in this case. Because it's a fact. You see, the Copernican hypothesis is a brilliant scientific insight. We see that the sun is moving, and that we are moving around the sun - we need to think of it before.

And the question of who had more of what is a matter of knowledge of facts and documents. As far as I remember, at least in 1988-89, already 20 years ago, the real numbers of the number of Soviet mechanized corps, tanks, armored vehicles, trucks, aircraft were first published. That is, by the beginning of the 90s, all this factual material was available, it was published by many historians. Once again I draw attention to the wonderful work of Meltyukhov, the book was called "Stalin's Missed Chance". So there is nothing new here. Perhaps I just took a closer look at this fact. Everyone saw that the Germans in the South

The Western Front, that is, in Ukraine, there were, relatively speaking, 750 tanks, and in all the mechanized corps of the South-Western Front there were 5 and a half thousand of them. It seems to be clear that five and a half thousand is more than 700, but if you pay attention to this fact, you can think

about it. **Another important detail from the book "June 22": you are considering the mysteries of the beginning of the war, when, it would seem, there were clear signs that someone from the Soviet command worked for Hitler, gave orders contrary to Soviet interests - on the Brest Fortress, for example. And you write "I do not believe." I think it's important that our listeners understand that you are by no means a conspiracy theorist.**

Of course, no conspiracy theories are needed, because the military catastrophe of the summer of 1941 is an event of such magnitude that, in my understanding, simply cannot fit into the framework of any conspiracy schemes. Because such a catastrophe, such a defeat, such a collapse is always the result of some huge tectonic forces, and not a conspiracy of three or four intruders.

**And why is the truth about the reasons for the defeat of 1941 so difficult to discover? And this state has been gone for a long time, and all the generals have long been in the grave, and you constantly complain in your books that many documents are classified. What and why**

**are they hiding? Is there any rational explanation?** You have asked a very interesting question, but it is multi-layered. Now I'll try to cut it into layers. As for the question of what happened in the summer of 1941, there is an answer to it. There was a rout, a colossal, monstrous rout. A huge amount of equipment was abandoned, about 10-12 thousand tanks within one month, a comparable figure of aircraft within a month and a half, the total number of prisoners and deserters in the summer and autumn of 1941 is twice the initial strength of the active army, that is, five western military districts at the time of 22 June. I have a chapter in a book called So Much and So Much Again. That's how much it was, a little over three million, and once again so much - this is the number of Red Army soldiers who were captured or

deserted. There is no mystery here, all these figures and facts are there, they are no longer disputed by anyone. The reason

why this happened, its assessment will always be a matter of hypothesis. In this case, this is not a question of archives, in no archive is that piece of paper on which it is written that the catastrophe of 1941 occurred for this and that reason. There is no such paper, we will not find it. But it seems to me that the facts that are already known, which are given on a huge number of pages of my books, are quite enough to come to a conclusion. There are some very clear things. We see that the Red Army has lost 6.3 million small arms in six months. Small arms do not break in such quantities. There are statistics on the structure of losses. For example, the Central Front in the region of Bryansk and Gomel during the 40 days of its existence lost 11 times more

missing persons than those killed and killed. There are absolutely colossal, long-known numbers of prisoners. They are known both from our documents and from German documents. There is a fairly well-known, well-known history of Soviet mechanized corps, which lost 80 percent of their tanks in two, three, four days without coming into fire contact with the enemy. Tanks do not break in such

quantities.

In September 1939, the Red Army, on the same terrain, in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, smashed the remnants of the Polish army, did what is called the "liberation" of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. And in two weeks, on the same terrain, in the same weather conditions, 10-12 percent of tanks were broken in different mechanized brigades. Such a range. Well, one tenth is broken. And such that in three or four days 80 percent of the tanks from among those that were considered serviceable broke down - this does not happen. Therefore, on the one hand, it seems to me that there is more than enough, an excessive amount of indirect evidence that this whole mountain of weapons was thrown, but if we want to get documentary, in the narrowest sense of the word, confirmation of this hypothesis, we will not find it never.

Documentary evidence can only be a newsreel with sound, with a date counter in the corner, which shows



how a soldier of the Red Army abandons a tank, swearing obscenely, gets out of this tank and goes towards the nearest forest. We will never find such a newsreel for each of the 10-12 thousand tanks, and if we find it, they will tell us that this is a montage. Therefore, in my opinion, in this case, the problem of archives will change little. We have enough facts. The problem is different. Society,

modern Russian, former Soviet, lacks the courage or desire to recognize these facts. Over the years, I have received an infinite number of e-mails, and an infinite number of discussions of my books and articles, and I see that some people simply write in the most direct text - "you all go" and say that "I don't need any of the truth of Solonin, no other truth, I don't want to think about what my grandfather did, I want to love my grandfather." As a human being, this is an absolutely normal position, there is no need to even object to it. But, probably, at some stage it is necessary to reach the level when love and respect for grandfather are still shared (an absolutely necessary property of every person, grandfather must be loved, respected and helped) and the readiness to look with a normal look, without rose-colored glasses on the history of their country. **I noticed that you often refer to the "Military**

**History Journal", but mostly to the issues of 1989-91. And the last time we all saw a mention of this magazine in the news was quite recently, in connection with an article that caused a scandalous resonance, which said that Poland was almost to blame for the fact that Hitler attacked her. Therefore, I want to ask you what happened to this main professional journal of military historians after perestroika?** I would love to reformat your question. In my opinion, it should sound like this: what happened in 1989-91, when this company of

people who made their careers, biographies and, excuse me, apartments in Moscow and big money, what happened to them that they suddenly began to publish documents and began to publish - yes, with all the reservations, with all the peculiarities of style - after all, some serious articles? What hit them that they took at the beginning of 1992, in the 1st and 2nd

issues, published those very famous "May 1941 Considerations" on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army, where it was written in black and white that it was not necessary to give the initiative to the German army and, of course, it was necessary to strike the first blow. I wonder what happened to them that they suddenly began to at least to some extent publish real documentary evidence? For me, this is somewhat of a mystery. Maybe they felt or it seemed to them that the government was changing? A wonderful book by

Alexander Gogun has recently been published, the title is terrible, the tabloid "Stalin's commandos", but under this tabloid title is the most valuable work on the partisan movement in Ukraine. It contains data obtained by another Ukrainian researcher; he analyzed 302 personal files of policemen and some middle-level leaders of the police created by the Germans in the occupied territory of Ukraine, and, if my memory serves me right, every fourth is a former NKVD officer, a former party member or a former secretary of a district party committee. Even like this.

That is, there is a certain part of the people who are in a hurry to testify their respect to any new government as quickly as possible. As you and I remember, in August 1991, it seemed to some, including me, that the government was changing, but everyone reacted to it in their own way. So they decided to pay their respects to the new government. Then it turned out that the government does not change, everything is in its place, only they are now called differently. Now not the first secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU, but the head of the regional administration. Accordingly, the fright passed, and everything returned to normal. The current state of Soviet and Russian military history, the Institute of Military History, the Academy of Military Sciences, headed by Comrade Gareev, is their normal, natural state. What happened to them in 1989-91 was such a historical jump. **And the new historiography of**

**the war, which you spoke about at the beginning of our conversation, is it you and Suvorov, or are there many other researchers, and you feel that your ranks are also quite large?**  
There

can even be no talk of having two, three or four surnames. For example, five collections have already been published under

titled "The Truth of Viktor Suvorov". Again, the name is yellow, tabloid, created by the marketing department, nevertheless, five thick books have been published, collections of articles by various authors living in Russia, Ukraine, America, Europe, where they just do not live, writing in different languages, including those who have never been a Soviet person at all, born Americans and Germans, that is, these are already dozens of authors who are forming this new historiography of the war. Recently, from these five collections, a collection was published in Germany, the first sign in German under the title "Nine Russian Historians Accuse Stalin." Of course, not two or three names. There are numerous serious works.

And someone, for some reason, leaves the conclusion of a global order, but in any case develops some layers, specific stories, continuously new facts are introduced, events are comprehended in a new way. There are already normal, professionally made descriptions of most of the military operations of the same 1941, serious works on the history of intelligence, on the prehistory of the war, on Soviet military planning. Of course, it is necessary to mention the name of the now deceased Colonel Bobylev. An official man, a military historian, nevertheless, he did excellent work on the analysis of Soviet military planning, in particular, the analysis of the military-strategic game of the General Staff, which was held in January 1941, in fact, then the plan for the invasion of Europe was being worked out. There are dozens of families. **Now we have come to the plot of your book "June 23: M-Day". You said that you are not arguing with Viktor Suvorov, but are continuing his work. I would like to**

**clarify what you and Suvorov agree on, what you disagree on, and, in general, forgive me for such a personal question, are you friends?**  
We are with Victor Suvorov in the kindest

relations, unfortunately, they are in absentia, but he tells me quite often calls, we have completely normal, one might say, friendly relations. Unfortunately, we have not yet had the opportunity to drink brotherhood, I think we have everything ahead. Now for the serious question. I can put it very clearly in a few words. Viktor Suvorov put forward

the hypothesis that Stalin planned to launch a large-scale strategic and offensive operation from the western borders of the Soviet Union into Europe in the summer of 1941. I fully agree with this. Victor Suvorov confirmed his hypothesis with the tiny number of scraps that he had at his disposal at that time, slipping out like the tip of an awl from a bag, some scraps of Soviet memoirs, some half-closed publications. I still wrote 15 years later than the first edition of Icebreaker came out, I had the opportunity to confirm the same hypothesis with a completely different archive of documentary material.

The second hypothesis put forward by Viktor Suvorov is that the Red Army suffered a crushing defeat in the summer of 1941 because it was preparing for an offensive and was unable to defend itself. I categorically disagree with this, I believe that even one percent of common sense does not exist in this hypothesis. Viktor Suvorov knows my opinion on this very well. We did not agree with him. I think that this is a completely frivolous idea. Not a single offensive operation of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 ended in anything but the heaviest losses. Therefore, the Red Army, of course, in the state in which it was, was not capable of either attacking or defending, and this, in my opinion, is very interestingly written in my book June 25th. Sorry for this publicity. It shows very interestingly how the Red Army tried to inflict a crushing blow on Finnish airfields, as a result of this crushing blow they lost 24 of their own bombers and damaged one aircraft at Finnish airfields - a captured Soviet SB. So I absolutely, categorically disagree with this, the second component of Suvorov's hypothesis. **Let's talk then, since you mentioned the book "June 25", about the second Soviet-Finnish war. It can be said that since childhood I lived**

**against the backdrop of this war, because my dacha is located near Leningrad and the old Finnish border (by the way, it has not yet been completely dismantled, wire barriers stretch through the forest in some places) passed right through my dacha site. Near my veranda there was an old Finnish bunker, and there we dug up shells and bones. But I can't say that before your book, I**

**knew something about the second Soviet-Finnish war, because this is probably the first monograph in Russia about completely forgotten events.**

In this case, I am forced to discard the remnants of any modesty and say yes. It got to the point that when I worked in the Podolsky archive, on many documents, in particular maps of military operations that I took from the archive, my signature was the first in the form. Actually, do you have any idea what this is about? For 60 years, hundreds of doctors of historical sciences did not even care to take and look at these maps and documents. In some cases, there were two or three more names, but no one seriously dealt with this topic, the war was completely deleted from Soviet historiography, from the historical memory of the people. If once there was some mention, it was only in the context of "the participation of the Finnish military in Hitler's aggression against the Soviet Union." It is clear why no one wanted to remember this war. Because it is one thing to look for and

find objective reasons why the most powerful German army won (indeed, the first-year Hitler Wehrmacht is the best land army of the 20th century) and why the Red Army was beaten and defeated by such an enemy. There is another explanation to be found here. But how to explain with something other than a lack of motivation, the defeat that the Finnish army inflicted on the Red Army, an army in which mobile units rode bicycles? This is not an exaggeration or a joke. They had two mobile formations - what the Germans had, say, a tank division, then the Finns had a jaeger brigade, the mobility of which was achieved due to the fact that they rode bicycles along the forest paths. There is even a corresponding newsreel. And here is a story about how Finnish cyclists smashed Soviet mechanized corps, this, of course, is a story that no one wanted

recall.

**But if there hadn't been this war, perhaps there would have been no blockade**

**of Leningrad?** Undoubtedly. But here it is necessary to remove any "would". Of course, if there had not been this war, then the blockade of Leningrad would not have happened and could not have happened. Because Leningrad is not located on a peninsula, there is the Finlyandsky railway station, the same one to which Vladimir Ilyich arrived in a sealed carriage, a railway tape ap

Therefore, if it were not for the war with Finland, then the fact that the Germans reached the southern suburbs of Leningrad, that they cut the railway at Mga, that they left at the Mga station to Lake Ladoga, could not have created any blockade, because from the north to A branch of the railway through Kexholm, Petrozavodsk and further, anywhere suits Leningrad.

Only because there was a second Soviet-Finnish war, the blockade of Leningrad became possible, all this is a nightmare and the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Moreover, Comrade Stalin could stop this whole nightmare with one political decision. Even before the start of the war (then the price of the issue would have been different), but even after the start, it would still be possible to agree. In fact, from the end of the autumn of 1941, there was already a de facto truce there, although it was not fixed in any way, and if the Soviet Union recognized the right of Finland to take away those territories that became annexed in 1940 as a result of the first war, if on these conditions succeeded - and I think it was quite realistic - to reach a peaceful agreement, at least a truce with Finland under the guarantees of the Western allies, that is, the British and Americans, then it would be possible to restore the railway connection with Leningrad, and we would not know the words "Leningrad Siege", and we would not understand what the Piskarevskoye cemetery means. **Since**

**we have already started talking in the subjunctive mood, another hypothetical question. The publicist and military expert Alexander Khramchikhin recently raised the following question: Stalin planned to start a war with Germany, Suvorov is right here, and so are you, but maybe it would be better for the fate of the world - there would be no Auschwitz ...**

**Have you thought?** Yes, indeed, there is something to think about. With all my deep and long-standing dislike for Comrade Stalin, I still cannot put on the same scale the death of tens of millions of people, on the one hand, and the reputational successes of Comrade Stalin. To hell with him, it would be better if Comrade Stalin got something else in his reputation and would increase his political capitalization, as they say now, if at this price it would be possible to save tens of millions of people who died in these four years. Yes of course it would be better for

all from a normal, human, humanistic position, if in May 1940 Stalin stabbed Hitler in the back.

And then Hitler's back was very frail, everything that he had more or less combat-ready was thrown to the Western Front, that is, to invade France, Holland and Belgium. Throughout the vast stretch of Eastern Europe there were seven German divisions, formed from reservists of a very low level of training, there was not a single aircraft in all German air defense districts, and only in Berlin there was a single fighter group, where there were 43 serviceable Messerschmitts. And in one of the books I wrote that against one "Messerschmitt" there were two Soviet bomber regiments. With such forces, Comrade Stalin could have stabbed his friend Hitler in the back in May 1940. Yes, of course, in this case, Eastern Europe, and not only Eastern Europe, would have ended up in the clutches of Comrade Stalin a few years earlier. But if at such a price it would be possible to save tens of millions of human lives, then, of course, I am FOR it. **The article published on your website about the so-called**

**“feast of the winners”, about what happened in East Prussia after the entry of Soviet troops, evoked a lot of responses, and I hoped that you were working on this story and the next book would be on this topic. But you said that there are not enough materials and the article will remain an article. In that case, what will be your next subject or do you intend to continue to develop the plots of 1941?**

I'm not a poet or a writer, so my next topics are determined not by the flight of inspiration, but by access to certain information layers. You asked a very good question at the beginning of our conversation about what was happening with the Military Historical Journal and other official journals. That is, at the turn of the 1980-90s, there was a certain ejection of lava from the volcano, it is always very short, a small amount of mass, material flies out. There was a kind of release, and in these few years a certain volume, an array of documents, became available. This array of documents was comprehended, thought over, processed by those historians, about whom I said that they are forming a new historiography of the war. This documentary array of information has already been processed and

meaningful. You can, of course, write the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth books, but this is unlikely to be interesting or necessary for anyone. And the next leap, the next stage in the development of this new historiography of the war, in my opinion, will become possible only when the next information release occurs, that is, for this it is necessary once again to lift the statue of Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky with the help of a cable and a crane.

**It is unlikely that this will happen in the near future, although who knows. I looked at what they write in Internet forums and discussions about your books, and, frankly, I felt sorry for you, because there is so much hatred and vicious feedback, often from people who have not read books, but are sure that you are the enemy. Of course, the author cannot be pleased that his books are discussed by wild people who have barely mastered the letter. So the question is: how do you see your ideal reader? Who is this: a student interested in history, an elderly man, most of whose life was spent in Soviet times? Who are your books for?**

First, I want to draw your attention to the fact that you, for obvious reasons, do not see the control panel of my site. On my site there are hundreds of letters written in absolutely adequate language, from people, as I understand it, of various ages, many of them are even suitable for my grandfathers, who speak very, very warmly about my books and thank me. For which we thank them. Therefore, I am quite calm about the hysterical reaction of people who did not even hold my books in their hands, but they heard from Vasya that there is such a Russophobe, an agent of the CIA, Mossad and Mi-6 at the same time as Solonin. As for who they are written for, it is

clear that they are written for a person of any age, any educational level, I tried my best to somehow strike a balance so that the book was written in human language, so that it could be read, including a reader who does not have many years of experience working with documents, texts, and so on, but at the same time, for each figure and each fact, there should be a link to some collection of documents.

I heard another hidden question in your words, I can answer it. People of the older generation, and precisely those



who are eyewitnesses of the war, participants in the war - at least a very significant part of them - have a quite positive attitude towards my books. I must tell you that the detractors consist of approximately two age groups. This is Moscow's "office plankton" 20-25 years old, who grew up in the era of \$ 147 per barrel, in an era when Russia, along with the price of a barrel of oil, "got up from its knees." So they became absolutely cool patriots. Moreover, what is interesting, I have already noticed this, is simply a tough dependence: the more patriotic the squealer is on the Internet, so he will definitely have an English-language or German-language login; he will never call himself Vasya, but some Red Rat or something like that. And plus those people whom I for myself call the word

"veteran of lectures in the Red Corner." That is, a person who is now 60-70 years old. You see, the arithmetic is simple. Of course, he didn't see the war, and he didn't see the post-war years either, but he attended lectures in the Red Corner for decades, he listened to what the party organizer said in the shop, he listened to what was said at the solemn meeting dedicated to the next anniversary Victories, and these "Veterans of the Red Corner" really have a very negative attitude towards any, not only mine, attempts to revise established myths. As for the veterans of the war, who drank it all themselves, then - believe

me, in this case I'm not talking about my ambitions, I'm talking about the assessment of views - I was approached by people who I fit as grandchildren, who thanked me, who they told me with tears in their eyes that they were grateful that on the threshold of their lives they could finally see that the truth about the war was written on paper, that it did not need to be passed from mouth to mouth, closing the door. I received letters from people who wrote: "My mother died in the Leningrad blockade, what a pity that she did not live to see and could not read your book "June 25". I repeat once again, I'm not talking about my ambitions and my author's pleasure, I'm talking about the fact that in fact the people of that generation, war veterans, are not "veterans of lectures in the Red Corner" - I did not conduct sociological research, but some part, of course, - they waited and wanted to live to see the day when they finally begin to speak, write, and discuss the truth about the war in public, openly and without fear.

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<b>notes</b>
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# Notes

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